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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 3 actors

PowerLess

PowerLess is a PowerShell backdoor associated with APT35 (also known as Charming Kitten/Phosphorus/Mint Sandstorm). It is notable for being written in and executed via PowerShell without invoking powershell.exe. Reported capabilities include encrypted command-and-control communications, a browser information-stealing module that can read Chrome and Edge browser database files, encryption of browser database files prior to exfiltration, and collection of keylogger data. Staged data has been observed in C:\Windows\Temp\cup.tmp for stolen browser data and C:\Windows\Temp\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK for keylogger data. Content also states that APT35 advanced PowerLess from version 3.3.0 to 3.3.4, adding AMSI and ETW bypass techniques, AES-encrypted payload delivery via malicious LNK files, and Telegram-based C2 communication. It has been described as part of APT35 espionage tooling.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Magic Hound

APT35 developed PowerLess (a PowerShell backdoor that executes without invoking powershell.exe) and BellaCiao (a dropper delivering tailored implants based on victim geolocation).

via sysdig blogwebflow.sysdig.com
tunnelvision

"...executed in a somewhat similar manner to how PowerLess, another backdoor used by the group, executes its PowerShell payload."

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Islamic Hacker Army

Their tools include custom backdoors like FalseFont or Powerless for espionage...

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"we have observed wide exploitation of ... recently Log4Shell... focusing around exploitation of VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities."

T1566PhishingEvidence1

“Initial access continued to rely on spear phishing — delivering macro-enabled documents or malicious links …” and “Iranian-linked threat actors have commonly used phishing (T1566) as the primary vector for initial access …”

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

In recent years, Iranian-linked threat actors have commonly used phishing (T1566) as the primary vector for initial access, often leading to execution via user execution (T1204) of malicious files, which tend to rely on the use of command and scripting interpreters (T1059) like PowerShell (T1059.001).

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence6
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

“PowerShell and Cmd serve as the universal backbone for execution across nearly all groups”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

In recent years, Iranian-linked threat actors have commonly used phishing (T1566) as the primary vector for initial access, often leading to execution via user execution (T1204) of malicious files

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

"ADVSTORESHELL encrypts with the 3DES algorithm and a hardcoded key prior to exfiltration."; "Agent Tesla can encrypt data with 3DES..."; "APT32's backdoor has used...RC4 encryption before exfiltration."; "Epic encrypts collected data using a public key framework..."; "Some variants encrypt...with AES and encode it with base64..."; "Prikormka...encrypts it with Blowfish."; "VERMIN encrypts the collected files using 3-DES."; "Zebrocy...RC4...as well as AES...and hexadecimal for encoding"

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The content references collection of credential material from local systems, including "Bumblebee can capture and compress stolen credentials from the Registry and volume shadow copies," "GALLIUM collected ... password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry," and "Windigo has used a script to gather credentials in files left on disk by OpenSSH backdoors."

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Operation MidnightEclipse stole saved cookies and login data from targeted systems; IceApple can collect files, passwords, and other data from a compromised host; RedLine Stealer collected chat logs and files associated with chat services.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

PowerLess has the ability to exfiltrate data, including Chrome and Edge browser database files, from compromised machines. QakBot can use esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge.

Discovery

1 technique
T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

"AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration."; "APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents..."; "Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data..."; "Cadelspy...compress stolen data into a .cab file."; "Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives."; "FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration."; "Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR...archive specified directories in .zip format"; "XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders..."

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Finally, for command and control and exfiltration, Iranian-linked groups most commonly rely on application layer protocols (T1071), such as HTTP

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Reverse Shell #1 uses WebClient UploadFile/DownloadString to "www.microsoft-updateserver[.]cf"; also notes webhook.site for output exfil.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

“BellaCiao (a dropper delivering tailored implants based on victim geolocation)” and “PowerLess (a PowerShell backdoor…)”

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… MacMa has used TLS encryption… Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications…”

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection… Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm…”

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.