FinFisher
FinFisher, also referred to as FinSpy, is a commercial surveillance malware and intrusion toolkit developed and marketed by Gamma Group / Gamma International / FinFisher GmbH and described in the content as sold to government law enforcement and intelligence customers. FinSpy is presented as a component of the broader FinFisher suite. The malware provides remote control and access over target systems and supports extensive surveillance and data exfiltration functions across desktop and mobile platforms, including Windows, macOS, Linux, iPhone/iOS, Android, Nokia/Symbian, Windows Phone, and BlackBerry.
Documented capabilities in the provided content include exfiltration of stored data; interception of email, instant messaging, VoIP, Skype calls, SMS messages, call logs, file transfers, and other communications; keylogging; screenshot and screen recording; webcam and microphone activation; audio recording; contact, location, photo, and file theft; extraction of saved passwords from more than 20 browsers, email clients, and chat programs; GPS and Cell ID tracking on mobile devices; and remote execution or delivery of additional payloads. Mobile variants are described as supporting covert communications, SMS-based exfiltration, and in some cases silent-call style live surveillance. The malware also performs anti-analysis behavior, including querying Windows Registry values as part of anti-sandbox checks.
Observed infection vectors in the content include malicious Microsoft Office documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-8759, infected Word document attachments, suspicious emails sent to activists, infected Excel documents, mobile trojans, web-based delivery via FinFly Web, USB and MBR infection options, and socially engineered lures masquerading as political or topical documents. One reported case involved a malicious Word document sent to a U.S.-based Ethiopian dissident, after which FinSpy was downloaded from Ethiopian infrastructure. The content also notes samples masquerading as Mozilla Firefox and a Malay-language lure themed around Malaysia’s 2013 General Elections.
The malware is repeatedly associated with politically sensitive surveillance and government use. The content specifically references targeting or suspected deployment involving Bahrain, Ethiopia, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Myanmar, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and many other countries. Reported victims include Bahraini activists, human rights lawyers, journalists, opposition figures, Ethiopian dissidents, and other civil society targets. The content states that Bahraini activists received FinSpy-laced emails, that leaked internal records indicated FinFisher support for Bahrain and installation on 77 computers between 2010 and 2012, and that EFF alleged Ethiopia used FinSpy to wiretap a U.S. citizen in Maryland. Citizen Lab reporting cited in the content links FinFisher infrastructure or deployments to dozens of countries and attributes likely government users in numerous cases.
Technical indicators and infrastructure details directly mentioned in the content include FinSpy command-and-control servers and fingerprints such as the distinctive response string "Hallo Steffi"; command-and-control IP 213.55.99.74 associated with Ethiopia’s Ethio Telecom; Bahrain C2 77.69.140.194 on Batelco; Indonesian server 112.78.143.26; Vietnam mobile C2 183.91.2.199 with SMS number +841257725403; and mobile/demo-related infrastructure including demo-de.gamma-international.de, ff-demo.blogdns.org, demo-01.gamma-international.de, and demo-04.gamma-international.de. The content also notes code and artifact references such as the term "FinSpy" in binaries, FinSpyV2 development paths, and use of Mozilla branding in some samples.
Overall, the content characterizes FinFisher/FinSpy as a government-grade commercial spyware ecosystem with desktop and mobile implants, relay/master infrastructure, multiple delivery mechanisms, and broad surveillance functionality, repeatedly documented in operations against activists, journalists, dissidents, and other politically exposed targets.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
7 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
CVE-2017-8759 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0, 3.5, 3.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.7 Associated Malware: FINSPY, FinFisher, WingBird Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches | CVE-2017-0199 ... Associated Malware: FINSPY, LATENTBOT, Dridex | CVE-2017-8759 ... Associated Malware: FINSPY, FinFisher, WingBird | CVE-2017-0199 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016, Vista SP2, Server 2008 SP2, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1 Associated Malware: FINSPY, LATENTBOT, Dridex | CVE-2017-8759 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0, 3.5, 3.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.7 Associated Malware: FINSPY, FinFisher, WingBird
CVE-2017-0199 ... Associated Malware: FINSPY, LATENTBOT, Dridex | CVE-2017-0199 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016, Vista SP2, Server 2008 SP2, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1 Associated Malware: FINSPY, LATENTBOT, Dridex | CVE-2017-0199 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016, Vista SP2, Server 2008 SP2, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1 Associated Malware: FINSPY, LATENTBOT, Dridex Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches
FinSpy We may only intercept data when we have a warrant from the judge... So what we would like to do is putting the rootkit asleep at the last day of the warrant, and waken the rootkit again on the first day of the new warrant.
helper2 : Python exploit for CVE-2015-5889. This first stage uses the exploits to get root access. | FinSpy is a commercial spyware suite produced by the Munich-based company FinFisher Gmbh... FinSpy is a full-fledged surveillance software suite, capable of intercepting communications, accessing private data, and recording audio and video, from the computer or mobile devices it is silently installed on.
