Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

NimDoor

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 25 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs34Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceProcess injectionDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
SpearphishingFake updateLure
Platforms
macOS

NimDoor is a macOS backdoor family associated with North Korean threat actors targeting Web3 and cryptocurrency businesses. Its multistage infection chains combine Nim and C++ binaries with AppleScript and Bash to establish persistent remote access and steal sensitive information. Targeted attacks were observed in April 2025.

Delivery relies on impersonating trusted contacts over Telegram and arranging business meetings through Calendly. Victims subsequently receive a Zoom-themed email instructing them to execute a purported Zoom SDK update. The malicious AppleScript retrieves additional stages from infrastructure impersonating Zoom, while extensive whitespace padding obscures its malicious code.

One execution chain uses a C++ loader to decrypt embedded payloads, launch a process in a suspended state, inject malicious code, and resume execution. The injected backdoor communicates over TLS-encrypted WebSockets and supports arbitrary command execution, system-information collection, and downloading additional payloads. Associated Bash scripts collect browser data and credentials, macOS Keychain data, shell histories, and Telegram databases and key material for exfiltration.

Nim-based components establish LaunchAgent persistence and use handlers for SIGINT and SIGTERM to deploy or restore persistent components when termination signals are received. An embedded AppleScript backdoor periodically transmits running-process information and executes scripts returned by command-and-control servers. Encrypted payloads, encoded configuration, and process injection further complicate detection and analysis.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
SquidSquad

Группировку связывают с вредоносным ПО RustBucket, SwiftBucket и NimDoor, а для вывода украденного она использует в том числе Tornado Cash.

via xakepxakep.ru
DPRK

Dubbed ‘NimDoor’, the attack chain begins when targets are lured via Telegram into accepting an invite to a business meeting. A malicious script is triggered by the meeting invite warning the victim that a “Zoom SDK update” is needed.

via sentinelone blogsentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The attack chain begins with a now-familiar social engineering vector: impersonation of a trusted contact over Telegram and inviting the target to schedule a meeting via Calendly. The target is subsequently sent an email containing a Zoom meeting link and instructions to run a so-called “Zoom SDK update script”.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The attack begins with social engineering, where attackers impersonate trusted contacts on Telegram, inviting victims to schedule Zoom meetings via Calendly. Victims receive an email with a malicious AppleScript disguised as a “Zoom SDK update.”

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Available commands we were able to identify in trojan1_arm64 were as follows: execCmd 12 Execute the arbitrary command provided in the data field.

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence3

The threat actors deploy AppleScripts widely, both to gain initial access and also later in the attack chain to function as lightweight beacons and backdoors.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

Bash scripts are used to exfiltrate Keychain credentials, browser data and Telegram user data.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"instructions to run a Zoom SDK update script" / "prompting users to copy and paste an authentication code..." / "open the Windows Run dialog and run a PowerShell command"

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

When the LaunchAgent is activated by a user login or reboot, GoogIe LLC is launched, which in turn calls CoreKitAgent and the rest of the payload logic.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence2

A novel persistence mechanism takes advantage of SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers to install persistence when the malware is terminated or the system rebooted... When triggered, CoreKitAgent catches these signals and writes the LaunchAgent for persistence, a copy of GoogIe LLC as the loader, and a copy of itself as the trojan.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

A novel persistence mechanism leverages SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers, reinstalling NimDoor if terminated or upon system reboot...

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Target is spawned by InjectWithDyldArm64 in a suspended state... and injected with the trojan1_arm64 binary’s code. After injection, the suspended Target process is resumed via kill (pid, SIGCONT) and the code from the trojan1_arm64 binary is executed.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

When the LaunchAgent is activated by a user login or reboot, GoogIe LLC is launched, which in turn calls CoreKitAgent and the rest of the payload logic.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence2

A novel persistence mechanism takes advantage of SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers to install persistence when the malware is terminated or the system rebooted... When triggered, CoreKitAgent catches these signals and writes the LaunchAgent for persistence, a copy of GoogIe LLC as the loader, and a copy of itself as the trojan.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

A novel persistence mechanism leverages SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers, reinstalling NimDoor if terminated or upon system reboot...

