Eternidade Stealer
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injectionSpoofing
- Delivery
- PhishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
Eternidade Stealer is a Delphi-based banking trojan targeting Microsoft Windows users, primarily in Brazil. Publicly documented in November 2025, it is used in financially motivated campaigns to steal credentials for banking portals, payment services, cryptocurrency exchanges, and wallets. Initial campaigns restrict execution to systems configured for Brazilian Portuguese. Later analyzed payloads contain banking-targeting references covering Brazil, Portugal, Argentina, and Mexico. No specific named threat group has been conclusively attributed to the malware.
Distribution relies on Portuguese-language WhatsApp phishing messages and malicious attachments. Campaigns pair a Python-based worm that abuses existing WhatsApp Web sessions to harvest contacts and distribute personalized messages with a separate installation chain for the banking trojan. This chain uses obfuscated Visual Basic scripts, malicious MSI installers, AutoIt loaders, and encrypted, compressed payloads. Observed chains establish persistence through registry autorun entries and deploy the final payload through process hollowing into legitimate Windows processes. Supporting components profile the host, enumerate security software, and monitor banking-related activity.
Eternidade continuously monitors application windows and running processes for financial targets, then supports operator-controlled credential-harvesting overlays that imitate legitimate banking interfaces. Its remote-control functions include screenshots and screen streaming, keystroke logging, keyboard and mouse control, clipboard retrieval and replacement, file upload and exfiltration, directory enumeration, shell command execution, and window manipulation. It can display distracting or blocking overlays and delete its own payload on command.
A distinguishing feature is dynamic command-and-control discovery through an email inbox accessed using IMAP over TLS and embedded credentials. The malware extracts an updated server address from messages and uses an embedded fallback address if discovery fails. Operational communications use a separate TCP protocol with dedicated channels for commands, file transfers, input and clipboard activity, and screen images.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
"...a Delphi-based banking trojan named Eternidade Stealer..."; "A Delphi-based credential stealer, Eternidade continuously scans active windows and running processes for strings related to banking portals, payment services, and cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets..."
Techniques & procedures
58 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
Previous campaigns observed through 2024 and 2025... show a clear evolution from simple phishing links to complex social engineering schemes involving fake government programs, delivery notifications, and even fraudulent investment groups shared through WhatsApp messages and groups.
Esta campanha consiste na entrega de um arquivo .zip malicioso... O artefato .vbs malicioso presente no .zip entregue as vítimas... Ele é recebido por meio de mensagem instantânea, de um dispositivo que já foi infectado anteriormente pelo WhatsWorm.
Mac users are encountering deceptive websites—often through Google Ads or malicious advertisements... During November 2025, Microsoft Defender Experts identified a WhatsApp platform abuse campaign... sends malicious attachments to all contacts using predefined messaging templates.
Eternidade Stealer: New Python WhatsApp Worm Uses IMAP Email for Covert C2 and Brazilian Bank Overlays
Execution
8 techniques
Execution
These campaigns leverage fileless execution, native macOS utilities, and AppleScript automation... Execution of various commands and scripts via osascript and sh.
The activity begins with an obfuscated Visual Basic script that drops a malicious batch file launching PowerShell instances to download payloads.
The operator sends the command line to be executed, which is concatenated with the command line 'cmd.exe /C'.
The installer executes a CustomAction that writes the binary csrss_svc.log to one of five possible directories, selected at random via a Visual Basic Script.
The WhatsApp worm used in the campaign is written in Python... The dropper also installs the necessary Python dependencies for the payloads to run successfully.
The .msi drops a series of files and establishes a persistence mechanism that runs an AutoIT interpreter whenever the system restarts.
Eternidade Stealer, which is distributed through WhatsApp hijacking and social engineering lures.
The campaign begins via an obfuscated VBScript... When executed, the script drops a batch file that downloads and executes payloads: a WhatsApp-propagating worm and an MSI installer that deploys a Delphi-based banking trojan.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
The orchestrator creates registry keys ... specifically, WorkDir and DmpPath under HKCU\Software\MyApp\Config.
The .msi establishes persistence in the Run registry key.
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The decrypted .tda file is a Delphi-compiled injector that performs process hollowing to run the final payload.
Loading it via process hollowing into the RegSvcs.exe process.
The .msi establishes persistence in the Run registry key.
Stealth
14 techniques
Stealth
Attacks involved the use of an obfuscated VBScript loading a Python-based WhatsApp worm
It is possible to observe, in a structured manner, the embedded binaries and actions performed during the installation of this .msi file.
A custom XOR-based cipher with a 16-bit key / state that changes with each byte.
A custom XOR decryption routine followed by decompression using the LZNT1 algorithm via the RtlDecompressFragment API.
The csrss_svc.log file ... is an AutoIt script containing 10 Base64 data blocks.
The decrypted .tda file is a Delphi-compiled injector that performs process hollowing to run the final payload.
