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Malware1 associated CVE

CountLoader

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK70Techniques
IOCs255Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceExfiltrationLateral movement
Delivery
Cracked softwareSeo poisoningLureClickfixUSB
Platforms
WindowsmacOS

CountLoader is a multistage malware loader targeting Windows and macOS that profiles infected systems, maintains persistence, and retrieves and executes additional payloads under remote operator control. Observed payloads include LummaStealer, Amatera, ACR Stealer, and cryptocurrency clippers. Distribution mechanisms include cracked-software downloads, trojanized installers, SEO-poisoned websites, social-media lures, malicious USB shortcuts, and DOUBLECUP ClickFix campaigns using fake verification prompts on impersonated business login pages.

Earlier Windows variants use obfuscated HTA scripts executed through MSHTA, often launched by malicious scripts bundled with a legitimate Python interpreter. CountLoader 4.5p uses fileless PowerShell execution, .NET reflection, and D/Invoke to bypass AMSI. Its evasion techniques include self-deletion, antivirus-aware execution, and copying legitimate Windows utilities under misleading names while modifying their executable metadata. Windows persistence primarily uses scheduled tasks; the macOS variant supports Intel and Apple Silicon systems and persists through LaunchAgents.

CountLoader collects operating-system, hardware, user, antivirus, privilege, and domain information, and inventories cryptocurrency wallet applications, browser extensions, and Signal Desktop. Some deployments include an Active Directory reconnaissance module that enumerates domain computers, groups, and privileged memberships. Host telemetry is transmitted through an obfuscated command-and-control protocol, with JWT bearer tokens used for authenticated tasking. Supported tasks include downloading and executing executables, archives, DLLs, MSI packages, and scripts; running PowerShell modules in memory; removing persistence; and propagating through malicious shortcuts on removable media and network shares.

CountLoader has supported large-scale infections across multiple countries. One sinkholed Windows campaign involved approximately 86,000 infected machines, with the highest infection counts in India, Indonesia, and the United States.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-6387via breakglass intelregreSSHionCountLoader — previously investigated by BGI — distributes via a filename specifically designed to lure security researchers: source code of carbanak backdoor discovered.exe . | CountLoader's secondary C2 at burning-edge[.]sbs ( 65.21.174[.]205 , Hetzner) has phpMyAdmin exposed at /phpmyadmin/ , MySQL on port 3306, and 120+ CVEs including regreSSHion.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

70 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 49+ malicious domains registered

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1583.003 — Virtual Private Server (PFCLOUD, ThinkHuge, OMEGATECH)

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 HTA payloads staged on delivery domains

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

Researchers observed CountLoader campaigns commencing through SEO poisoning

Initial Access

6 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence6

Propagates via removable media by creating malicious LNK shortcuts next to hidden originals; the shortcut executes the original file and then launches the malware via mshta with a C2 parameter.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence5

Researchers observed CountLoader campaigns commencing through SEO poisoning, fake social media posts or software sites offering free or 'cracked' downloads

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

"First Malicious MCP Server Found Stealing Emails in Rogue Postmark-MCP Package"; "Self-Replicating Worm Hits 180+ npm Packages"; "SilentSync RAT Delivered via Two Malicious PyPI Packages"; "Malicious Rust Crates Steal Solana and Ethereum Keys"; "VS Code ... republish deleted extensions"

T1566PhishingEvidence4

В обнаруженных кампаниях злоумышленники создавали поддельные страницы входа в NetSuite, Odoo, HubSpot и Salesforce, а вредоносный код загружался через встроенный iframe.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 HTML files with spoofed extensions via email

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence4

even direct messages meant to entice victims

Execution

13 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The loader also verifies whether CrowdStrike Falcon service is active by querying the antivirus list via WMI.

