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Malware1 associated actor

Maverick

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionSpoofing
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Maverick is a Windows-focused Brazilian banking trojan, first observed in 2024, that targets online banking, cryptocurrency, and payment services. It is associated with the Brazilian cybercrime cluster Water Saci and is considered related to the Coyote and SORVEPOTEL ecosystem, sharing implementation and encryption characteristics while remaining a distinct malware family. Maverick is typically distributed through WhatsApp-based social-engineering campaigns, including worm-like propagation from compromised WhatsApp Web sessions to victims’ contacts. Observed infection chains use archive-contained shortcut payloads, PowerShell, in-memory .NET loading, and encrypted shellcode to minimize disk artifacts. The malware geofences victims for Brazil using locale, regional, timezone, and date-format checks. It monitors supported browsers for visits to targeted Brazilian financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges, then can activate credential-harvesting overlays and remote operator functionality. Supported actions include keylogging, screenshot capture, mouse and keyboard control, screen blocking, process manipulation, browser monitoring, and phishing-window generation. Maverick also uses WhatsApp Web automation to propagate malicious messages through authenticated victim accounts. Persistence has been implemented through user-startup execution mechanisms.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Saci

The malware family is assessed to be a major update of the Maverick, which is known to leverage a worm called SORVEPOTEL to spread via WhatsApp Web to a victim's contacts.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Desktop threats continued to be distributed via traditional delivery methods like malicious emails, compromised websites, and droppers.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This threat group employs a wider-ranging attack model focused on a bespoke delivery and propagation mechanism that includes WhatsApp, ClickFix techniques, and email-centric phishing.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The target field of the LNK file contained an obfuscated Windows command that constructed and ran an initial Base64-encoded PowerShell command.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The archive contained a malicious Windows LNK file that, when launched, initiated a series of malicious PowerShell commands. | The campaign ... seeks to trick users into executing a malicious file attached to a self-spreading message received from a previously infected WhatsApp web session.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

These MSI installer packages are abusing a signed Logitech program called Logi AI Prompt Builder. The malware leverages DLL side-loading against the application to launch a malicious DLL ("screen_retriever_plugin.dll")

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The archive contained a malicious Windows LNK file that, when launched, initiated a series of malicious PowerShell commands.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The archive contained a malicious Windows LNK file that, when launched, initiated a series of malicious PowerShell commands.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Comments written in Portuguese in the PowerShell explicitly stated the author’s defense evasion goals: ... “disable UAC”

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The target field of the LNK file contained an obfuscated Windows command that constructed and ran an initial Base64-encoded PowerShell command.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

Other notable actors included Coyote and emerging families like Maverick, which abused WhatsApp for distribution while maintaining fileless techniques and overlaps with established Brazilian banking malware to steal credentials and enable fraudulent transactions on desktop banking platforms.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Both payloads were delivered via the same C2 infrastructure and only to hosts that passed a set of anti-analysis checks.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

These MSI installer packages are abusing a signed Logitech program called Logi AI Prompt Builder. The malware leverages DLL side-loading against the application to launch a malicious DLL ("screen_retriever_plugin.dll")

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The downloaded second-stage PowerShell command attempted to modify local security controls. Comments written in Portuguese in the PowerShell explicitly stated the author’s defense evasion goals: “add an exclusion in Microsoft Defender” and “disable UAC”.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Both payloads were delivered via the same C2 infrastructure and only to hosts that passed a set of anti-analysis checks.

Collection

1 technique
T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

It employs a two-pronged approach that involves a WhatsApp Web worm that hijacks authenticated browser sessions

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The first-stage PowerShell command ... downloaded the next-stage PowerShell command from a remote command and control (C2) server hosted on hxxps://www.zapgrande[.]com.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The first-stage PowerShell command covertly launched an Explorer process that downloaded the next-stage PowerShell command from a remote command and control (C2) server hosted on hxxps://www.zapgrande[.]com.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.