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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 9 actors

Zeus

ZeuS is a banking Trojan first introduced in 2007 and widely recognized as an early precursor to the modern infostealer ecosystem. Its original purpose was to covertly steal victims’ financial information, especially online banking credentials, account numbers, passwords, PINs, and related banking data. The malware was commonly delivered through phishing emails, spam campaigns, links to compromised websites, and drive-by download activity; multiple reports in the content specifically describe phishing emails carrying ZeuS or directing victims to compromised sites that infected them. ZeuS was also distributed at scale through infrastructure such as Avalanche and was used in attacks against businesses, municipalities, churches, and other organizations, with particular emphasis on small- and mid-sized businesses in the United States and Europe.

The malware is repeatedly described as a banking Trojan and credential stealer. Reported capabilities include theft of banking credentials, financial information, and other sensitive data; browser-focused interception techniques such as memory-injection/man-in-the-browser style keylogging; and use in account takeover fraud that enabled unauthorized ACH and wire transfers. The content also states that ZeuS was used in large-scale online banking heists and that botnets powered by ZeuS contributed to losses exceeding $100 million, while other reporting cited roughly $70 million stolen in one major multinational case and more than $200 million attributed collectively to crime rings using Bogachev’s ZeuS banking Trojan.

ZeuS is strongly associated in the content with Russian-speaking cybercrime actors. Multiple sources link it to Evil Corp, described as a Russian cybercrime group active since 2007 and also associated with Dridex and later ransomware operations. The malware is also closely tied to Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev, identified by aliases including slavik and lucky12345, whom U.S. authorities and the FBI accuse of building and distributing the ZeuS banking Trojan. The content further references the JabberZeuS crew and the Business Club/Gameover ZeuS ecosystem, indicating ZeuS was used by organized criminal groups with money mule networks and international cash-out operations.

The source code for ZeuS leaked in 2011, which the content says accelerated the growth of the broader infostealer ecosystem and influenced later malware families. The content also states that ZeuS development was reportedly terminated and its code base merged with SpyEye, while Gameover ZeuS was based on ZeuS code and evolved into a major botnet responsible for more than one million infections and over $100 million in losses. ZeuS is also cited as malware historically associated with later families and operations including Dridex and Chthonic, and as a payload installed by other botnets such as Mariposa.

High-confidence indicators and identifiers mentioned in the content are primarily naming and attribution references rather than technical IOCs: aliases include Zeus and ZeuS; related variants include Gameover ZeuS/GOZ and JabberZeuS; and associated actors include Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev, Evil Corp, and the JabberZeuS crew.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

9 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Indrik Spider

SocGholish is linked to the Russian cybercriminal group Evil Corp. This group has previously been responsible for Zeus and Dridex malware and is also associated with several large-scale ransomware and money-laundering operations.

via politiepolitie.nl
Avalanche

During 1H2010, the criminals instead emphasized the Avalanche infrastructure as a major distribution point for the notorious Zeus Trojan. Zeus is a sophisticated piece of malware that is in the hands of many different e-criminals.

via web archiveweb.archive.org
JabberZeuS

These days it seems more often involved in sending emails that try to trick recipients into opening malware-laden attachments, most often variants of the ZeuS and SpyEye trojans.

via krebs on securitykrebsonsecurity.com
SilverTerrier

Unit 42 identified ten strains of info-stealers popular with SilverTerrier: AgentTesla, Atmos, AzoRult, ISpySoftware, ISR Stealer, KeyBase, LokiBot, Pony, PredatorPain, and Zeus.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Business Club

The JabberZeuS Crew, the Business Club, and other crime rings collectively pocketed over $200 million from U.S. and U.K. financial institutions using Evgeniy Bogachev’s ZeuS banking trojan...

via recordedfuturerecordedfuture.com
JabberZeuS Crew

The JabberZeuS Crew, the Business Club, and other crime rings collectively pocketed over $200 million from U.S. and U.K. financial institutions using Evgeniy Bogachev’s ZeuS banking trojan...

via recordedfuturerecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

In November 2010, Panin allegedly received the source code and rights to sell Zeus from Evginy Bogachev, a/k/a Slavik, and incorporated many components of Zeus into SpyEye.

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

According to data recorded by Abuse.ch, some of the domains Microsoft seized appear to belong to legitimate businesses whose sites were compromised and used to host components of the malware infrastructure.

