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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Disco

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationReconnaissance
Delivery
AitmLure
Platforms
Windows

Disco is a malware framework associated with the Belarus-aligned cyber-espionage actor MoustachedBouncer and has been in use since at least 2020. It is primarily used in surveillance operations targeting foreign diplomatic entities in Belarus and is notable for being delivered through adversary-in-the-middle operations conducted at the ISP level. In these intrusions, victims are induced to execute malicious archive or installer files presented as software updates, after which Disco establishes persistence and retrieves additional components over SMB.

Disco is principally a Go-based implant ecosystem, with related components also implemented in .NET. Its initial stage can create a scheduled task that runs at very short intervals to maintain persistence and repeatedly launch follow-on payloads. The framework is modular and supports execution of spying plugins used to collect victim data and exfiltrate it. Documented plugin capabilities include screenshot capture, execution of PowerShell scripts, reverse-proxy functionality, and use of a local privilege escalation exploit for CVE-2021-1732. Disco operations also include SMB-based staging and exfiltration workflows, reducing dependence on conventional internet-facing command-and-control infrastructure. Associated activity indicates use of multiple communications mechanisms across the broader toolset and operational chain, including DNS and SMB.

Disco forms part of MoustachedBouncer’s newer intrusion stack alongside the older NightClub framework. It has been observed in campaigns that rely on traffic interception and selective redirection to malicious update lures, followed by user execution of malicious ZIP and MSI-delivered payloads. The malware’s role in these operations is post-compromise espionage, plugin execution, persistence, and data theft from Windows systems used by diplomatic targets.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-1732via i blackhat archiveWindows Win32k Window Object Type Confusion Privilege EscalationDisco Go 2020 AitM Disco Execute Spying plugins Exfiltrate Collected data ... Recent file stealer Take screenshots PowerShell scripts LPE CVE-2021-1732 Plug-ins Reverse Proxy (revsocks)View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MoustachedBouncer

(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

AitM: compromised router or ISP? Residential IP addresses Deep Packet Inspection in Belarus SORM Assessment: ISP level

Initial Access

1 technique
T1659Content InjectionEvidence3

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) has achieved initial access and execution through content injection into DNS, HTTP, and SMB replies to targeted hosts that redirect them to download malicious files.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) can create a scheduled task to run every minute for persistence.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

PowerShell scripts ... Government staff Europe and Asia ... Backdoor PowerShell

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence5

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) has been executed through inducing user interaction with malicious .zip and .msi files.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) can create a scheduled task to run every minute for persistence.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) can create a scheduled task to run every minute for persistence.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

LPE CVE-2021-1732

Credential Access

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

MoustachedBouncer AitM-powered surveillance via Belarus ISPs ... How MoustachedBouncer uses AitM? ... Assessment: ISP level

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

\35.214.56[.]2\OfficeBroker\OfficeBroker.exe ... Plugins - SMB shares \\209.19.37[.]184\driverpack\aact.exe

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Recent file stealer ... File stealer .doc, .docx, .xls and .pdf

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Take screenshots ... Screenshotter

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

MoustachedBouncer AitM-powered surveillance via Belarus ISPs ... How MoustachedBouncer uses AitM? ... Assessment: ISP level

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence3

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) can use SMB to transfer files.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Reverse Proxy (revsocks)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) can download files to targeted systems via SMB.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

T1659Content InjectionEvidence3

[Disco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1088) has achieved initial access and execution through content injection into DNS, HTTP, and SMB replies to targeted hosts that redirect them to download malicious files.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Command and Control SMTP/IMAP, DNS and SMB ... C&C by emails SMTP ... DNS-tunneling backdoor

Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.