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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Remote Access Trojan

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLanding page
Platforms
LinuxmacOSWindows

A remote access trojan (RAT) is malware that provides an attacker with covert remote control over an infected system. RATs commonly support interactive command execution, system profiling, arbitrary code execution, file transfer, credential harvesting, persistence, and data exfiltration, enabling both espionage and broader post-compromise operations. They are frequently used as full-featured backdoors after initial compromise and can facilitate follow-on actions such as lateral movement, extortion, or deployment of additional malware.

Recent observed use cases include software supply-chain compromises, social-engineering campaigns, and scam-driven malware delivery. In one documented npm supply-chain campaign tracked as ChainVeil and attributed to the actor SuccessKey, malicious JavaScript packages executed on import rather than installation and ultimately delivered a RAT through a resilient multi-stage command-and-control architecture that used blockchain services for payload resolution and fallback retrieval. That payload supported reverse-shell access, credential harvesting, file exfiltration, arbitrary JavaScript execution, background process spawning, process termination, and persistence through hidden shell-configuration modification, while also incorporating anti-analysis checks. RAT delivery has also been reported in other npm package compromises involving obfuscated payloads.

RATs are also distributed through social-engineering operations, including fraudulent support tickets targeting help-desk personnel, fake single sign-on lures, and online job scams in which malware is disguised as interview software or application materials. These campaigns aim to compromise employee or personal devices, steal credentials and sensitive data, and establish persistent access that can later be leveraged against enterprise environments. In operational technology and transportation contexts, suspected RAT infections have raised concern because remote access on poorly segmented systems can expose sensitive onboard or industrial functions.

RATs primarily target general-purpose computing environments and are especially prevalent on Windows, macOS, and Linux systems, though specific families vary widely in implementation and tradecraft. As a category, RATs remain a staple tool for cybercriminal and state-linked intrusion activity because they combine persistence, operator interactivity, and flexible post-exploitation capability in a single malware class.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SuccessKey

It uses an unprecedented 4-tier blockchain-based Command and Control ( C2 ) infrastructure spanning three blockchains (Tron, Aptos, Binance Smart Chain) to deliver a full-featured Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with reverse shell, credential harvesting, file exfiltration, and persistent backdoor injection.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

The attacker gained access to the lead maintainer's PC through a targeted social engineering campaign and RAT malware.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1585Establish AccountsEvidence1

The attacker would then share links online, like social media or forums... to lure users to the malicious GitHub repos.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence6

When the axios HTTP client library was compromised, attackers pushed two poisoned releases that dropped a remote-access Trojan on every machine that ran a fresh install during a roughly three-hour window.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

The attacker gained access to the lead maintainer's PC through a targeted social engineering campaign and RAT malware.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Similarly, he tricked a Robinhood employee into installing a remote access trojan which he used to steal customer information.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

A separate supply-chain attack on the widely used Axios npm package occurred within hours of the leak, injecting a remote-access trojan into versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

VentureBeat reported that anyone who installed or updated Claude Code via npm on March 31 between 00:21 and 03:29 UTC may have pulled in the compromised dependency.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

attackers pushed two poisoned releases that dropped a remote-access Trojan on every machine that ran a fresh install during a roughly three-hour window.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

Step 2 — Poison it. Add something malicious. Usually this hides in a postinstall script — a feature that lets packages run code automatically the moment you install them, with no confirmation prompt.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

Specifically, they used ChatGPT to generate and iterate on working code and deployment guidance for ... UAC / SmartScreen / Mark-of-the-Web bypasses

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The threat actor also used our models to generate code for obfuscation and “crypter” patterns, such as inserting padding instructions and junk sequences

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The package impersonated an installer for OpenClaw... The campaign combined brand impersonation with malicious package delivery, using a familiar project name to increase the odds of installation by developers or users seeking OpenClaw tooling.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

VentureBeat reported that anyone who installed or updated Claude Code via npm on March 31 between 00:21 and 03:29 UTC may have pulled in the compromised dependency.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

Step 2 — Poison it. Add something malicious. Usually this hides in a postinstall script — a feature that lets packages run code automatically the moment you install them, with no confirmation prompt.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

typical operator use of the model involved eliciting building-block code, such as converting compiled executables into shellcode, designing in-memory loaders | Specifically, they used ChatGPT to generate and iterate on working code and deployment guidance for in-memory execution and shellcode loaders

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

Lazarus APT group... used a social engineering campaign, sending fake job offers with a remote access trojan... Iranian hackers pose as recruiters on LinkedIn and distribute malware through fake lucrative job offers.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Specifically, they used ChatGPT to generate and iterate on working code and deployment guidance for ... UAC / SmartScreen / Mark-of-the-Web bypasses

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

According to the report, the package targeted macOS systems and was designed to steal credentials in addition to deploying a RAT... it stole macOS credentials from compromised devices.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The researchers said the malicious package deployed a remote access trojan after installation and collected sensitive information from infected hosts.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Check your network logs for connections to sfrclak[.]com or 142.11.206.73 on port 8000

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Only after resolving that address does the downloader retrieve the final payload, such as a Remote Access Trojan.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence8

including a remote-access trojan... and remote-access (RAT) components including video and input emulation

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

he tricked a Robinhood employee into installing a remote access trojan which he used to steal customer information.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

simple exfiltration helpers, such as a Telegram bot uploader and archive-and-ship scripts

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.