We have previously reported on BlackOasis using other zero-days in the past; CVE-2016-4117 in May 2016, CVE-2016-0984 in June 2015, and CVE-2015-5119 in June 2015.
We have previously reported on BlackOasis using other zero-days in the past; CVE-2016-4117 in May 2016, CVE-2016-0984 in June 2015, and CVE-2015-5119 in June 2015.
We have previously reported on BlackOasis using other zero-days in the past; CVE-2016-4117 in May 2016, CVE-2016-0984 in June 2015, and CVE-2015-5119 in June 2015.
Groups observed using it
6 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
FinFisher is a spyware product manufactured by the Gamma Group, a British company that sells surveillance technology... Bill Marczak... and Morgan Marquis-Boire... analyzed the e-mails and found evidence that they contained FinSpy, part of the FinFisher spyware tool kit.
EFF has filed a lawsuit in federal court in Washington, DC alleging that the government of Ethiopia, using notorious surveillance malware known as FinSpy, illegally wiretapped and invaded the privacy of our client, a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil.
FinFisher is a sophisticated computer spyware suite, written by Munich-based FinFisher GmbH, and sold exclusively to governments for intelligence and law enforcement purposes.
FinFisher, one of the original suppliers of so-called "lawful intercept" spyware, has repeatedly been criticized for selling malware to countries with poor human rights records such as Bahrain, Egypt and Ethiopia.
FinSpy is a commercial spyware suite produced by the Munich-based company FinFisher Gmbh... FinSpy is a full-fledged surveillance software suite, capable of intercepting communications, accessing private data, and recording audio and video, from the computer or mobile devices it is silently installed on.
Techniques & procedures
36 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 techniqueThe October 2024 European Commission guidelines define listed export controls for six types of surveillance technology, including intrusion software: “software that allows operators to covertly and remotely access electronic devices, in order to obtain data, track users or eavesdrop using a device's built-in microphone or cameras.”
Initial Access
5 techniquesBootable USB Key Failure FinSpy Version 3.0. When building an infection and requesting creation of a bootable usb key... | Unable to create bootable iso image and bootable infection dongle ... tried both bootable iso image and bootable infection dongle
ClamAV blocked Webinfection ... silently were blocking our injected Javascript Code. as soon as the AV was disabled, the injected code was executed. | FinFly Web ... I tried updating it online but I get a /.../bin/update not accessible message.
At the time, members of the advocacy group Bahrain Watch in Washington, D.C., and London had been targeted via email by what appeared to be malware.
Malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology. OLE allows documents to contain embedded content from other applications such as spreadsheets. | According to U.S. Government technical analysis, malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology. OLE allows documents to contain embedded content from other applications such as spreadsheets. | Malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology.
It is more likely to be installed by sending a deceptive link to the target. | And make sure your employees are all freshly trained on the do's and don'ts of malware infection paths and protection strategies, like clicking on links in email (that's a don't)
Execution
2 techniquesU.S. Government reporting has identified the top 10 most exploited vulnerabilities by state, nonstate, and unattributed cyber actors from 2016 to 2019 as follows: CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-5638, CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2018-4878, CVE-2017-8759, CVE-2015-1641, and CVE-2018-7600. | Malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology. OLE allows documents to contain embedded content from other applications such as spreadsheets. | U.S. Government reporting has identified the top 10 most exploited vulnerabilities by state, nonstate, and unattributed cyber actors from 2016 to 2019 as follows: CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-5638, CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2018-4878, CVE-2017-8759, CVE-2015-1641, and CVE-2018-7600. According to U.S. Government technical analysis, malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology. | U.S. Government reporting has identified the top 10 most exploited vulnerabilities... malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology... the three vulnerabilities used most frequently across state-sponsored cyber actors from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, and CVE-2012-0158. | U.S. Government reporting has identified the top 10 most exploited vulnerabilities by state, nonstate, and unattributed cyber actors from 2016 to 2019 as follows: CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2018-4878, CVE-2017-8759, and CVE-2015-1641. According to U.S. Government technical analysis, malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology.
