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Malware2 associated actors

PureLogs Stealer

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 17 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs76Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationDefense evasionProcess injectionPersistence
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

PureLogs Stealer is a commercial .NET information stealer for Windows developed and sold by PureCoder since June 2022. It harvests browser data and saved credentials, cryptocurrency-wallet information, and data from installed applications, including FTP clients, email clients, and VPN software. Observed deployments have launched headless Chrome and Microsoft Edge instances to harvest saved credentials and injected the stealer into legitimate Windows processes.

PureLogs Stealer is distributed through multistage infection chains, including phishing campaigns using accounting documents, fake Adobe Sign notifications, and copyright-infringement lures. Delivery chains have used PureCrypter, obfuscated PowerShell, encoded .NET assemblies, and entirely in-memory execution. Some campaigns reconstruct encrypted payloads using process environment variables and steganographic data embedded in image metadata, while establishing persistence through a Windows logon-script mechanism. These techniques conceal payload material and reduce the final stealer's presence on disk.

The Russian-speaking threat actor VasyGrek, also known as Fluffy Wolf, has deployed PureLogs Stealer against Russian organizations across multiple sectors, including industry, construction, energy, agriculture, finance, and information technology. It has appeared alongside PureHVNC and, in some infection chains, Pay2Key ransomware. Its role in these coordinated toolchains is information and credential theft, distinct from the remote-access and ransomware functions provided by other components.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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vasygrek

VasyGrek favored PureCoder tools, including PureHVNC and PureLogs Stealer; an analyzed PureCrypter sample delivered both alongside Pay2Key.

via f6f6.ru
Fluffy Wolf

PureLogs Stealer appears in the list of malware used by VasyGrek.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

A malicious GitHub repository was promoted via Bing AI search results for OpenClaw Windows ... just hosting the malware on GitHub was enough to poison Bing AI search results.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Reference: https://gurucul.com/blog/analyzing-purelogs-stealer-fake-adobe-sign-phishing-uses-png-steganography-and-fileless-execution/

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

« La compromission débute par un mail de phishing exploitant la technique ClickFix. »

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Stealth Packer is a new packer that... creates hidden ghost scheduled tasks... EdgeUpdateHelper Scheduled Task ... Set to run ... AdobeCloudHelper.exe daily

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

The decoded base64 is a powershell script... Finally, the output is executed via a powershell.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Whereas the base64 decoded content of DetahNoteJ.txt is a DLL file... eventually storing it in a variable called $assembly.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

The malicious GitHub repository contained installation instructions which, if followed, would run information stealers and GhostSocks malware on a Windows system, and Atomic MacOS Stealer (AMOS) on a MacOS system.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Stealth Packer is a new packer that... creates hidden ghost scheduled tasks... EdgeUpdateHelper Scheduled Task ... Set to run ... AdobeCloudHelper.exe daily

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Stealth Packer is a new packer that... creates hidden ghost scheduled tasks... EdgeUpdateHelper Scheduled Task ... Set to run ... AdobeCloudHelper.exe daily

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

« Recherche le PID de svchost.exe (fallback sur explorer.exe) [et] injecte via la chaîne classique OpenProcess → VirtualAllocEx (0x40) → WriteProcessMemory → CreateRemoteThread. »

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.001 — Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection ».

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.003 — Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking ».

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The sample contains long strings assigned to extremely long variable names; these variables are declared but never used. A Base64-encoded PowerShell script is embedded in the variable content.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

the attackers progressively reconstruct the payload through process environment variables, PowerShell, RC4 decryption, and PNG iTXt metadata before executing PureLogs Stealer entirely in memory

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1027.007 — Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution ».

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

This blog details an investigation into malicious GitHub repositories posing as OpenClaw installers... At first glance, the GitHub repository could easily be mistaken for a legitimate installer.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

« Recherche le PID de svchost.exe (fallback sur explorer.exe) [et] injecte via la chaîne classique OpenProcess → VirtualAllocEx (0x40) → WriteProcessMemory → CreateRemoteThread. »

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.001 — Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection ».

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1055.003 — Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking ».

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

The PowerShell script downloads DetahNoteJ.txt, loads the content into a variable, then Base64 decodes that content, eventually storing it in a variable called $assembly.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

« Anti-VM/sandbox : requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB. »

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

« requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB ».

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

« Temporisation : délais de plusieurs dizaines de secondes, kill date programmée au 1er septembre 2026 ».

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3

« Un second loader PowerShell récupère ... s_enterprise et l’injecte en mémoire via VirtualAlloc() + CreateThread(). »

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Registry Key "HKCU\Environment\UserinitMprLogonScript"

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

« Anti-debug : neutralisation de SetUnhandledExceptionFilter ».

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

« credentials navigateurs Chromium/Firefox (Login Data, Web Data, cookies de session) ».

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

information stealers continue to be an initial access vector... If an information stealer compromises the system, it can harvest not only account credentials but also sensitive OpenClaw configuration files

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

« credentials navigateurs Chromium/Firefox (Login Data, Web Data, cookies de session) ».

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The article's TTP list explicitly identifies « T1012 — Query Registry ».

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

« Recherche le PID de svchost.exe (fallback sur explorer.exe). »

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

« requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température) ».

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

MetaStealer и PureLogs Stealer ... могут осуществить кражу файлов из зараженной системы.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

« Anti-VM/sandbox : requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB. »

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

« requêtes WMI (fabricant, GPU, CPU, température), énumération des imprimantes et périphériques USB ».

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

« Temporisation : délais de plusieurs dizaines de secondes, kill date programmée au 1er septembre 2026 ».

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

Command and Control Fallback Channels T1008 22 C2 IPs, 8 domains, 10+ port options

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

outbound connections to staging services such as PixelDrain provides valuable detection opportunities

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The loaders retrieve stages from « hxxp://158.94.211.92/... »; PureLogs uses a C2 with « communications chiffrées ».

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The powershell script downloads the DetahNoteJ.txt, loads the content into a variable, then base64 decodes that content.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

C2-адресов, которые ведут к одному серверу и отличаются лишь выделенным портом для каждого вредоносного инструмента.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

MetaStealer и PureLogs Stealer ... взаимодействует с командным сервером и выполняет эксфильтрацию данных.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

76 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching76Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.