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

An attacker-controlled domain hosts an AppleScript file named zoom_sdk_support.scpt... This domain name format has been chosen for similarity to the legitimate Zoom meeting domain us05web.zoom[.]us... The misspelling of GoogIe LLC (uppercase ‘i’, not lowercase ‘L’) is intended to help the malware blend in and avoid suspicion.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Target is spawned by InjectWithDyldArm64 in a suspended state... and injected with the trojan1_arm64 binary’s code. After injection, the suspended Target process is resumed via kill (pid, SIGCONT) and the code from the trojan1_arm64 binary is executed.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Bash scripts are used to exfiltrate Keychain credentials... The script also targets the following Keychain and shell files and directories: /Library/Keychains/System.keychain ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

"capabilities to harvest credentials from web browsers like Arc, Brave, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Firefox"

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

On execution, the script beacons out every 30 seconds to one of the two hardcoded C2s, chosen at random, and attempts to post data obtained from listing all running processes on the victim machine.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

getSysInfo 234 Get information about the system such as boot time, username, macOS version, machine name, platform and arch.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The upl script is a credential-stealer designed to silently extract browser and system-level information... Browser data is copied to /private/var/tmp/uplex_<username>/<browser>/

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Bash scripts exfiltrate Keychain credentials, browser data (Chrome, Firefox, Brave, Arc, Edge), and Telegram databases, targeting cryptocurrency wallets and sensitive information.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

The data is then compressed via ditto -ck and posted to the C2 using curl.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"remote communications via wss, the TLS-encrypted version of the WebSocket protocol" | "AppleScript that beacons out every 30 seconds to one of two hard-coded command-and-control (C2) servers"

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

After first negotiating an HTTP handshake, the injected code uses wss to communicate with the C2 – another uncommon technique for macOS malware – at wss://firstfromsep[.]online/client.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The script ends with three lines of malicious code that retrieve and execute a second-stage script from a command-and-control server... The multi-staged infection process... resulted in the download of two Mach-O binaries— a and installer —into /private/var/tmp.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

After first negotiating an HTTP handshake, the injected code uses wss to communicate with the C2... The malware uses multiple levels of RC4 encryption in combination with the base64 encoding and three different keys before the communication.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The data is then compressed via ditto -ck and posted to the C2 using curl... The Telegram data is exfiltrated to the same server used in the upl script.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
xakepNews · Oct 21, 2026Северокорейскую группировку SuidSquad подозревают в краже $2,84 млн в сети BNB Chain - ХакерMentioned in background information as malware associated with SquidSquad, which targets cryptocurrency founders, executives, and wealthy investors. The article does not describe NimDoor's capabilities or establish its involvement in the reported $2.84 million theft.Read more ↗sentinelone blogNews · Jan 6, 202612 Months of Fighting Cybercrime & Defending Enterprises | The SentinelLABS 2025 ReviewNimDoor is a Nim-based macOS backdoor targeting Web3 and cryptocurrency platforms, attributed to North Korean threat actors.Read more ↗polyswarmNews · Jul 14, 2025NimDoor MacOS MalwareNimDoor is a MacOS malware campaign attributed to North Korea-affiliated threat actors, likely Stardust Chollima. It targets Web3 and cryptocurrency organizations using social engineering (fake Zoom updates via Telegram), AppleScript, and Nim/C++ binaries. The malware steals Keychain credentials, browser data, and Telegram information, employs process injection, and maintains persistence through novel signal handlers. It communicates with C2 servers via encrypted WebSockets and is designed to evade detection and hinder analysis.Read more ↗securityaffairsNews · Jul 5, 2025North Korea-linked threat actors spread macOS NimDoor malware via fake Zoom updatesA rare macOS backdoor written largely in Nim (with AppleScript and C++ components) delivered via fake Zoom update lures. It uses encrypted configuration/communications (including TLS WebSocket/wss C2), performs data theft (e.g., browser history, Keychain credentials, Telegram data), employs persistence (signal-handler based redeployment/reinfection), and includes a relatively uncommon macOS process injection technique requiring specific entitlements.Read more ↗
+5 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching34Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.