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Malware2 associated actors

Zebrocy

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK59Techniques
IOCs41Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows
Also known asZekapab

Zebrocy, also known as Zekapab, is a modular Windows backdoor family associated with APT28, the Russian state-sponsored cyberespionage group also known as Fancy Bear. The family includes C/C++ implementations and a Go-based version. It supports reconnaissance, information collection, additional payload deployment, persistence, and data exfiltration.

Zebrocy collects the current username, system date and time-zone information, running-process details, and information about newly added network drives. Variants capture screenshots in JPEG and BMP formats. It can transfer browser credential-dumping tools onto compromised systems to extract credentials and store them in database files. A backdoor command creates scheduled tasks for persistence, while collected data can be exfiltrated through HTTP POST requests using URL/percent encoding.

Its anti-analysis behavior includes validating its own executable name and searching for processes associated with VMware, VirtualBox, and Parallels. Zebrocy also decodes secondary payloads before writing them to disk and uses AES and XOR to decrypt strings and payloads. These functions support its use as an espionage implant and a platform for deploying further tooling.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

Historical campaigns by APT28 relied heavily on modular C++ backdoors such as Zebrocy or Sofacy.

via sh3llc0d3 blogsh3llc0d3.com
petrovite

PETROVITE demonstrates Stage 1 of the ICS Kill Chain capabilities and targets mining and energy operations in Kazakhstan.

via dragos bloghub.dragos.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

59 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

Multiple entries describe APT28/Pawn Storm/Sofacy campaigns using lure documents, themed emails, and phishing schemes, e.g., “APT28 Hacker Group Targeting Europe, Americas, Asia in Widespread Phishing Scheme”, “New Spear Phishing Campaign Pretends to be EFF”, and “distribution of emails with 'instructions' on 'updating the operating system'”.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

Examples include “PowerPoint mouse-over event abused to deliver Graphite implants”, “BREXIT-themed lure document that delivers ZEKAPAB malware”, “fake NATO training docs to breach govt networks”, and repeated references to lure documents delivering Zebrocy or Seduploader.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The attack flow, described below, begins with a phishing email containing a malicious shortened URL.

Execution

8 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence4

One variant of [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) uses WMI queries to gather information.(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The Golang backdoor can create a pre-defined scheduled task.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The Golang backdoor uses cmd.exe to execute commands.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The script written to the batch file will run a PowerShell command that drops an executable from the C2

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence9

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the system.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The file ... with the name “Seminar.rtf” exploited CVE-2017-0199 ... “Seminar.rtf” downloaded a second stage document ... (4de5adb865b5198b4f2593ad436fceff, exploiting CVE-2017-11882) ... we detected a spearphishing GreyEnergy document ... exploiting CVE-2017-11882

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Zebrocy attempts to get users to click on Microsoft Office attachments containing malicious macro scripts.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

UserInitMprLogonScript Windows enables the execution of logon scripts whenever a user or group of users logs into a system. Adding a script’s path to the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key accomplishes this.

T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence3

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) performs persistence with a logon script via adding to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The Golang backdoor can create a pre-defined scheduled task.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

UserInitMprLogonScript Windows enables the execution of logon scripts whenever a user or group of users logs into a system. Adding a script’s path to the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key accomplishes this.

T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence3

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) performs persistence with a logon script via adding to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The Golang backdoor can create a pre-defined scheduled task.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

One listed item explicitly names “T1055 Process Injection” and includes APT28-linked malware such as Downdelph among examples.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

This redirection process, starting with Google as the first domain the PDF attempts to access, is an obvious Antivirus evasion technique.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251)'s Delphi variant was packed with UPX.(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

"Gold Dragon encrypts data using Base64..."; "FELIXROOT encrypts collected data with AES and Base64"; "Patchwork encrypted...with AES and then encoded them with base64."; "Pillowmint...encrypted...with AES and further encoded it with Base64."; "Some variants...encode it with base64"; "Zebrocy...hexadecimal for encoding data"

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

PETROVITE ... T1036 Masquerading ... ERYTHRITE ... T1036 Masquerading

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Post-infection, the malware displayed a decoy document to mitigate suspicion

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

One listed item explicitly names “T1055 Process Injection” and includes APT28-linked malware such as Downdelph among examples.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence11

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has a command to delete files and directories.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) decodes its secondary payload and writes it to the victim’s machine. [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) also uses AES and XOR to decrypt strings and payloads.(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

There are many variations on how malware authors specifically detect sandboxes, but the general theme is that they will check the characteristics of the environment to see whether it looks like a targeted host rather than an automated system.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

«Проверка процессов (vmtoolsd, vbox.exe) ... PlugX, Remcos, EvilBunny»; «WMI-запросы ... GravityRAT, OopsIE»; «Ключи реестра ... Smoke Loader, ROKRAT».

