POWERSTATS
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistenceReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasionPost exploitation
- Delivery
- SpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
POWERSTATS, also known as Powermud, is a PowerShell-based backdoor for Windows associated with MuddyWater, an Iranian state-sponsored espionage group subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It provides persistent access to compromised systems and supports reconnaissance and data theft. POWERSTATS has been deployed in campaigns targeting government entities and telecommunications organizations, including targets in Tajikistan and Turkey, within MuddyWater’s broader focus on the Middle East and Central Asia.
Delivery chains use malicious Office documents, macros, and impersonation lures. A documented campaign combined exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 with macro-enabled documents retrieved from compromised servers to extract and execute POWERSTATS. Execution and staging involve PowerShell, encoded VBScript, JavaScript, and the Windows HTML Application Host, with multiple layers of script obfuscation and runtime deobfuscation.
POWERSTATS establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and uses Base64-encoded command-and-control traffic. Its capabilities include capturing screenshots, enumerating running processes, identifying the current username, collecting IP addresses, network adapter configuration and domain information, and uploading files from compromised hosts. It can also execute additional payloads and issue PowerShell commands to delete files across multiple local drives.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
These files contain segments of the malicious code used to extract the POWERSTATS malware.
Techniques & procedures
57 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
As stated, the obfuscated code used in the campaign was hosted on three compromised domains, including an Israeli domain (pazazta[.]com).
The experts observed compromised accounts at third party organizations sending the MuddyWater malware
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
from February to April 2019, the hackers conducted a series of phishing campaigns targeting government entities, educational organizations, and financial, telecommunications, and defense companies in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan.
Ever since at least 2017, the attackers behind MuddyWater have used a simple yet effective infection vector: Spear-phishing. Attacks usually begin with a targeted email sent to an organization.
Execution
11 techniques
Execution
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use WMI queries to retrieve data from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command <code>”C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe” /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR “c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe”</code>.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
Main source code consists of PowerShell commands and variables. These variables are then divided into multiple layers of obfuscated intertwined encoded VBScript (VBE), JavaScript and PowerShell code.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) uses PowerShell for obfuscation and execution.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use VBScript (VBE) code for execution.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use JavaScript code for execution.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
This is the first time MuddyWater has used these two vectors in conjunction... Opening the file leverages CVE-2017-0199 and sends a request to the hacked server. | Attack Vector 2 – CVE-2017-0199... If the victim confirms, the vulnerability will activate, and the Word software will communicate to the C2 server.
Malicious macro-embedded document used to launch an Excel process and a PowerShell command as first stage. | In the first stage of the operation the attackers deliver a macro-embedded document. Depending on each sample, the content of document is either a fake resume application, or a letter from the Ministry of Justice in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use DCOM (targeting the 127.0.0.1 loopback address) to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use DDE to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command <code>”C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe” /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR “c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe”</code>.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security... Ember Bear disables Windows Defender via registry key changes... JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys... POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.
HKCU,Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run,CiscoAny,,"%APPDATA%\ CiscoAny.exe " Then, the following command is executed... This means that the executable will run the next time the user logs in, since it is added to the RUN registry key.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command <code>”C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe” /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR “c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe”</code>.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
HKCU,Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run,CiscoAny,,"%APPDATA%\ CiscoAny.exe " Then, the following command is executed... This means that the executable will run the next time the user logs in, since it is added to the RUN registry key.
Hackers re-used the AppLocker bypass and lateral movement techniques for the purpose of indirect code execution.
Stealth
13 techniques
Stealth
Frankenstein has used PowerShell to run a series of base64-encoded commands, that acted as a stager and enumerated hosts.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) uses character replacement, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) environment variables, and XOR encoding to obfuscate code. [POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223)'s backdoor code is a multi-layer obfuscated, encoded, and compressed blob. (Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) [POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has used PowerShell code with custom string obfuscation (Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has used useless code blocks to counter analysis.(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
The executable is written in Delphi and packed with UPX, contains anti-analysis techniques, and seems to be impersonating a cellular networking tool.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has created a scheduled task named "MicrosoftEdge" to establish persistence.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can delete all files on the C:\, D:\, E:\ and, F:\ drives using [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) Remove-Item commands.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can deobfuscate the main backdoor code.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
The group leverages commands execution via 3 rd party processes (e.g. Excel) used not only for POWERSTATS functionality as seen before, but also for first-stage needs
T1218.003 MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious .INF file to execute its POWERSTATS payload.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can use Mshta.exe to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
The new variant uses a new code execution techniques leveraging INF and SCT files.
2019-04 Template injection Document with macros POWERSTATS v1 or v2
Detecting debugging programs used to analyze malicious files
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security... Ember Bear disables Windows Defender via registry key changes... JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys... POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
"credential theft via LaZagne and Mimikatz"; "PowerShell backdoor for credential theft"
Discovery
9 techniques
Discovery
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve IP, network adapter configuration information, and domain from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has the ability to identify the username on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has used <code>get_tasklist</code> to discover processes on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve OS name/architecture and computer/domain name information from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
Collecting data about ... available file servers
Collecting data about local and domain accounts
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve usernames from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has detected security tools.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
Detecting debugging programs used to analyze malicious files
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
According to FireEye report, TEMP.Zagros attackers are adopting a new backdoor dubbed POWERSTATS for backdoors and the reuse of a known technique for lateral movements.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can upload files from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve screenshots from compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro POWERSTATS V3 June 2019)
Command and Control
11 techniques
Command and Control
Finally, the aforementioned ID.dat file is updated... The second executable starts by checking the internet connectivity. It sends a request to google.com... Then, it will POST the file containing the system details to 185.117.75[.]116.php... Returning to the main executable, a request is sent to googleads.hopto[.]org with the victim’s unique ID.
Then, several communications are carried out to the C2 server with the address hxxp://plet[.]dk/css/css.css... After receiving indication from the C2 server (hxxp://185.244.149[.]218/game.php).
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has connected to C2 servers through proxies.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.
during PowGoop activity, we also observed the attackers downloading tools and some unknown content from GitHub repos
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can retrieve and execute additional [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) payloads from the C2 server.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) encoded C2 traffic with base64.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)
The backdoor has the following functionalities: ... Executing code remotely; Uploading and downloads files via the C&C server
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) has encrypted C2 traffic with RSA.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) can sleep for a given number of seconds.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)
Then, it will POST the file containing the system details to 185.117.75[.]116.php
Observables
98 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
98 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.