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Malware1 associated actor

Eternidade Stealer

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK58Techniques
IOCs52Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injectionSpoofing
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Eternidade Stealer is a Delphi-based banking trojan targeting Microsoft Windows users, primarily in Brazil. Publicly documented in November 2025, it is used in financially motivated campaigns to steal credentials for banking portals, payment services, cryptocurrency exchanges, and wallets. Initial campaigns restrict execution to systems configured for Brazilian Portuguese. Later analyzed payloads contain banking-targeting references covering Brazil, Portugal, Argentina, and Mexico. No specific named threat group has been conclusively attributed to the malware.

Distribution relies on Portuguese-language WhatsApp phishing messages and malicious attachments. Campaigns pair a Python-based worm that abuses existing WhatsApp Web sessions to harvest contacts and distribute personalized messages with a separate installation chain for the banking trojan. This chain uses obfuscated Visual Basic scripts, malicious MSI installers, AutoIt loaders, and encrypted, compressed payloads. Observed chains establish persistence through registry autorun entries and deploy the final payload through process hollowing into legitimate Windows processes. Supporting components profile the host, enumerate security software, and monitor banking-related activity.

Eternidade continuously monitors application windows and running processes for financial targets, then supports operator-controlled credential-harvesting overlays that imitate legitimate banking interfaces. Its remote-control functions include screenshots and screen streaming, keystroke logging, keyboard and mouse control, clipboard retrieval and replacement, file upload and exfiltration, directory enumeration, shell command execution, and window manipulation. It can display distracting or blocking overlays and delete its own payload on command.

A distinguishing feature is dynamic command-and-control discovery through an email inbox accessed using IMAP over TLS and embedded credentials. The malware extracts an updated server address from messages and uses an embedded fallback address if discovery fails. Operational communications use a separate TCP protocol with dedicated channels for commands, file transfers, input and clipboard activity, and screen images.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Saci

"...a Delphi-based banking trojan named Eternidade Stealer..."; "A Delphi-based credential stealer, Eternidade continuously scans active windows and running processes for strings related to banking portals, payment services, and cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

58 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Previous campaigns observed through 2024 and 2025... show a clear evolution from simple phishing links to complex social engineering schemes involving fake government programs, delivery notifications, and even fraudulent investment groups shared through WhatsApp messages and groups.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Esta campanha consiste na entrega de um arquivo .zip malicioso... O artefato .vbs malicioso presente no .zip entregue as vítimas... Ele é recebido por meio de mensagem instantânea, de um dispositivo que já foi infectado anteriormente pelo WhatsWorm.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Mac users are encountering deceptive websites—often through Google Ads or malicious advertisements... During November 2025, Microsoft Defender Experts identified a WhatsApp platform abuse campaign... sends malicious attachments to all contacts using predefined messaging templates.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Eternidade Stealer: New Python WhatsApp Worm Uses IMAP Email for Covert C2 and Brazilian Bank Overlays

Execution

8 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

These campaigns leverage fileless execution, native macOS utilities, and AppleScript automation... Execution of various commands and scripts via osascript and sh.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The activity begins with an obfuscated Visual Basic script that drops a malicious batch file launching PowerShell instances to download payloads.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence4

The operator sends the command line to be executed, which is concatenated with the command line 'cmd.exe /C'.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence7

The installer executes a CustomAction that writes the binary csrss_svc.log to one of five possible directories, selected at random via a Visual Basic Script.

T1059.006PythonEvidence3

The WhatsApp worm used in the campaign is written in Python... The dropper also installs the necessary Python dependencies for the payloads to run successfully.

T1059.010AutoHotKey & AutoITEvidence2

The .msi drops a series of files and establishes a persistence mechanism that runs an AutoIT interpreter whenever the system restarts.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Eternidade Stealer, which is distributed through WhatsApp hijacking and social engineering lures.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The campaign begins via an obfuscated VBScript... When executed, the script drops a batch file that downloads and executes payloads: a WhatsApp-propagating worm and an MSI installer that deploys a Delphi-based banking trojan.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

The orchestrator creates registry keys ... specifically, WorkDir and DmpPath under HKCU\Software\MyApp\Config.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The .msi establishes persistence in the Run registry key.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The decrypted .tda file is a Delphi-compiled injector that performs process hollowing to run the final payload.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence7

Loading it via process hollowing into the RegSvcs.exe process.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The .msi establishes persistence in the Run registry key.