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

«малварь вызывает sleep(60000) или NtDelayExecution и замеряет реальное время ожидания. Если песочница ускоряет таймеры ... обнаруживается расхождение.»

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The packed executable loads an AutoIt payload into memory.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers... Kimsuky has also used Nirsoft's WebBrowserPassView tool to dump the passwords obtained from victims... Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

PETROVITE ... T1056 Input Capture: Keylogging ... The Appleseed backdoor is a multi-component backdoor that can ... log keystrokes

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence3

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) installs an application-defined Windows hook to get notified when a network drive has been attached, so it can then use the hook to call its RecordToFile file stealing method.(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence10

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has the capability to upload dumper tools that extract credentials from web browsers and store them in database files.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)

Discovery

14 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) executes the <code>reg query</code> command to obtain information in the Registry.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) runs the <code>ipconfig /all</code> command.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) gets the username from the system.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence3

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) uses <code>netstat -aon</code> to gather network connection information.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence8

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) uses the <code>tasklist</code> and <code>wmic process get Capture, ExecutablePath</code> commands to gather the processes running on the system.(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence13

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) collects the OS version and computer name. [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) also runs the <code>systeminfo</code> command to gather system information. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence10

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) searches for files that are 60mb and less and contain the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .exe, .zip, and .rar. [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) also runs the <code>echo %APPDATA%</code> command to list the contents of the directory.(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) can obtain the current execution path as well as perform drive enumeration.(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence7

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) enumerates information about connected storage devices.(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence5

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) gathers the current time zone and date information from the system.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence4

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) identifies network drives when they are added to victim systems.(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

There are many variations on how malware authors specifically detect sandboxes, but the general theme is that they will check the characteristics of the environment to see whether it looks like a targeted host rather than an automated system.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

«Проверка процессов (vmtoolsd, vbox.exe) ... PlugX, Remcos, EvilBunny»; «WMI-запросы ... GravityRAT, OopsIE»; «Ключи реестра ... Smoke Loader, ROKRAT».

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

«малварь вызывает sleep(60000) или NtDelayExecution и замеряет реальное время ожидания. Если песочница ускоряет таймеры ... обнаруживается расхождение.»

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) collects the serial number for the storage volume C:\.(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

Collection

8 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

In addition, Zebrocy file content stealers and keyloggers coded in C# were detected at targets in 2017 and 2018.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

PETROVITE ... T1056 Input Capture: Keylogging ... The Appleseed backdoor is a multi-component backdoor that can ... log keystrokes

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence3

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) installs an application-defined Windows hook to get notified when a network drive has been attached, so it can then use the hook to call its RecordToFile file stealing method.(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence4

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence9

A variant of [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) captures screenshots of the victim’s machine in JPEG and BMP format.(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence4

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) scans the system and automatically collects files with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, ,.xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .jpeg, .bmp, .tiff, .kum, .tlg, .sbx, .cr, .hse, .hsf, and .lhz.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence5

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has used a method similar to RC4 as well as AES for encryption and hexadecimal for encoding data before exfiltration. (Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Both sets of activity used the same servers at the same time and targeted the same organization... different Zebrocy C2 servers, including 193.23.181[.]151 ... Another server we detected that was used both by Zebrocy and by GreyEnergy is 185.217.0[.]124 ... They retrieve additional data from the following URL...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence11

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) uses HTTP for C2.(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence3

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) uses SMTP and POP3 for C2.(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) obtains additional code to execute on the victim's machine, including the downloading of a secondary payload.(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence4

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence4

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has used URL/Percent Encoding on data exfiltrated via HTTP POST requests.(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

PETROVITE ... T1573 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) uses SSL and AES ECB for encrypting C2 communications.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence10

[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

41 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

115 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching41Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping59Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.