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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
"...including Latrodectus, Brute Ratel C4, Cobalt Strike, BackConnect, and a custom .NET backdoor."
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The attacks start with an email bombing campaign, followed by direct contact via Teams, where the attacker impersonates an IT staff.
S-RM has already observed that certain Black Basta ransomware members appear to have moved to Cactus Ransomware based on the use of a version of BackConnect malware previously only seen in Black Basta attacks as well as other tactics, techniques and procedure (TTP) similarities like the use of social engineering attacks with email flooding for Microsoft Quick Assist access.
We observed OneDrive Standalone Updater connecting to the external IP 38.180.25[.]3 , which is flagged as Dangerous and categorized as C&C server.
36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Backdoor component referenced as deployed in a Lunar Spider-linked intrusion to maintain access/enable remote connectivity.
Malware used for initial access and campaign linkage between BlackBasta and Cactus operations.
Backdoor-style malware cited as a linkage between former Black Basta members and Cactus ransomware activity, based on reuse of a version previously seen only in Black Basta attacks.
BackConnect is a persistent backdoor used to maintain remote control of compromised systems, execute commands, and exfiltrate sensitive data including credentials, financial information, and personal files. In these incidents it was deployed via DLL sideloading through OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe and used C2 infrastructure stored in TitanPlus registry keys.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.