Stealth

14 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Attacks involved the use of an obfuscated VBScript loading a Python-based WhatsApp worm

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence2

It is possible to observe, in a structured manner, the embedded binaries and actions performed during the installation of this .msi file.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2

A custom XOR-based cipher with a 16-bit key / state that changes with each byte.

T1027.015CompressionEvidence2

A custom XOR decryption routine followed by decompression using the LZNT1 algorithm via the RtlDecompressFragment API.

T1036.008Masquerade File TypeEvidence2

The csrss_svc.log file ... is an AutoIt script containing 10 Base64 data blocks.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The decrypted .tda file is a Delphi-compiled injector that performs process hollowing to run the final payload.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence7

Loading it via process hollowing into the RegSvcs.exe process.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

<|DELETEDKL|>: this command is a remote self-removal or cleanup instruction.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4

Decoded at runtime and written to disk with the .au3 extension, and executed at the end.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

executando-o por meio do msiexec.exe... msiexec.exe /i instalador.msi /qn /norestart

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Such a behavior reflects a classic banker or overlay-stealer tactic, where malicious components lie dormant until the victim opens a targeted banking or wallet application, ensuring the attack triggers only in relevant contexts and remains invisible to casual users or sandbox environments.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware only targets Brazilian victims by checking the OS language. If the system is not detected as Brazilian Portuguese, it displays an error message and aborts execution.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

O script AutoIT irá... executá-lo em memória, por meio da técnica de Reflective DLL Injection... O script AutoIT implementa a técnica de injeção via Reflective DLL.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

Trustwave SpiderLabs researchers have recently identified a banking Trojan we dubbed Eternidade Stealer, which is distributed through WhatsApp hijacking and social engineering lures.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

The orchestrator creates registry keys ... specifically, WorkDir and DmpPath under HKCU\Software\MyApp\Config.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Other commands observed are: activating keylogging features

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

<|MONKEYTURE|>: Collects locally captured password/input text and returns it with a marker such as <|SendSenha|>.

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence2

These commands primarily control fake banking overlays and credential-collection UI.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence3

This command allows the threat actor to send a custom overlay for fake inputs to steal credentials... create fake password input fields and submit button that is positioned over legitimate banking windows.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

From the enumerated windows, the stealer specifically looks for applications associated with Brazilian banks, payment services, and cryptocurrency wallets/exchanges to target for credential harvesting.

Discovery

11 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence4

The orchestrator then monitors open program windows related to the banking applications.

T1012Query RegistryEvidence3

First Eternidade checks if it’s in block state query Bloqueado value on the registry key \Software\MinhaAplicacao.

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

It contains functions that gather system telemetry, the external IP via an api.ipify.org call, and local IP collection

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Gathered information: Computer name OS version and build Username

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence5

The code locates a RegSvcs.exe process in order to inject the next stage into its memory space.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

System information, such as the public IPv4 address, operating system versions, and other details.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

The <|Folder|> command aims to enumerate directories in the file system.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Such a behavior reflects a classic banker or overlay-stealer tactic, where malicious components lie dormant until the victim opens a targeted banking or wallet application, ensuring the attack triggers only in relevant contexts and remains invisible to casual users or sandbox environments.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware only targets Brazilian victims by checking the OS language. If the system is not detected as Brazilian Portuguese, it displays an error message and aborts execution.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence3

The script enumerates running processes and registry uninstall keys to detect installed security products. It also utilizes WMI to enumerate antivirus (AV)/firewall/anti-spyware products

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence3

The malware only targets Brazilian victims by checking the OS language.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

leverages WPPConnect to automate message sending from hijacked WhatsApp accounts, harvests the victim’s contact list, and sends malicious attachments to all contacts using predefined messaging templates.

Collection

8 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

It loads the requested local file into a stream ... and initiates the file content transfer to operator.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Other commands observed are: activating keylogging features

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

<|MONKEYTURE|>: Collects locally captured password/input text and returns it with a marker such as <|SendSenha|>.

