PureLogs Stealer is a commercial .NET information stealer for Windows developed and sold by PureCoder since June 2022. It harvests browser data and saved credentials, cryptocurrency-wallet information, and data from installed applications, including FTP clients, email clients, and VPN software. Observed deployments have launched headless Chrome and Microsoft Edge instances to harvest saved credentials and injected the stealer into legitimate Windows processes.
PureLogs Stealer is distributed through multistage infection chains, including phishing campaigns using accounting documents, fake Adobe Sign notifications, and copyright-infringement lures. Delivery chains have used PureCrypter, obfuscated PowerShell, encoded .NET assemblies, and entirely in-memory execution. Some campaigns reconstruct encrypted payloads using process environment variables and steganographic data embedded in image metadata, while establishing persistence through a Windows logon-script mechanism. These techniques conceal payload material and reduce the final stealer's presence on disk.
The Russian-speaking threat actor VasyGrek, also known as Fluffy Wolf, has deployed PureLogs Stealer against Russian organizations across multiple sectors, including industry, construction, energy, agriculture, finance, and information technology. It has appeared alongside PureHVNC and, in some infection chains, Pay2Key ransomware. Its role in these coordinated toolchains is information and credential theft, distinct from the remote-access and ransomware functions provided by other components.
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
VasyGrek favored PureCoder tools, including PureHVNC and PureLogs Stealer; an analyzed PureCrypter sample delivered both alongside Pay2Key.
PureLogs Stealer appears in the list of malware used by VasyGrek.
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
A malicious GitHub repository was promoted via Bing AI search results for OpenClaw Windows ... just hosting the malware on GitHub was enough to poison Bing AI search results.
Reference: https://gurucul.com/blog/analyzing-purelogs-stealer-fake-adobe-sign-phishing-uses-png-steganography-and-fileless-execution/
« La compromission débute par un mail de phishing exploitant la technique ClickFix. »
Stealth Packer is a new packer that... creates hidden ghost scheduled tasks... EdgeUpdateHelper Scheduled Task ... Set to run ... AdobeCloudHelper.exe daily
The decoded base64 is a powershell script... Finally, the output is executed via a powershell.
Whereas the base64 decoded content of DetahNoteJ.txt is a DLL file... eventually storing it in a variable called $assembly.
The malicious GitHub repository contained installation instructions which, if followed, would run information stealers and GhostSocks malware on a Windows system, and Atomic MacOS Stealer (AMOS) on a MacOS system.
Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"
Stealth Packer is a new packer that... creates hidden ghost scheduled tasks... EdgeUpdateHelper Scheduled Task ... Set to run ... AdobeCloudHelper.exe daily
Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"
Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"
Stealth Packer is a new packer that... creates hidden ghost scheduled tasks... EdgeUpdateHelper Scheduled Task ... Set to run ... AdobeCloudHelper.exe daily
« Recherche le PID de svchost.exe (fallback sur explorer.exe) [et] injecte via la chaîne classique OpenProcess → VirtualAllocEx (0x40) → WriteProcessMemory → CreateRemoteThread. »
The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.001 — Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection ».
The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.003 — Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking ».
The sample contains long strings assigned to extremely long variable names; these variables are declared but never used. A Base64-encoded PowerShell script is embedded in the variable content.
the attackers progressively reconstruct the payload through process environment variables, PowerShell, RC4 decryption, and PNG iTXt metadata before executing PureLogs Stealer entirely in memory
The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1027.007 — Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution ».
This blog details an investigation into malicious GitHub repositories posing as OpenClaw installers... At first glance, the GitHub repository could easily be mistaken for a legitimate installer.
« Recherche le PID de svchost.exe (fallback sur explorer.exe) [et] injecte via la chaîne classique OpenProcess → VirtualAllocEx (0x40) → WriteProcessMemory → CreateRemoteThread. »
The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.001 — Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection ».
The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.003 — Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking ».
The PowerShell script downloads DetahNoteJ.txt, loads the content into a variable, then Base64 decodes that content, eventually storing it in a variable called $assembly.
« Anti-VM/sandbox : requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB. »
« requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB ».
« Temporisation : délais de plusieurs dizaines de secondes, kill date programmée au 1er septembre 2026 ».
« Un second loader PowerShell récupère ... s_enterprise et l’injecte en mémoire via VirtualAlloc() + CreateThread(). »
Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"
« Anti-debug : neutralisation de SetUnhandledExceptionFilter ».
« credentials navigateurs Chromium/Firefox (Login Data, Web Data, cookies de session) ».
information stealers continue to be an initial access vector... If an information stealer compromises the system, it can harvest not only account credentials but also sensitive OpenClaw configuration files
« credentials navigateurs Chromium/Firefox (Login Data, Web Data, cookies de session) ».
The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1012 — Query Registry ».
« Recherche le PID de svchost.exe (fallback sur explorer.exe). »
« requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température) ».
MetaStealer и PureLogs Stealer ... могут осуществить кражу файлов из зараженной системы.
« Anti-VM/sandbox : requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB. »
« requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB ».
« Temporisation : délais de plusieurs dizaines de secondes, kill date programmée au 1er septembre 2026 ».
Command and Control Fallback Channels T1008 22 C2 IPs, 8 domains, 10+ port options
outbound connections to staging services such as PixelDrain provides valuable detection opportunities
The loaders retrieve stages from « hxxp://158.94.211.92/... »; PureLogs uses a C2 with « communications chiffrées ».
The powershell script downloads the DetahNoteJ.txt, loads the content into a variable, then base64 decodes that content.
C2-адресов, которые ведут к одному серверу и отличаются лишь выделенным портом для каждого вредоносного инструмента.
MetaStealer и PureLogs Stealer ... взаимодействует с командным сервером и выполняет эксфильтрацию данных.
76 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.