T1584.005BotnetEvidence1

There is evidence he also was using his own botnet kit or at least taking a fee to set up instances of it on behalf of buyers. In late 2009, security researchers had tracked dozens of Zeus control servers

T1585Establish AccountsEvidence1

This report takes a look at Avalanche’s evolution, examining how these e-criminals have incorporated interrelated methods—including phishing, malware, botnets, and spam—into their work.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

These lures took victims to “drive-by download” sites, where the criminals infected vulnerable machines.

T1566PhishingEvidence4

"Avalanche" is the name given to the world's most prolific phishing gang and to the infrastructure it uses to host phishing sites. And this is the group that has shifted additional resources to the creation of spoof sites and spam lures that distributed the very latest, most malignant Zeus variants.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The businesses were hit with the Zeus Trojan embedded in the phishing emails.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

Avalanche sent false alerts/updates purporting to be from popular social networking sites, and lures that offered popular software upgrades, and fake downloadable forms from tax authorities.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Use of URL-shortening services (such as bit.ly and tinyurl.com) by phishers may be a growing trend. URL shorteners can be useful for launching social engineering attacks via services such as Twitter.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

These days it seems more often involved in sending emails that try to trick recipients into opening malware-laden attachments, most often variants of the ZeuS and SpyEye trojans.

Persistence

1 technique
T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence1

The malware operates via a browser extension in Firefox or via a Browser Helper Object in Microsoft Corp.'s Internet Explorer.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the government believes is responsible for building and distributing the ZeuS banking Trojan . Bogachev is thought to be a core architect of ZeuS, a malware strain that has been used to steal hundreds of millions of dollars from bank accounts

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

By patching the memory tables or injecting directly into memory, this technique can be used by malware authors to bypass Windows UAC (User Account Control).

Stealth

6 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Specifically, Harderman says he wants to turn the guts of the Trojan into a rootkit, and to build additional functionality on top, in the form of modular plug-ins.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

GOZ, however, utilizes a P2P network of infected hosts to communicate and distribute data, and employs encryption to evade detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The criminals posed as employees of the business, moving thousands of dollars to overseas locations.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the government believes is responsible for building and distributing the ZeuS banking Trojan . Bogachev is thought to be a core architect of ZeuS, a malware strain that has been used to steal hundreds of millions of dollars from bank accounts

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

SpyEye made headlines this year when investigators discovered it automatically searched for and removed ZeuS from infected PCs before installing itself.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

infected tens of millions of computers, harvested huge volumes of sensitive financial data

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Trojans like ZeuS and SpyEye have the built-in ability to keep logs of every keystroke a victim types on his or her keyboard

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

others used it just as a piece of malware to log information that ZeuS collected from victims from either the keystroke logging, or the built-in POST data logging, which worked for both HTTP and HTTPS websites

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

In 2007 the first large scale attacks took place, that used the ZeuS bank attack configuration called “webinjects”... While ZeuS is a versatile malware kit... its key strength is in browser manipulation through the use of its dynamic configuration.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

Information stealers seem to be the preferred type of malware to help in their fraudulent email attacks... The attacker can pilfer data about the targets and use it to create efficient messages for diverting transactions or asking money to be sent to fraudsters' account.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

According to its ad, the malware could self-propagate to other computers once it infected a victim, could steal banking credentials, and could carry out DDOS attacks.

Collection

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

infected tens of millions of computers, harvested huge volumes of sensitive financial data

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Trojans like ZeuS and SpyEye have the built-in ability to keep logs of every keystroke a victim types on his or her keyboard

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

others used it just as a piece of malware to log information that ZeuS collected from victims from either the keystroke logging, or the built-in POST data logging, which worked for both HTTP and HTTPS websites

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

In 2007 the first large scale attacks took place, that used the ZeuS bank attack configuration called “webinjects”... While ZeuS is a versatile malware kit... its key strength is in browser manipulation through the use of its dynamic configuration.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence3

Scripts can be injected via a variety of methods, including cross-site scripting, man-in-the-browser, man-in-the-middle, or a compromise of the remote website.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Zeus distribution also relies on the registration of domain names for spamming, drive-by-download sites, and Zeus command-and-control domains.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The peer-to-peer layer merely functioned as a reliable and robust communication mechanism, and a way to hide the next layers of the infrastructure in order to become more resistant to takedown activity.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Whit this so-called initial access, even more dangerous software can then be installed.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

bot_bc_add vnc <ip> <port> ... Most of these commands are used... to... connect to the victim’s desktop... One specific plugin that was seen, was a VNC component before the plugin VNC was actually built into the malware itself.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

the ZeuS author declined to help them keep it undetectable by commercial antivirus tools... he refuses to write bypass of [anti-malware] scans

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

147 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
90 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
29 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
28 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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IOC matching147

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Threat actor attribution9

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.