Loading it via process hollowing into the RegSvcs.exe process.
<|DELETEDKL|>: this command is a remote self-removal or cleanup instruction.
Decoded at runtime and written to disk with the .au3 extension, and executed at the end.
executando-o por meio do msiexec.exe... msiexec.exe /i instalador.msi /qn /norestart
Such a behavior reflects a classic banker or overlay-stealer tactic, where malicious components lie dormant until the victim opens a targeted banking or wallet application, ensuring the attack triggers only in relevant contexts and remains invisible to casual users or sandbox environments.
The malware only targets Brazilian victims by checking the OS language. If the system is not detected as Brazilian Portuguese, it displays an error message and aborts execution.
O script AutoIT irá... executá-lo em memória, por meio da técnica de Reflective DLL Injection... O script AutoIT implementa a técnica de injeção via Reflective DLL.
Trustwave SpiderLabs researchers have recently identified a banking Trojan we dubbed Eternidade Stealer, which is distributed through WhatsApp hijacking and social engineering lures.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The orchestrator creates registry keys ... specifically, WorkDir and DmpPath under HKCU\Software\MyApp\Config.
Credential Access
5 techniques
Credential Access
Other commands observed are: activating keylogging features
<|MONKEYTURE|>: Collects locally captured password/input text and returns it with a marker such as <|SendSenha|>.
These commands primarily control fake banking overlays and credential-collection UI.
This command allows the threat actor to send a custom overlay for fake inputs to steal credentials... create fake password input fields and submit button that is positioned over legitimate banking windows.
From the enumerated windows, the stealer specifically looks for applications associated with Brazilian banks, payment services, and cryptocurrency wallets/exchanges to target for credential harvesting.
Discovery
11 techniques
Discovery
The orchestrator then monitors open program windows related to the banking applications.
First Eternidade checks if it’s in block state query Bloqueado value on the registry key \Software\MinhaAplicacao.
It contains functions that gather system telemetry, the external IP via an api.ipify.org call, and local IP collection
Gathered information: Computer name OS version and build Username
The code locates a RegSvcs.exe process in order to inject the next stage into its memory space.
System information, such as the public IPv4 address, operating system versions, and other details.
The <|Folder|> command aims to enumerate directories in the file system.
Such a behavior reflects a classic banker or overlay-stealer tactic, where malicious components lie dormant until the victim opens a targeted banking or wallet application, ensuring the attack triggers only in relevant contexts and remains invisible to casual users or sandbox environments.
The malware only targets Brazilian victims by checking the OS language. If the system is not detected as Brazilian Portuguese, it displays an error message and aborts execution.
The script enumerates running processes and registry uninstall keys to detect installed security products. It also utilizes WMI to enumerate antivirus (AV)/firewall/anti-spyware products
The malware only targets Brazilian victims by checking the OS language.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
leverages WPPConnect to automate message sending from hijacked WhatsApp accounts, harvests the victim’s contact list, and sends malicious attachments to all contacts using predefined messaging templates.
Collection
8 techniques
Collection
It loads the requested local file into a stream ... and initiates the file content transfer to operator.
Other commands observed are: activating keylogging features
<|MONKEYTURE|>: Collects locally captured password/input text and returns it with a marker such as <|SendSenha|>.
These commands primarily control fake banking overlays and credential-collection UI.
This command allows the threat actor to send a custom overlay for fake inputs to steal credentials... create fake password input fields and submit button that is positioned over legitimate banking windows.
GETPRINTDESKTOP: obtain a full screenshot of the victim’s desktop.
<|ClipBoadV|> ... can retrieve or replace clipboard content.
which facilitated automated WhatsApp messaging, contact list extraction, and malicious file delivery
Command and Control
8 techniques
Command and Control
If the malware cannot connect to the email account, it uses a hardcoded fallback C2 address.
It uses Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) to dynamically retrieve command-and-control (C2) addresses
After collection, the orchestrator is sent via an HTTP POST request.
The malware attempts to dynamically obtain the C2 address via an IMAP connection on TCP port 993.
A proprietary C2 protocol based on TCP and text-based delimiters.
The <|UploadFile|> command allow[s] the operator [to] place a file supplied by the operator onto the victim’s filesystem.
One notable feature of this malware is that it uses hardcoded credentials to log into its email account, from which it retrieves its C2 server. It is a very clever way to update its C2... If the malware cannot connect to the email account, it uses a hardcoded fallback C2 address.
The following shows the procedure for retrieving the C2 server from the email: 1. Connect to the IMAP server via SSL (Port 993) using hardcoded credentials.
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
De maneira automatizada, o WhatsWorm e o script AutoIT implementa a capacidade de envio de informações das vítimas.
<|DownloadFile|>: this command allow[s] the operator to exfiltrate a selected file from the victim to the operator.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
O objetivo final do adversário, é o roubo de dados bancário, causando prejuízo financeiro a vítima.
Observables
52 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.