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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

CHILLYHELL

ChillyHell is a modular macOS backdoor targeting Apple systems, particularly Intel-based Macs. It has been active since at least 2021 and was first publicly documented by Mandiant in 2023. The malware is written in C++ and has been linked to UNC4487, a threat cluster that Mandiant assessed as a suspected espionage actor and that was previously observed compromising Ukrainian government-related websites, including a Ukrainian auto insurance website used by government officials, to socially engineer victims into executing malware such as Matanbuchus or ChillyHell.

Once executed, ChillyHell profiles the compromised host, establishes persistence, and initiates command-and-control communications with hard-coded servers over HTTP or DNS. Reported C2 IPs include 93.88.75[.]252 and 148.72.172[.]53. Persistence mechanisms include LaunchAgent installation, LaunchDaemon installation, and shell profile injection or modification of .zshrc, .bash_profile, and .profile. The malware then enters a command loop and supports multiple post-compromise actions, including providing remote shell or command-line access, downloading updated versions of itself, fetching and dropping additional payloads, extracting local usernames, and conducting password brute-force activity. A referenced module, ModuleSUBF, enumerates user accounts from /etc/passwd and performs brute-force attacks using a password list retrieved from C2.

ChillyHell uses several evasion and stealth techniques. It timestomps created artifacts to make files appear older, including fallback use of shell touch commands if direct timestamp modification fails. It also changes or shifts its communication methods with control servers to avoid detection. Researchers reported that it can open a decoy Google.com page in the default browser to reduce user suspicion. The malware evaded detection for years, including a sample uploaded to VirusTotal on May 2, 2025 that reportedly had zero detections at the time referenced.

A notable aspect of ChillyHell is that malicious samples were developer-signed and passed Apple notarization in 2021, with one malicious file publicly hosted on Dropbox since 2021. Jamf reported renewed activity in 2025 and assessed the malware was still evolving. Apple later revoked the developer certificates associated with the malware after notification. The full scope of deployment is unknown, but reporting describes ChillyHell as used in targeted attacks and as likely the work of a cybercrime group, while other reporting ties it to UNC4487.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC4487

A dormant macOS threat is showing signs of new life, according to a report from cybersecurity firm Jamf. The company has been closely monitoring a macOS backdoor named ChillyHell, which has been active since 2021.

via hackreadhackread.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

UNC4487 is a suspected espionage actor that has been observed compromising the websites of Ukrainian government entities to redirect and socially engineer targets to execute Matanbuchus or CHILLYHELL malware.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

connecting to a remote server to give the attacker a command line to control the computer

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

UNC4487 is a suspected espionage actor that has been observed compromising the websites of Ukrainian government entities to redirect and socially engineer targets to execute Matanbuchus or CHILLYHELL malware.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

To set up persistence, CHILLYHELL either installs itself as a LaunchAgent or a system LaunchDaemon.

T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence2

To set up persistence, CHILLYHELL either installs itself as a LaunchAgent or a system LaunchDaemon.

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence2

As a backup mechanism, it alters the user's shell profile (.zshrc, .bash_profile, or .profile) to inject a launch command into the configuration file.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

To set up persistence, CHILLYHELL either installs itself as a LaunchAgent or a system LaunchDaemon.

T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence2

To set up persistence, CHILLYHELL either installs itself as a LaunchAgent or a system LaunchDaemon.

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence2

As a backup mechanism, it alters the user's shell profile (.zshrc, .bash_profile, or .profile) to inject a launch command into the configuration file.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

to stay hidden from the user, the malware opens a decoy Google.com page in a browser, which can minimise suspicion.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence2
TacticStealth

A noteworthy tactic adopted by the malware is its use of timestomping to modify the timestamps of created artifacts to avoid raising red flags.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

run a module named ModuleSUBF to enumerate user accounts from "/etc/passwd" and conduct brute-force attacks using a pre-defined password list retrieved from the C2 server.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Once executed, the malware extensively profiles the compromised host

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

run a module named ModuleSUBF to enumerate user accounts from "/etc/passwd"

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Once executed, the malware extensively profiles the compromised host and establishes persistence using three different methods, following which it initializes command-and-control (C2) communication with a hard-coded server ... over HTTP or DNS

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

CHILLYHELL supports a wide range of commands that allow it to launch a reverse shell to the C2 IP address

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

CHILLYHELL supports a wide range of commands that allow it to ... download a new version of the malware, fetch additional payloads

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

it could be used for remote access... connecting to a remote server to give the attacker a command line to control the computer

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 months ago
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IOC matching2

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.