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence2

These commands primarily control fake banking overlays and credential-collection UI.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence3

This command allows the threat actor to send a custom overlay for fake inputs to steal credentials... create fake password input fields and submit button that is positioned over legitimate banking windows.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

GETPRINTDESKTOP: obtain a full screenshot of the victim’s desktop.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

<|ClipBoadV|> ... can retrieve or replace clipboard content.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

which facilitated automated WhatsApp messaging, contact list extraction, and malicious file delivery

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

If the malware cannot connect to the email account, it uses a hardcoded fallback C2 address.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

It uses Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) to dynamically retrieve command-and-control (C2) addresses

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

After collection, the orchestrator is sent via an HTTP POST request.

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence5

The malware attempts to dynamically obtain the C2 address via an IMAP connection on TCP port 993.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

A proprietary C2 protocol based on TCP and text-based delimiters.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

The <|UploadFile|> command allow[s] the operator [to] place a file supplied by the operator onto the victim’s filesystem.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

One notable feature of this malware is that it uses hardcoded credentials to log into its email account, from which it retrieves its C2 server. It is a very clever way to update its C2... If the malware cannot connect to the email account, it uses a hardcoded fallback C2 address.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

The following shows the procedure for retrieving the C2 server from the email: 1. Connect to the IMAP server via SSL (Port 993) using hardcoded credentials.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

De maneira automatizada, o WhatsWorm e o script AutoIT implementa a capacidade de envio de informações das vítimas.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

<|DownloadFile|>: this command allow[s] the operator to exfiltrate a selected file from the victim to the operator.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

O objetivo final do adversário, é o roubo de dados bancário, causando prejuízo financeiro a vítima.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

52 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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malware newsNews · Oct 21, 2026Inside Brazil’s Financial Malware Ecosystem: Deep Dive into the Eternidade Stealer - Malware Analysis - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsDelphi-based Windows banking malware distributed primarily through WhatsApp phishing to steal financial credentials and enable operator-directed fraud. The analyzed chain uses a malicious MSI, AutoIt scripts, encrypted and compressed payloads, and a Delphi loader to inject the final payload into RegSvcs.exe through process hollowing. Persistence is established through a registry Run key. Capabilities include screen capture and streaming, keyboard and mouse control, clipboard manipulation, file transfer, shell execution, banking credential overlays, victim communication, screen blocking, and self-deletion. It discovers C2 addresses through an IMAPS mailbox, with a fallback domain, and uses a proprietary TCP protocol with separate command and data channels. The campaign focuses on Brazil, while the payload's banking targets also include institutions in Portugal, Argentina, and Mexico. No specific threat group or exploited vulnerability is identified.Read more ↗0x0d4y blogNews · Oct 21, 2026Inside Brazil’s Financial Malware Ecosystem: Deep Dive into the Eternidade Stealer - 0x0d4y Malware ResearchDelphi-based Windows banking malware, first publicly documented on November 19, 2025, distributed primarily through WhatsApp phishing. The analyzed infection chain uses a malicious MSI, an AutoIt orchestrator, encrypted and compressed payloads, and a Delphi loader to inject the final payload into RegSvcs.exe through process hollowing. It monitors banking windows and supports operator-controlled credential overlays, screen capture and streaming, keyboard and mouse control, clipboard manipulation, file transfer, shell execution, victim messaging, and self-deletion. It discovers C2 addresses through an IMAPS mailbox, with secretonow.site as a fallback, and communicates through a proprietary TCP protocol with separate operational channels. Its objective is banking credential theft and financial fraud; the article lists 95 targeted banks.Read more ↗cloudatg insightsNews · Feb 13, 2026AI Development & Software Engineering | CloudATGDelphi-based banking trojan/stealer distributed via WhatsApp hijacking/social engineering; uses IMAP to retrieve C2 addresses dynamically; targets Brazil.Read more ↗security affairsNews · Feb 4, 2026Microsoft: Info-Stealing malware expands from Windows to macOSInfostealer delivered via a multi-stage chain abusing WhatsApp; uses scripts (VBScript/PowerShell) and a Python component to propagate via hijacked WhatsApp accounts, then installs via MSI to steal banking, payment, and cryptocurrency credentials.Read more ↗
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IOC matching52Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping58Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.