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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

NightClub

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceSpoofing
Platforms
Windows

NightClub is a modular Windows espionage malware framework associated with the Belarus-aligned threat actor MoustachedBouncer and active since at least 2014. It is a long-running surveillance platform used primarily against foreign diplomatic targets in Belarus. The malware has evolved across multiple generations from an early service-based implant into a plugin-driven framework with email-based command and control and specialized collection modules.

NightClub is written in C++ and uses SMTP and IMAP for command-and-control communications, with some variants also supporting DNS-based communications and exfiltration. Document theft is a core function, with collection focused on common office and PDF formats. Reported plugins and modules provide keylogging, screenshot capture, audio recording, active-window enumeration, removable-drive monitoring, and a DNS-tunneling backdoor. Screen capture functionality has been implemented through Windows graphics APIs, while audio capture has leveraged components such as the LAME encoder and mciSendStringW.

The malware uses multiple persistence and evasion techniques on Windows. Known variants establish persistence through Windows services and by modifying service-related Registry configuration, including ServiceDLL settings. Operators have used legitimate-looking service and executable names to blend into the host environment. NightClub has also staged captured files and keystrokes locally before exfiltration and has manipulated file timestamps to match legitimate Windows files as an anti-forensics measure.

Operationally, NightClub has been used as part of MoustachedBouncer’s broader cyber-espionage activity targeting embassy personnel and other foreign diplomatic entities. Later variants used modular orchestrator and agent components with external encrypted configuration, reflecting continued development and operational maturity. Overall, NightClub is best characterized as a stealthy surveillance backdoor designed for long-term collection on compromised Windows systems.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-1732via i blackhat archiveWindows Win32k Window Object Type Confusion Privilege EscalationRecent file stealer Take screenshots PowerShell scripts LPE CVE-2021-1732 Plug-ins Reverse Proxy (revsocks)View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MoustachedBouncer

(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence3

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use multiple native APIs including `GetKeyState`, `GetForegroundWindow`, `GetWindowThreadProcessId`, and `GetKeyboardLayout`.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence2

BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Paramenters

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence7

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can modify the Registry to set the ServiceDLL for a service created by the malware for persistence.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence7

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has created a Windows service named `WmdmPmSp` to establish persistence.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

InvisiMole can collect data from the system, and can monitor changes in specified directories. NightClub can use a file monitor to steal specific files from targeted systems.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries. Attor's dispatcher can modify the Run registry key. Kimsuky has also modified the registry entry for HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key for persistence with the name WindowsSecurityCheck. PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence7

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has created a Windows service named `WmdmPmSp` to establish persistence.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

InvisiMole can collect data from the system, and can monitor changes in specified directories. NightClub can use a file monitor to steal specific files from targeted systems.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries. Attor's dispatcher can modify the Run registry key. Kimsuky has also modified the registry entry for HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key for persistence with the name WindowsSecurityCheck. PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can obfuscate strings using the congruential generator `(LCG): staten+1 = (690069 × staten + 1) mod 232`.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has created a service named `WmdmPmSp` to spoof a Windows Media service.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has chosen file names to appear legitimate including EsetUpdate-0117583943.exe for its dropper.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence4

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can modify the Creation, Access, and Write timestamps for malicious DLLs to match those of the genuine Windows DLL user32.dll.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence2

BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Paramenters

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence7

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can modify the Registry to set the ServiceDLL for a service created by the malware for persistence.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use a plugin for keylogging.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

MoustachedBouncer AitM-powered surveillance via Belarus ISPs ... How MoustachedBouncer uses AitM? ... Assessment: ISP level

Discovery

4 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence4

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use `GetForegroundWindow` to enumerate the active window.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has the ability to use `GetWindowThreadProcessId` to identify the process behind a specified window.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence6

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use a file monitor to identify .lnk, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xslx, and .pdf files.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence6

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has the ability to monitor removable drives.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Collection

8 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use a file monitor to steal specific files from targeted systems.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use a plugin for keylogging.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has copied captured files and keystrokes to the `%TEMP%` directory of compromised hosts.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence5

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can load a module to call `CreateCompatibleDC` and `GdipSaveImageToStream` for screen capture.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

C&C by emails SMTP CSmtp library

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence4

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can load a module to leverage the LAME encoder and `mciSendStringW` to control and capture audio.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

MoustachedBouncer AitM-powered surveillance via Belarus ISPs ... How MoustachedBouncer uses AitM? ... Assessment: ISP level

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence3

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use emails for C2 communications.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1071.004DNSEvidence4

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use a DNS tunneling plugin to exfiltrate data by adding it to the subdomain portion of a DNS request.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can load multiple additional plugins on an infected host.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence3

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) has used a non-standard encoding in DNS tunneling removing any `=` from the result of base64 encoding, and replacing `/` characters with `-s` and `+` characters with `-p`.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

[NightClub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1090) can use SMTP and DNS for file exfiltration and C2.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence3

Command and Control SMTP/IMAP, DNS and SMB ... C&C by emails SMTP ... DNS-tunneling backdoor

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

19 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.