INC Ransomware
INC Ransom is a ransomware-as-a-service operation active since at least July 2023. It has targeted public and private organizations and is repeatedly associated in the provided reporting with healthcare, including attacks on U.S. healthcare organizations, Scotland's National Health Service, and broader 2025 healthcare victimization trends. The content also describes politically framed activity in which Israeli-linked entities were listed on its leak site, including ramet-trom.co.il, with claims of approximately 1 TB of exfiltrated data.
Observed initial access and intrusion methods in the provided content include phishing, use of valid accounts, and exploitation of public-facing applications, specifically including CVE-2023-3519 in Citrix NetScaler. Post-compromise activity includes scanning for domain administrator accounts, enumerating domain groups, testing network connectivity, discovering network shares and services, staging data on compromised hosts, and archiving data with 7-Zip and WinRAR prior to exfiltration. The group has used MegaSync for exfiltration to cloud storage.
INC Ransom has used legitimate tools and native Windows functionality during operations, including AnyDesk, PuTTY, PsExec, WMIC, RDP, Advanced IP Scanner, NETSCAN.EXE, cmd.exe, Internet Explorer for share browsing, and SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe to disable Windows Defender. It has renamed PsExec to winupd to masquerade as a legitimate Windows update component and has executed the encryptor as a service via Service Control Manager using the name winupd and path %SystemRoot%\winupd.exe. The ransomware can use wmic.exe to spread or deploy across multiple endpoints, delete volume shadow copy backups, identify external USB and hard drives for encryption, and identify printers to print ransom notes. The content also notes recent use of Mimikatz by INC Ransomware and a recurring sequence of EDR-killer activity followed by ransomware deployment.
The operation conducts double extortion by stealing and encrypting victim data and demanding payment for decryption and/or non-disclosure. Reported victim organizations in the content include Yamaha Motor Philippines, the U.S. division of Xerox Business Solutions, and healthcare entities including McLaren Health Care in Michigan, where linked reporting said the attack disrupted IT systems, phone systems, and access to patient information databases, forcing some appointment and procedure rescheduling. Microsoft reporting in the content states that Vanilla Tempest used INC ransomware for the first time in an observed U.S. healthcare intrusion after access via Storm-0494 and Gootloader, followed by installation of Supper malware, use of AnyDesk and MEGA, lateral movement via RDP and WMI Provider Host, and network-wide deployment of INC ransomware.
The content further associates INC with multiple financially motivated actors and affiliate ecosystems. It states that INC Ransom is also known as GOLD IONIC, that Microsoft linked Fox Tempest and Vanilla Tempest to ransomware affiliates and families including INC, and that on-chain analysis identified links between INC and Lynx ransomware variants. High-confidence observables and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include CVE-2023-3519, use of AnyDesk, PuTTY, MegaSync/MEGA, PsExec renamed to winupd, WMIC/wmic.exe, SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe, NETSCAN.EXE, 7-Zip, WinRAR, and the leak-site listing of ramet-trom.co.il.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
...public-facing Citrix NetScaler appliances vulnerable to ongoing attacks exploiting a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-5777) known as Citrix Bleed 2.
INC Ransom has used INC Ransomware to encrypt victim's data.
This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2024-21378, where a custom MAPI form loads a potentially malicious DLL. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.
The following analytic identifies remote code execution (RCE) attempts targeting F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices, specifically exploiting CVE-2020-5902.
Groups observed using it
4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Microsoft revealed on Wednesday that its threat analysts have observed the financially motivated Vanilla Tempest threat actor using INC ransomware for the first time in an attack on the U.S. healthcare sector.
Microsoft revealed on Wednesday that its threat analysts have observed the financially motivated Vanilla Tempest threat actor using INC ransomware for the first time in an attack on the U.S. healthcare sector.
INC Ransomware has the ability to use wmic.exe to spread to multiple endpoints within a compromised environment.
The ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group Tarnished Scorpius (aka INC Ransomware) has listed on its leak site an Israeli industrial machinery company, and replaced the company logo with a swastika.
Techniques & procedures
22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 techniqueFurther analysis revealed that Fox Tempest expanded its offerings earlier this year by providing customers with pre-configured virtual machines hosted through Cloudzy infrastructure. Users could upload malware to these systems and receive digitally signed binaries generated through certificates controlled by the group.
Execution
2 techniquesStealth
2 techniquesthe service enabled cybercriminals to disguise malware as trusted software, improving the likelihood that malicious files would bypass security controls and be executed by victims.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'
Defense Impairment
1 techniqueMicrosoft has announced the disruption of a large-scale malware-signing-as-a-service (MSaaS) operation that exploited its Azure Artifact Signing platform to generate fraudulent code-signing certificates... The group allegedly abused Microsoft's Artifact Signing service to create short-lived digital certificates that allowed malware to appear legitimate to both users and operating systems.
Discovery
7 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
Multiple tools/actors are described using Active Directory/domain group enumeration, e.g., “AdFind can enumerate domain groups”, “net group "domain admins" /domain to enumerate domain groups”, “BloodHound can collect information about domain groups and members”, and “AD Explorer tool to enumerate groups on a victim's network.”
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.
Lateral Movement
3 techniquesThe attackers then moved laterally using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and the Windows Management Instrumentation Provider Host to deploy INC ransomware across the victim's network.
Examples include 'Aquatic Panda used WMI for lateral movement in victim environments,' 'Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement,' and 'Cinnamon Tempest has used Impacket for lateral movement via WMI.'
Exfiltration
1 techniqueDollar Tree appeared on the INC Ransomware’s dark web leak site earlier today. The group claims to have breached the company’s security and stolen 1.2TB of sensitive and personal data.
Impact
5 techniquesINC Ransomware and Tarnished Scorpius have listed Israeli entities on their leak sites, claiming "political" attacks where the goal is data destruction and reputational damage rather than financial profit.
INC Ransom is especially known for its double-extortion tactics, where they not only encrypt a victim’s data but also exfiltrate it, threatening to publish it online if the ransom isn’t paid.
Apostle retrieves a list of all running processes on a victim host, and stops all services containing the string "sql," likely to propagate ransomware activity to database files. LockBit 3.0 can identify and terminate specific services. RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.
Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands. Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools. Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.
INC Ransom is especially known for its double-extortion tactics, where they not only encrypt a victim’s data but also exfiltrate it, threatening to publish it online if the ransom isn’t paid.
IOCs tracked for this family
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
86 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A ransomware family whose affiliates were tied to Fox Tempest infrastructure and services.
A ransomware family linked by Microsoft’s investigation to Fox Tempest’s code-signing service.
A ransomware family linked through Fox Tempest-associated affiliates.
Ransomware family linked by Microsoft’s investigation to Fox Tempest’s code-signing service.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.