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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 4 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

INC Ransomware

Also known asINCINC Ransom

INC Ransom is a ransomware-as-a-service operation active since at least July 2023. It has targeted public and private organizations and is repeatedly associated in the provided reporting with healthcare, including attacks on U.S. healthcare organizations, Scotland's National Health Service, and broader 2025 healthcare victimization trends. The content also describes politically framed activity in which Israeli-linked entities were listed on its leak site, including ramet-trom.co.il, with claims of approximately 1 TB of exfiltrated data.

Observed initial access and intrusion methods in the provided content include phishing, use of valid accounts, and exploitation of public-facing applications, specifically including CVE-2023-3519 in Citrix NetScaler. Post-compromise activity includes scanning for domain administrator accounts, enumerating domain groups, testing network connectivity, discovering network shares and services, staging data on compromised hosts, and archiving data with 7-Zip and WinRAR prior to exfiltration. The group has used MegaSync for exfiltration to cloud storage.

INC Ransom has used legitimate tools and native Windows functionality during operations, including AnyDesk, PuTTY, PsExec, WMIC, RDP, Advanced IP Scanner, NETSCAN.EXE, cmd.exe, Internet Explorer for share browsing, and SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe to disable Windows Defender. It has renamed PsExec to winupd to masquerade as a legitimate Windows update component and has executed the encryptor as a service via Service Control Manager using the name winupd and path %SystemRoot%\winupd.exe. The ransomware can use wmic.exe to spread or deploy across multiple endpoints, delete volume shadow copy backups, identify external USB and hard drives for encryption, and identify printers to print ransom notes. The content also notes recent use of Mimikatz by INC Ransomware and a recurring sequence of EDR-killer activity followed by ransomware deployment.

The operation conducts double extortion by stealing and encrypting victim data and demanding payment for decryption and/or non-disclosure. Reported victim organizations in the content include Yamaha Motor Philippines, the U.S. division of Xerox Business Solutions, and healthcare entities including McLaren Health Care in Michigan, where linked reporting said the attack disrupted IT systems, phone systems, and access to patient information databases, forcing some appointment and procedure rescheduling. Microsoft reporting in the content states that Vanilla Tempest used INC ransomware for the first time in an observed U.S. healthcare intrusion after access via Storm-0494 and Gootloader, followed by installation of Supper malware, use of AnyDesk and MEGA, lateral movement via RDP and WMI Provider Host, and network-wide deployment of INC ransomware.

The content further associates INC with multiple financially motivated actors and affiliate ecosystems. It states that INC Ransom is also known as GOLD IONIC, that Microsoft linked Fox Tempest and Vanilla Tempest to ransomware affiliates and families including INC, and that on-chain analysis identified links between INC and Lynx ransomware variants. High-confidence observables and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include CVE-2023-3519, use of AnyDesk, PuTTY, MegaSync/MEGA, PsExec renamed to winupd, WMIC/wmic.exe, SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe, NETSCAN.EXE, 7-Zip, WinRAR, and the leak-site listing of ramet-trom.co.il.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2025-5777CitrixBleed 2Exploited in the wild

...public-facing Citrix NetScaler appliances vulnerable to ongoing attacks exploiting a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-5777) known as Citrix Bleed 2.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2023-3519Unauthenticated RCE in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway

INC Ransom has used INC Ransomware to encrypt victim's data.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
CVE-2024-21378Microsoft Outlook Custom Forms Remote Code Execution

This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2024-21378, where a custom MAPI form loads a potentially malicious DLL. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
CVE-2020-5902F5 BIG-IP TMUI Remote Code Execution

The following analytic identifies remote code execution (RCE) attempts targeting F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices, specifically exploiting CVE-2020-5902.

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Storm-0494

Microsoft revealed on Wednesday that its threat analysts have observed the financially motivated Vanilla Tempest threat actor using INC ransomware for the first time in an attack on the U.S. healthcare sector.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Vanilla Tempest

Microsoft revealed on Wednesday that its threat analysts have observed the financially motivated Vanilla Tempest threat actor using INC ransomware for the first time in an attack on the U.S. healthcare sector.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
INC

INC Ransomware has the ability to use wmic.exe to spread to multiple endpoints within a compromised environment.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Tarnished Scorpius

The ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group Tarnished Scorpius (aka INC Ransomware) has listed on its leak site an Israeli industrial machinery company, and replaced the company logo with a swastika.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

Further analysis revealed that Fox Tempest expanded its offerings earlier this year by providing customers with pre-configured virtual machines hosted through Cloudzy infrastructure. Users could upload malware to these systems and receive digitally signed binaries generated through certificates controlled by the group.

Execution

2 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence3
TacticExecution

The attackers then moved laterally using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and the Windows Management Instrumentation Provider Host to deploy INC ransomware across the victim's network.

T1106Native APIEvidence1
TacticExecution

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

the service enabled cybercriminals to disguise malware as trusted software, improving the likelihood that malicious files would bypass security controls and be executed by victims.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

Microsoft has announced the disruption of a large-scale malware-signing-as-a-service (MSaaS) operation that exploited its Azure Artifact Signing platform to generate fraudulent code-signing certificates... The group allegedly abused Microsoft's Artifact Signing service to create short-lived digital certificates that allowed malware to appear legitimate to both users and operating systems.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Multiple tools/actors are described using Active Directory/domain group enumeration, e.g., “AdFind can enumerate domain groups”, “net group "domain admins" /domain to enumerate domain groups”, “BloodHound can collect information about domain groups and members”, and “AD Explorer tool to enumerate groups on a victim's network.”

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery
T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery
T1652Device Driver DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery
T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

The attackers then moved laterally using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and the Windows Management Instrumentation Provider Host to deploy INC ransomware across the victim's network.

T1021.003Distributed Component Object ModelEvidence1

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda used WMI for lateral movement in victim environments,' 'Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement,' and 'Cinnamon Tempest has used Impacket for lateral movement via WMI.'

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage SitesEvidence1

Dollar Tree appeared on the INC Ransomware’s dark web leak site earlier today. The group claims to have breached the company’s security and stolen 1.2TB of sensitive and personal data.

Impact

5 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1
TacticImpact

INC Ransomware and Tarnished Scorpius have listed Israeli entities on their leak sites, claiming "political" attacks where the goal is data destruction and reputational damage rather than financial profit.

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence17
TacticImpact

INC Ransom is especially known for its double-extortion tactics, where they not only encrypt a victim’s data but also exfiltrate it, threatening to publish it online if the ransom isn’t paid.

T1489Service StopEvidence2
TacticImpact

Apostle retrieves a list of all running processes on a victim host, and stops all services containing the string "sql," likely to propagate ransomware activity to database files. LockBit 3.0 can identify and terminate specific services. RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence4
TacticImpact

Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands. Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools. Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1
TacticImpact

INC Ransom is especially known for its double-extortion tactics, where they not only encrypt a victim’s data but also exfiltrate it, threatening to publish it online if the ransom isn’t paid.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
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IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.