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Malware2 associated actors2 associated CVEs

MedusaLocker

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK46Techniques
IOCs303Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Extortion
Delivery
Malspam
Platforms
Windows

MedusaLocker is a ransomware family first observed in 2019 that encrypts victim data for ransom-based extortion. It is operationally distinct from the similarly named Medusa ransomware operation and should not be conflated with the Medusa Android banking trojan. Technical characteristics, intrusion methods, tooling, and actor associations attributed to those threats do not automatically apply to MedusaLocker.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-7771via securelistExploited in the wildArbitrary Physical Memory Access in TechPowerUp ThrottleStop DriverThe vulnerability in ThrottleStop.sys has been assigned CVE-2025-7771. According to our information, the vendor is currently preparing a patch.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-55182via f5 communityExploited in the wildReact2Shell"A critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-55182 and dubbed React2Shell, exists within the React Server Components (RSC) architecture, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code..."View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MedusaLocker

“MedusaLocker Ransomware Strikes Moroccan Company Kde” reports that the MedusaLocker group claimed responsibility on November 4, 2026, for an attack on Kde (icn.ma), an industrial and automotive company in Morocco.

via malware newsmalware.news
ANTHROPOID SPIDER

"...web server exploitation campaigns in 2020 that primarily delivered MedusaLocker ransomware."

via crowdstrike bloggo.crowdstrike.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

46 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Common campaigns are delivered through stolen credentials, exposed VPN/edge vulnerabilities, malspam containing malicious attachments or download links.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

MedusaLocker ransomware actors most often gain access to victim devices through vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations [T1133].

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Common campaigns are delivered through stolen credentials, exposed VPN/edge vulnerabilities, malspam containing malicious attachments or download links.

T1566PhishingEvidence5

Email and spam filters are critical in the case of MedusaLocker as email is one of the malware distribution vectors commonly abused by attackers.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

After gaining access, typically through phishing, malicious attachments, or compromised network entry points, it conducts network-wide file encryption...

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

When installed, this ransomware will also copy itself to %UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\svchostt.exe and create a scheduled task that launches the program every 30 minutes in order to remain resident.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Additionally, the MedusaLocker Ransomware creates a Schedule Task entry in the system and launches itself every 15 minutes for an indefinite period.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

“When executed, a Skill’s code runs with access to the local environment, including filesystem and network, effectively granting it the privileges of a local process.”

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

MedusaLocker ransomware uses a batch file to execute PowerShell script invoke-ReflectivePEInjection [T1059.001].

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

To execute attacker-controlled commands, the malware employs a Sysnative cmd.exe bypass. Instead of launching commands directly, it constructs the following chain: \SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c %windir%\sysnative\cmd.exe /c <command>.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

...с помощью ... эксплойтов, вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов...

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений, обманных загрузок... фальшивых обновлений, перепакованных и заражённых инсталляторов

T1569System ServicesEvidence1

It will also restart the LanmanWorkstation service in order to make sure that Windows networking is running and that mapped network drives are accessible.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

When installed, this ransomware will also copy itself to %UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\svchostt.exe and create a scheduled task that launches the program every 30 minutes in order to remain resident.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Additionally, the MedusaLocker Ransomware creates a Schedule Task entry in the system and launches itself every 15 minutes for an indefinite period.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Common campaigns are delivered through stolen credentials, exposed VPN/edge vulnerabilities, malspam containing malicious attachments or download links.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

It will create the Registry value EnableLinkedConnections under the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System registry key and set it to 1.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

MedusaLocker ransomware actors most often gain access to victim devices through vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations [T1133].

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

To achieve persistence on the infected system, the Medusalocker creates a registry entry under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the value name BabyLockerKZ pointing to its executable path.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

When installed, this ransomware will also copy itself to %UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\svchostt.exe and create a scheduled task that launches the program every 30 minutes in order to remain resident.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Additionally, the MedusaLocker Ransomware creates a Schedule Task entry in the system and launches itself every 15 minutes for an indefinite period.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Common campaigns are delivered through stolen credentials, exposed VPN/edge vulnerabilities, malspam containing malicious attachments or download links.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

To achieve persistence on the infected system, the Medusalocker creates a registry entry under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the value name BabyLockerKZ pointing to its executable path.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence4

a four-year old ICMLuaUtil COM-based user account control (UAC) bypass... is used to elevate privileges

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“AVADDON, ThunderX and RANZY have different implementations to obfuscate both the RSA key and the strings.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

After the "Adding to Autoload" debug message it will rename itself to svchost.exe ... It also copies itself to %APPDATA% after renaming to executable to "svchostt.exe".

