SUNSPOT is a Windows malware implant used to compromise the SolarWinds Orion software build process during the 2020 SolarWinds supply-chain intrusion. Associated with APT29, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service threat group also tracked as NOBELIUM, it inserted the SUNBURST backdoor into Orion builds rather than operating as the backdoor deployed to downstream customers.
SUNSPOT enumerates running processes, hashes process names to identify Microsoft MSBuild instances, and examines build-process command-line arguments to locate the targeted Orion solution. It decrypts embedded SUNBURST source code stored in AES-128-CBC-encrypted blobs, backs up a legitimate source file, and temporarily substitutes malicious source code so that SUNBURST is compiled into the product. After injection, it restores the original source and deletes the backup artifact, concealing the modification from subsequent inspection. It also maintains an encrypted local log.
During the intrusion, the operators maintained SUNSPOT persistence through a scheduled task that executed at host startup. Its immediate target was SolarWinds' Windows build environment; the resulting trojanized Orion updates enabled downstream compromise of government and private-sector organizations.
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
APT29 also created a scheduled task to maintain SUNSPOT persistence when the host booted during the 2020 SolarWinds intrusion.
Nobelium had managed to compromise the SolarWinds software build environment and used a custom implant called SUNSPOT to load the SUNBURST backdoor into the Orion software update.
In a blog post late last night, the infosec firm said the Orion-targeting malware, which it codenamed Sunspot, had "several safeguards" to ensure its deployment of compromised code into new Orion builds didn't trigger SolarWinds' suspicions.
28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including SUNBURST, SUNSPOT, Raindrop, and TEARDROP.
after the threat actor gained access to their production systems they successfully trojanised SolarWinds Orion’s software updates to distribute malware consisting of backdoor code embedded in a legitimate SolarWinds software library
As part of the attack, the hackers gained access to the SolarWinds Orion build system and injected the sunburst backdoor into a legitimate DLL used by the SolarWinds Orion IT management software. This DLL was later automatically distributed to SolarWinds customers in a supply chain attack.
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) malware was designed and used to insert [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) used Windows API functions such as <code>MoveFileEx</code> and <code>NtQueryInformationProcess</code> as part of the [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) injection process.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
let build_processes = dynamic ( [ "MSBuild.exe" , "dontnet.exe" , "VBCSCompiler.exe" ] )
SUNSPOT monitors and hijacks processes involved in the compilation of code and replaces one of the source files with a malicious source file containing the SUNBURST backdoor.
After being executed, the malware would monitor and automatically injecting a Sunburst backdoor by replacing the company's legitimate source code with malicious code... injected the sunburst backdoor into a legitimate DLL used by the SolarWinds Orion IT management software.
Sunspot malware watched the build server for build commands and silently replaced some of Orion's source code files with malware.
They have manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.
replaces one of the source files with a malicious source file containing the SUNBURST backdoor
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.
APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code>.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) encrypted log entries it collected with the stream cipher RC4 using a hard-coded key. It also uses AES128-CBC encrypted blobs for [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) source code and data extracted from the SolarWinds Orion <MsBuild.exe</code> process.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
SUNBURST source code used generic variable names and pre-obfuscated strings, and was likely sanitized of developer comments before being added to SUNSPOT.
actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) was identified on disk with a filename of <code>taskhostsvc.exe</code> and it created an encrypted log file at <code>C:\Windows\Temp\vmware-vmdmp.log</code>.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.
Once build is complete, replace malicious code files with legitimate code from the backups created.
Following the successful injection of [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559), [SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) deleted a temporary file it created named <code>InventoryManager.bk</code> after restoring the original SolarWinds Orion source code to the software library.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
let build_processes = dynamic ( [ "MSBuild.exe" , "dontnet.exe" , "VBCSCompiler.exe" ] )
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code>.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) decrypts [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559), which was stored in AES128-CBC encrypted blobs.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) only replaces SolarWinds Orion source code if the MD5 checksums of both the original source code file and backdoored replacement source code match hardcoded values.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) creates a mutex using the hard-coded value ` {12d61a41-4b74-7610-a4d8-3028d2f56395}` to ensure that only one instance of itself is running.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
SUNSPOT monitors and hijacks processes involved in the compilation of code and replaces one of the source files with a malicious source file containing the SUNBURST backdoor.
After being executed, the malware would monitor and automatically injecting a Sunburst backdoor by replacing the company's legitimate source code with malicious code... injected the sunburst backdoor into a legitimate DLL used by the SolarWinds Orion IT management software.
Sunspot malware watched the build server for build commands and silently replaced some of Orion's source code files with malware.
They have manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) monitored running processes for instances of <code>MsBuild.exe</code> by hashing the name of each running process and comparing it to the corresponding value <code>0x53D525</code>. It also extracted command-line arguments and individual arguments from the running <code>MsBuild.exe</code> process to identify the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) enumerated the Orion software Visual Studio solution directory path.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
As described above this tools is often used by threat actors to enumerate active directory trust with “domain_trust”... nltest /domain_trusts
[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) created a copy of the SolarWinds Orion software source file with a <code>.bk</code> extension to backup the original content, wrote [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) using the same filename but with a <code>.tmp</code> extension, and then moved [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) using <code>MoveFileEx</code> to the original filename with a <code>.cs</code> extension so it could be compiled within Orion software.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
44 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.