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Mallory
Malware

Pysa

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK46Techniques
IOCs114Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningBrute forceExtortion
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
WindowsLinuxEsxi

PYSA, also known as Mespinoza, is a human-operated ransomware family used in financially motivated attacks against government entities, educational institutions, healthcare organizations, and private companies. Mespinoza has been observed since at least October 2018, with the PYSA variant documented from December 2019. Victims have included French local authorities and educational institutions in the United States and United Kingdom. Windows payloads are well documented, and the operation has also developed Linux encryptors for VMware ESXi environments. The analyzed ransomware payloads do not self-propagate.

PYSA operators gain initial access through phishing and compromised credentials, including brute-forced Active Directory and RDP credentials. Intrusions involve hands-on reconnaissance, credential dumping with Mimikatz, network discovery with Advanced IP Scanner and Advanced Port Scanner, and lateral movement through RDP and PsExec. PowerShell scripts support ransomware deployment, disable security software, and delete restore points and shadow copies. Operators steal data before encryption using tools including WinSCP and PowerShell scripts that identify sensitive folders through predefined keywords. Stolen financial, personal, credential, and internal business information supports ransom valuation and double extortion through threats of disclosure or sale.

The C++ Windows implementation uses the CryptoPP library and hybrid encryption, combining AES-CBC for file contents with RSA to protect encryption keys and initialization vectors. It enumerates fixed drives, processes drives concurrently, and excludes selected system-critical files and directories. Additional Python-based variants have also been observed. PYSA creates ransom notes, modifies Windows legal-notice settings to display its demands, and uses cleanup scripts to delete its executable and associated artifacts. Payloads have also masqueraded as legitimate Windows components to evade detection.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

46 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These brute-force attacks were followed by the exfiltration of a company's accounts & passwords database. Victim organizations also reported seeing unauthorized RDP connections to their domain controllers

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

PYSA typically gains unauthorized access to victim networks by compromising Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials and/or through phishing emails.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

...обманных загрузок... вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов, фальшивых обновлений, перепакованных и заражённых инсталляторов.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

...ботнетов, эксплойтов...

T1566PhishingEvidence4

The PYSA ransomware operators typically gain initial access to target systems through phishing email messages or by compromising credentials...

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Victim organizations also reported seeing unauthorized RDP connections to their domain controllers, and the deployment of Batch and PowerShell scripts.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence9

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has used Powershell scripts to deploy its ransomware.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Victim organizations also reported seeing unauthorized RDP connections to their domain controllers, and the deployment of Batch and PowerShell scripts.

T1059.006PythonEvidence3

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has used Python scripts to deploy ransomware.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1106Native APIEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Execution ... Native API ... These are drives for which the Windows API function GetDriveTypeW returns 0x3 (DRIVE_FIXED)...

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений, обманных загрузок...

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence4

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has used [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to copy and execute the ransomware.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These brute-force attacks were followed by the exfiltration of a company's accounts & passwords database. Victim organizations also reported seeing unauthorized RDP connections to their domain controllers

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence12

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has modified the registry key “SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System” and added the ransom note.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

PYSA typically gains unauthorized access to victim networks by compromising Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials and/or through phishing emails.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These brute-force attacks were followed by the exfiltration of a company's accounts & passwords database. Victim organizations also reported seeing unauthorized RDP connections to their domain controllers

Stealth

6 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has executed a malicious executable by naming it svchost.exe.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

the Pysa gang also deployed a version of the PowerShell Empire penetration-testing tool, stopped various antivirus products, and even uninstalled Windows Defender in some instances.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has deleted batch files after execution. (Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These brute-force attacks were followed by the exfiltration of a company's accounts & passwords database. Victim organizations also reported seeing unauthorized RDP connections to their domain controllers

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

By targeting virtual machines, ransomware operators can also encrypt multiple servers at once with a single command. In June, researchers spotted a new REvil ransomware Linux encryptor designed to target VMware ESXi virtual machines, a popular enterprise virtual machine platform.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence12

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has modified the registry key “SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System” and added the ransom note.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence10

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has the capability to stop antivirus services and disable Windows Defender.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Multiple actors and tools are described as using Mimikatz/Windows Credential Editor/LaZagne/ProcDump to “dump credentials,” often by targeting LSASS memory (e.g., “used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials,” “dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function,” “injecting itself into lsass.exe”).

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence3

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) can perform OS credential dumping using [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1110Brute ForceEvidence7

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has used brute force attempts against a central management console, as well as some Active Directory accounts.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence4

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has extracted credentials from the password database before encrypting the files.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

AADInternals can gather unsecured credentials for Azure AD services, such as Azure AD Connect, from a local machine... Agent Tesla has the ability to extract credentials from configuration or support files... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials.

Discovery

8 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The p.ps1 script is used to kill or terminate services which may interfere with the encryption process. It also attempts to identify specific anti-virus applications.

T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1012 --> Query Registry --> Discovery

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) can perform network reconnaissance using the Advanced IP Scanner tool.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence8

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) can perform network reconnaissance using the Advanced Port Scanner tool.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

Le script « step1.ps1 » est chargé de lister les fichiers présents sur le système.

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Of course Mespinoza won't stop with the system drive so it will check for connected removable media or shared network drives. GetDriveTypeW will tell it which type of media the selected device belongs to.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Of course Mespinoza won't stop with the system drive so it will check for connected removable media or shared network drives.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

By targeting virtual machines, ransomware operators can also encrypt multiple servers at once with a single command. In June, researchers spotted a new REvil ransomware Linux encryptor designed to target VMware ESXi virtual machines, a popular enterprise virtual machine platform.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Victim organizations also reported seeing unauthorized RDP connections to their domain controllers

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence7

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has laterally moved using RDP connections.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

"PsExec ... can be used to execute binaries on remote systems using a temporary Windows service"; "RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new service on the remote system"; "Winexe installs a service on the remote system, executes the command, then uninstalls the service"

Collection

2 techniques
T1074Data StagedEvidence2

more and more ransomware gangs prefer to steal the data before encrypting it, to use it as leverage in ransom negotiations

T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1114 --> Email Collection --> Collection

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

These brute-force attacks were followed by the exfiltration of a company's accounts & passwords database.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

...the FBI reports that malicious actors use the WinScp tool for data exfiltration from victim systems before the data is encrypted.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

On top of client applications such as those provided by Mega, many ransomware families may use other software or built-in operating system utilities to exfiltrate data. We’ll use Mega as the example here... you can look for execution of any process that is not chrome.exe ... initiating a network connection to the domains mega.io or mega.co.nz .

T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage SitesEvidence1

As 14 ransomware gangs are now stealing data and publishing it in their blogs, we can assume that more ransomware operators will adopt the tactic and will require double ransoms.

Impact

6 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence12

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has used RSA and AES-CBC encryption algorithm to encrypt a list of targeted file extensions.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1489Service StopEvidence6

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) can stop services and processes.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence8

[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) has the functionality to delete shadow copies.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

T1531Account Access RemovalEvidence1

La modification du mot de passe des comptes locaux [T1498].

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

BlackByte Ransomware modifies the victim Registry to prevent system recovery; ShrinkLocker modifies various registry keys associated with system logon and BitLocker functionality to effectively lock-out users following disk encryption.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Вымогатели, распространяющие Mespinoza-Pysa, стали угрожать опубликовать украденные данные с целью усиления давления на жертву... для этого операторы-вымогатели начинают кражу данных ещё перед шифрованием файлов.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

114 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching114Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping46Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.