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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

POWERSTATS

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK57Techniques
IOCs98Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistenceReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasionPost exploitation
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows
Also known asPowermud

POWERSTATS, also known as Powermud, is a PowerShell-based backdoor for Windows associated with MuddyWater, an Iranian state-sponsored espionage group subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It provides persistent access to compromised systems and supports reconnaissance and data theft. POWERSTATS has been deployed in campaigns targeting government entities and telecommunications organizations, including targets in Tajikistan and Turkey, within MuddyWater’s broader focus on the Middle East and Central Asia.

Delivery chains use malicious Office documents, macros, and impersonation lures. A documented campaign combined exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 with macro-enabled documents retrieved from compromised servers to extract and execute POWERSTATS. Execution and staging involve PowerShell, encoded VBScript, JavaScript, and the Windows HTML Application Host, with multiple layers of script obfuscation and runtime deobfuscation.

POWERSTATS establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and uses Base64-encoded command-and-control traffic. Its capabilities include capturing screenshots, enumerating running processes, identifying the current username, collecting IP addresses, network adapter configuration and domain information, and uploading files from compromised hosts. It can also execute additional payloads and issue PowerShell commands to delete files across multiple local drives.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-0199via clearsky blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office and WordPad OLE Remote Code ExecutionClearsky has detected new and advanced attack vector used by MuddyWater to target governmental entities and the telecommunication sector. Notably, the TTP includes decoy documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 as the first stage of the attack. | These files contain segments of the malicious code used to extract the POWERSTATS malware.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
MuddyWater

These files contain segments of the malicious code used to extract the POWERSTATS malware.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

57 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

As stated, the obfuscated code used in the campaign was hosted on three compromised domains, including an Israeli domain (pazazta[.]com).

T1586Compromise AccountsEvidence1

The experts observed compromised accounts at third party organizations sending the MuddyWater malware

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

from February to April 2019, the hackers conducted a series of phishing campaigns targeting government entities, educational organizations, and financial, telecommunications, and defense companies in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

Ever since at least 2017, the attackers behind MuddyWater have used a simple yet effective infection vector: Spear-phishing. Attacks usually begin with a targeted email sent to an organization.

Execution

11 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence6

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use WMI queries to retrieve data from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command <code>”C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe” /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR “c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe”</code>.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Main source code consists of PowerShell commands and variables. These variables are then divided into multiple layers of obfuscated intertwined encoded VBScript (VBE), JavaScript and PowerShell code.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence22

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) uses PowerShell for obfuscation and execution.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence14

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use VBScript (VBE) code for execution.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence10

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use JavaScript code for execution.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

This is the first time MuddyWater has used these two vectors in conjunction... Opening the file leverages CVE-2017-0199 and sends a request to the hacked server. | Attack Vector 2 – CVE-2017-0199... If the victim confirms, the vulnerability will activate, and the Word software will communicate to the C2 server.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence5

Malicious macro-embedded document used to launch an Excel process and a PowerShell command as first stage. | In the first stage of the operation the attackers deliver a macro-embedded document. Depending on each sample, the content of document is either a fake resume application, or a letter from the Ministry of Justice in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia.

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use DCOM (targeting the 127.0.0.1 loopback address) to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use DDE to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command <code>”C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe” /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR “c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe”</code>.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security... Ember Bear disables Windows Defender via registry key changes... JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys... POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

HKCU,Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run,CiscoAny,,"%APPDATA%\ CiscoAny.exe " Then, the following command is executed... This means that the executable will run the next time the user logs in, since it is added to the RUN registry key.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command <code>”C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe” /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR “c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe”</code>.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

HKCU,Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run,CiscoAny,,"%APPDATA%\ CiscoAny.exe " Then, the following command is executed... This means that the executable will run the next time the user logs in, since it is added to the RUN registry key.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Hackers re-used the AppLocker bypass and lateral movement techniques for the purpose of indirect code execution.

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence13

Frankenstein has used PowerShell to run a series of base64-encoded commands, that acted as a stager and enumerated hosts.

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) uses character replacement, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) environment variables, and XOR encoding to obfuscate code. [POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223)'s backdoor code is a multi-layer obfuscated, encoded, and compressed blob. (Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) [POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has used PowerShell code with custom string obfuscation (Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

T1027.016Junk Code InsertionEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has used useless code blocks to counter analysis.(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence7

The executable is written in Delphi and packed with UPX, contains anti-analysis techniques, and seems to be impersonating a cellular networking tool.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has created a scheduled task named "MicrosoftEdge" to establish persistence.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence11

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can delete all files on the C:\, D:\, E:\ and, F:\ drives using [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) Remove-Item commands.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence10

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can deobfuscate the main backdoor code.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

The group leverages commands execution via 3 rd party processes (e.g. Excel) used not only for POWERSTATS functionality as seen before, but also for first-stage needs

T1218.003CMSTPEvidence1

T1218.003 MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious .INF file to execute its POWERSTATS payload.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence6

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use Mshta.exe to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1

The new variant uses a new code execution techniques leveraging INF and SCT files.

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

2019-04 Template injection Document with macros POWERSTATS v1 or v2

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Detecting debugging programs used to analyze malicious files

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security... Ember Bear disables Windows Defender via registry key changes... JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys... POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence6

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

"credential theft via LaZagne and Mimikatz"; "PowerShell backdoor for credential theft"

Discovery

9 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence9

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve IP, network adapter configuration information, and domain from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has the ability to identify the username on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence9

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has used <code>get_tasklist</code> to discover processes on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence15

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve OS name/architecture and computer/domain name information from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Collecting data about ... available file servers

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence2

Collecting data about local and domain accounts

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve usernames from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence5

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has detected security tools.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Detecting debugging programs used to analyze malicious files

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

According to FireEye report, TEMP.Zagros attackers are adopting a new backdoor dubbed POWERSTATS for backdoors and the reuse of a known technique for lateral movements.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can upload files from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve screenshots from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)

Command and Control

11 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

Finally, the aforementioned ID.dat file is updated... The second executable starts by checking the internet connectivity. It sends a request to google.com... Then, it will POST the file containing the system details to 185.117.75[.]116.php... Returning to the main executable, a request is sent to googleads.hopto[.]org with the victim’s unique ID.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Then, several communications are carried out to the C2 server with the address hxxp://plet[.]dk/css/css.css... After receiving indication from the C2 server (hxxp://185.244.149[.]218/game.php).

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence4

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has connected to C2 servers through proxies.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

during PowGoop activity, we also observed the attackers downloading tools and some unknown content from GitHub repos

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence10

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve and execute additional [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) payloads from the C2 server.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence3

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) encoded C2 traffic with base64.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The backdoor has the following functionalities: ... Executing code remotely; Uploading and downloads files via the C&C server

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has encrypted C2 traffic with RSA.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence3

[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can sleep for a given number of seconds.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

Then, it will POST the file containing the system details to 185.117.75[.]116.php

Indicators of compromise

Observables

98 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching98Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping57Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.