After the attachment was opened, FinSpy was surreptitiously downloaded onto his computer from a server located at an Ethiopian IP address.
Persistence
3 techniquesAcross the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.
USB Infection Generation ERROR ... 1- Master Boot record of HD ... we totally need the first option to be active while the generation.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniquesKaspersky warning FinSpy Trojan installs but give a warning on every boot, process id xxx is trying to inject into another process.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Stealth
10 techniquesAdd flag to put rootkit asleep and to waken the rootkit FinSpy | Add flag to put rootkit asleep and to waken the rootkit ... putting the rootkit asleep at the last day of the warrant, and waken the rootkit again
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
Request for relay software without branding ... without branding, eg, Gamma, Finspy, relay, ffrelay. The logging should not have the branding as well. | Customized Metadata selection of a trojan+Icon Changer ... metadata in the properties of the file show random association with another software... option of ICON CHANGER
Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.
Kaspersky warning FinSpy Trojan installs but give a warning on every boot, process id xxx is trying to inject into another process.
Possibility of removing Collected Data from the Target before transfer to Server
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
USB Infection Generation ERROR ... 1- Master Boot record of HD ... we totally need the first option to be active while the generation.
Trojen detected by AntiVirus FinFly Web ... the trojen popup comes behind the Youtube video in the self created website and in some websites the trojen does not appear at all.
Defense Impairment
1 techniqueCredential Access
5 techniquesIt would be good to have a module which can sniff HTTP/S connections for HTTP/S POST parameters and their contents.
Keylogger doesnt catch Fn keys ... Keylogger export ... Unable to retrieve Keylogger data | keylogger mixup FinSpy When visualizing data, the keylogger module does not show the correct information.
FinSpy can also record Internet telephone calls, text messages, and file transfers transmitted through Skype
Browser Password Retrieval ... Browsers change their behaviors in terms of storing passwords ... 3rd party passwords storages instead of the internal browser storage e.g. like LastPass
Shall we copy again communication keys from ./finspy_master/data/certs from offline to remote master?
Discovery
5 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."
It would be good to have a module which can sniff HTTP/S connections for HTTP/S POST parameters and their contents.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
Lateral Movement
1 techniqueBootable USB Key Failure FinSpy Version 3.0. When building an infection and requesting creation of a bootable usb key... | Unable to create bootable iso image and bootable infection dongle ... tried both bootable iso image and bootable infection dongle
Collection
7 techniquesrecover non-downloaded data from the target machine ... file access module ... download selected files
Keylogger doesnt catch Fn keys ... Keylogger export ... Unable to retrieve Keylogger data | keylogger mixup FinSpy When visualizing data, the keylogger module does not show the correct information.
timestamp screenshots FinSpy ... screenshots taken from the target are not individually timestamped. | Title based screen recording ... Dual Screen Capture ... screenshots taken from the target
Clipboard recording FinSpy Clipboard recording modules would be useful to an investigation.
Security researchers who studied the spyware last month said it can ... remotely turn on cameras and microphones...
web camera FinSpy Web camera module is not working ... Request for capturing single frames with the Webcam | Webcam does not work FinSpy ... The webcam of HP Pavilion dv6 laptop did not work.
screen recording zip archiving have issue ... multiple zip files are created
Command and Control
1 techniquethe sample attempts to connect to both Internet-based and SMS-based command & control servers... net.rmi.device.api.fsmbb.core.com.* Appears to contain the mechanics of communication with the command & control server, including the plaintext TLV-based wire protocol. | The ‘logind’ process attempts to talk to a remote command and control server... After the user accepts these permissions, the sample attempts to connect to both Internet-based and SMS-based command & control servers.
Exfiltration
1 techniquetarget did successfully completed the http 3 way handshake, but after the 3 way handshake, there is an bad data request error.
IOCs tracked for this family
66 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
104 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Commercial spyware used to target mobile phones and collect contacts, text messages, emails, locations, photos, other data, and record calls.
Referenced as a sophisticated malware platform from the period when public malware analysis was more detailed and frequent.
Mentioned as highly privileged malware in the context of UEFI bootkit threats mitigated by Secure Boot.
State spyware product from a Munich-based company, described as a surveillance tool allegedly supplied to law enforcement and implicated in illegal export allegations.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.