NimDoor
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceProcess injectionDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- SpearphishingFake updateLure
- Platforms
- macOS
NimDoor is a macOS backdoor family associated with North Korean threat actors targeting Web3 and cryptocurrency businesses. Its multistage infection chains combine Nim and C++ binaries with AppleScript and Bash to establish persistent remote access and steal sensitive information. Targeted attacks were observed in April 2025.
Delivery relies on impersonating trusted contacts over Telegram and arranging business meetings through Calendly. Victims subsequently receive a Zoom-themed email instructing them to execute a purported Zoom SDK update. The malicious AppleScript retrieves additional stages from infrastructure impersonating Zoom, while extensive whitespace padding obscures its malicious code.
One execution chain uses a C++ loader to decrypt embedded payloads, launch a process in a suspended state, inject malicious code, and resume execution. The injected backdoor communicates over TLS-encrypted WebSockets and supports arbitrary command execution, system-information collection, and downloading additional payloads. Associated Bash scripts collect browser data and credentials, macOS Keychain data, shell histories, and Telegram databases and key material for exfiltration.
Nim-based components establish LaunchAgent persistence and use handlers for SIGINT and SIGTERM to deploy or restore persistent components when termination signals are received. An embedded AppleScript backdoor periodically transmits running-process information and executes scripts returned by command-and-control servers. Encrypted payloads, encoded configuration, and process injection further complicate detection and analysis.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Группировку связывают с вредоносным ПО RustBucket, SwiftBucket и NimDoor, а для вывода украденного она использует в том числе Tornado Cash.
Dubbed ‘NimDoor’, the attack chain begins when targets are lured via Telegram into accepting an invite to a business meeting. A malicious script is triggered by the meeting invite warning the victim that a “Zoom SDK update” is needed.
Techniques & procedures
25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
The attack chain begins with a now-familiar social engineering vector: impersonation of a trusted contact over Telegram and inviting the target to schedule a meeting via Calendly. The target is subsequently sent an email containing a Zoom meeting link and instructions to run a so-called “Zoom SDK update script”.
The attack begins with social engineering, where attackers impersonate trusted contacts on Telegram, inviting victims to schedule Zoom meetings via Calendly. Victims receive an email with a malicious AppleScript disguised as a “Zoom SDK update.”
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
Available commands we were able to identify in trojan1_arm64 were as follows: execCmd 12 Execute the arbitrary command provided in the data field.
The threat actors deploy AppleScripts widely, both to gain initial access and also later in the attack chain to function as lightweight beacons and backdoors.
Bash scripts are used to exfiltrate Keychain credentials, browser data and Telegram user data.
"instructions to run a Zoom SDK update script" / "prompting users to copy and paste an authentication code..." / "open the Windows Run dialog and run a PowerShell command"
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
When the LaunchAgent is activated by a user login or reboot, GoogIe LLC is launched, which in turn calls CoreKitAgent and the rest of the payload logic.
A novel persistence mechanism takes advantage of SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers to install persistence when the malware is terminated or the system rebooted... When triggered, CoreKitAgent catches these signals and writes the LaunchAgent for persistence, a copy of GoogIe LLC as the loader, and a copy of itself as the trojan.
A novel persistence mechanism leverages SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers, reinstalling NimDoor if terminated or upon system reboot...
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Target is spawned by InjectWithDyldArm64 in a suspended state... and injected with the trojan1_arm64 binary’s code. After injection, the suspended Target process is resumed via kill (pid, SIGCONT) and the code from the trojan1_arm64 binary is executed.
When the LaunchAgent is activated by a user login or reboot, GoogIe LLC is launched, which in turn calls CoreKitAgent and the rest of the payload logic.
A novel persistence mechanism takes advantage of SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers to install persistence when the malware is terminated or the system rebooted... When triggered, CoreKitAgent catches these signals and writes the LaunchAgent for persistence, a copy of GoogIe LLC as the loader, and a copy of itself as the trojan.
A novel persistence mechanism leverages SIGINT/SIGTERM signal handlers, reinstalling NimDoor if terminated or upon system reboot...
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
An attacker-controlled domain hosts an AppleScript file named zoom_sdk_support.scpt... This domain name format has been chosen for similarity to the legitimate Zoom meeting domain us05web.zoom[.]us... The misspelling of GoogIe LLC (uppercase ‘i’, not lowercase ‘L’) is intended to help the malware blend in and avoid suspicion.
Target is spawned by InjectWithDyldArm64 in a suspended state... and injected with the trojan1_arm64 binary’s code. After injection, the suspended Target process is resumed via kill (pid, SIGCONT) and the code from the trojan1_arm64 binary is executed.
The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.
The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
Bash scripts are used to exfiltrate Keychain credentials... The script also targets the following Keychain and shell files and directories: /Library/Keychains/System.keychain ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db
"capabilities to harvest credentials from web browsers like Arc, Brave, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Firefox"
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
On execution, the script beacons out every 30 seconds to one of the two hardcoded C2s, chosen at random, and attempts to post data obtained from listing all running processes on the victim machine.
getSysInfo 234 Get information about the system such as boot time, username, macOS version, machine name, platform and arch.
The upl script is a credential-stealer designed to silently extract browser and system-level information... Browser data is copied to /private/var/tmp/uplex_<username>/<browser>/
The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.
The state machine also contains a 10-minute sleep routine, likely as an anti-VM or sandbox countermeasure.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
Bash scripts exfiltrate Keychain credentials, browser data (Chrome, Firefox, Brave, Arc, Edge), and Telegram databases, targeting cryptocurrency wallets and sensitive information.
The data is then compressed via ditto -ck and posted to the C2 using curl.
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
"remote communications via wss, the TLS-encrypted version of the WebSocket protocol" | "AppleScript that beacons out every 30 seconds to one of two hard-coded command-and-control (C2) servers"
After first negotiating an HTTP handshake, the injected code uses wss to communicate with the C2 – another uncommon technique for macOS malware – at wss://firstfromsep[.]online/client.
The script ends with three lines of malicious code that retrieve and execute a second-stage script from a command-and-control server... The multi-staged infection process... resulted in the download of two Mach-O binaries— a and installer —into /private/var/tmp.
After first negotiating an HTTP handshake, the injected code uses wss to communicate with the C2... The malware uses multiple levels of RC4 encryption in combination with the base64 encoding and three different keys before the communication.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The data is then compressed via ditto -ck and posted to the C2 using curl... The Telegram data is exfiltrated to the same server used in the upl script.
Observables
34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.