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Erase VSS, disable FW using ransomware • Delete file using “sdelete.exe –p 5 <FileName>” • Delete eventlog using “pslog.exe -c security”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

Удаляет теневые копии файлов... командами: vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Common campaigns are delivered through stolen credentials, exposed VPN/edge vulnerabilities, malspam containing malicious attachments or download links.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

the "vssadmin" utility built into the Windows operating system is used to delete shadow copies

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

It terminates itself if the Windows Locale ID is equal to the following: 419 = Russian 422 = Ukrainian It terminates itself if machine is set to the following keyboard layout language: 419 = Russian 485 = Yakut (Russia) 444 = Tatar 422 = Ukrainian

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After acquiring the mutex, the ransomware checks for the privilege of its running process.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

MedusaLocker v3 incorporates well-known anti-debugging techniques to evade analysis... utilizes high-resolution timing checks to detect abnormal execution conditions.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

It will create the Registry value EnableLinkedConnections under the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System registry key and set it to 1.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence5

Disable firewall

T1688Safe Mode BootEvidence1

Restarts the machine in safe mode to avoid detection by security software [T1562.009].

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Looks like the attacker left a few files related to Mimikatz as well... Besides the Mimikatz files in the kamikadze directory...

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

The group or groups that deploy MedusaLocker have been known to conduct brute-force attacks against open or exposed RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) to gain an initial foothold in their victims' environments.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

MedusaLocker can also perform ICMP sweeping to identify other systems on the same network.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware uses ICMP sweeping to profile the network to identify other systems that can be used to maximize the likelihood of a ransom payment.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

Стремится завершить следующие процессы, чтобы убедиться, что все файлы данных закрыты... sqlservr, sqlagent ... winword.exe ... java.exe

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping for MedusaLocker v3: Discovery System Information Discovery T1082 Queries local system info before encryption.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping for MedusaLocker v3: File and Directory Discovery T1083 Enumerates files to encrypt.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence5

This is done to make sure mapped drives are accessible even in a UAC launched process. It will also restart the LanmanWorkstation service in order to make sure that Windows networking is running and that mapped network drives are accessible.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

It terminates itself if the Windows Locale ID is equal to the following: 419 = Russian 422 = Ukrainian It terminates itself if machine is set to the following keyboard layout language: 419 = Russian 485 = Yakut (Russia) 444 = Tatar 422 = Ukrainian

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After acquiring the mutex, the ransomware checks for the privilege of its running process.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

MedusaLocker v3 incorporates well-known anti-debugging techniques to evade analysis... utilizes high-resolution timing checks to detect abnormal execution conditions.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

This would be a huge discovery infection vector-wise as this looks like the attacker gained access to the machine via RDP.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

If the malware is able to locate them, MedusaLocker then attempts to leverage the SMB protocol to discover accessible network locations and if files are discovered in those locations, they are also encrypted

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Eventually, the ransomware propagates to all shared resources and proceeds to infect other connected systems within the network.

Collection

2 techniques
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

MedusaLocker claimed an attack on the municipal administration of Thiverval-Grignon, extracting 162 email addresses from internal systems; the advisory was republished under two separate threat-actor attributions.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

“Organization with 7568 emails extracted.”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Upon execution, it copies itself to the %APPDATA%\Roaming\ directory.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

WE GATHERED HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL/ PERSORNAL DATA. THESE DATA ARE CURRENTLY STORED ON A PRIVATE SERVER.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence3

Organization with 30 emails extracted.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence3

Summary Organization with 69 emails extracted.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence27

“Qualisteel ... has fallen victim to a ransomware attack conducted by the group medusalocker.”

T1489Service StopEvidence5

It will then look for and terminate the following processes in order to shut down security programs and to make sure all data files are closed and accessible for encrypting

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence7

Finally, it clears the Shadow Volume Copies so that they cannot be used to restore files, removes backups made with Windows backup, and disables the Windows automatic startup repair using the following commands: vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet ... wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP

Indicators of compromise

Observables

303 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

69 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching303Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping46Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.