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence4

проверяет наличие Signal Desktop и закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

CountLoader creates persistence using Scheduled Task with name "GoogleTaskSystem136.0.7023.12" + <GUID-like string>.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence6

с помощью findstr или certutil извлекает из изображения скрытый JavaScript, VBScript или PowerShell-код, который запускает дроппер второго этапа.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence11

11 Executes a remote PowerShell payload by downloading and in-memory executing it via Invoke-RestMethod piping to Invoke-Expression.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 49+ malicious domains registered Resource Development Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 HTA payloads staged on delivery domains Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Links to typosquat domains distributed Initial Access Drive-by Compromise T1189 Typosquat domains serve malicious downloads Execution System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005 HTA payload executes via mshta.exe Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Obfuscated PowerShell in HTA payload Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003 CMD commands in HTA payload

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

с помощью findstr или certutil извлекает из изображения скрытый JavaScript, VBScript или PowerShell-код

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence7

с помощью findstr или certutil извлекает из изображения скрытый JavaScript, VBScript или PowerShell-код

T1197BITS JobsEvidence4

bitsadmin.exe /transfer "<job>" /download /priority foreground "<url>" "<out>"

T1204User ExecutionEvidence5

Его клиенты проводят ClickFix-атаки, скрывая вредоносный код в PNG-изображениях, которые заранее загружаются в кеш браузера жертвы.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence2

After the user clicks the fake download prompt, the site redirects them to a MediaFire link that hosts a malicious archive.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence6

The archive contains two items: an encrypted ZIP file and a .docx file that contains the password needed to open the ZIP.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Alongside Setup.exe, the archive contains one or more python3<X>.dll files that the interpreter automatically loads... they cause the local Lib directory to be used for dependency resolution and basic module loading.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence4

проверяет наличие Signal Desktop и закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

CountLoader creates persistence using Scheduled Task with name "GoogleTaskSystem136.0.7023.12" + <GUID-like string>.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence4

bitsadmin.exe /transfer "<job>" /download /priority foreground "<url>" "<out>"

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Registry Run Key (T1547.001): Writes to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for user-level persistence

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

It rewrites the target of these shortcuts so that when the user double-clicks their browser shortcut, it secretly launches the intended browser and the RAT in the background.

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence4

проверяет наличие Signal Desktop и закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

CountLoader creates persistence using Scheduled Task with name "GoogleTaskSystem136.0.7023.12" + <GUID-like string>.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe, never touching the disk... | The next stages involve a PowerShell packer that decrypts and launches a shellcode injector... The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe...

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Registry Run Key (T1547.001): Writes to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for user-level persistence

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

It rewrites the target of these shortcuts so that when the user double-clicks their browser shortcut, it secretly launches the intended browser and the RAT in the background.

Stealth

22 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

Для расшифровки финального пейлоада используется публичный IPv4-адрес жертвы: на его основе формируется ключ для кастомного потокового шифра на базе SHA-256 в режиме CTR с XOR.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

The campaign deploys an updated CountLoader and the newly identified DeviceManager RAT, which leverage advanced techniques such as Windows binary patching and blockchain-based C2 resolution.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence3

скрывая вредоносный код в PNG-изображениях... хостит картинки со скрытыми при помощи стеганографии пейлоадами

T1027.006HTML SmugglingEvidence2

March 12: The HTML Smuggling Batch (3 samples) ... All three confirmed as version 4.1.1 with the simplified protocol.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

CountLoader establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and can copy, rename, and modify the PE metadata of legitimate Windows utilities, including conhost.exe, powershell.exe, and mshta.exe, to execute commands while masquerading as trusted applications.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

The vast majority of detections for mshta.exe come from instances where the command line contains domains that appear to be legitimate services but are hosted on the .cc TLD... Starting in late February 2026... shifted to .vg and .gl TLDs.

T1036.007Double File ExtensionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 49+ malicious domains registered Resource Development Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 HTA payloads staged on delivery domains Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Links to typosquat domains distributed Initial Access Drive-by Compromise T1189 Typosquat domains serve malicious downloads Execution System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005 HTA payload executes via mshta.exe Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Obfuscated PowerShell in HTA payload Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003 CMD commands in HTA payload Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript T1059.007 JavaScript embedded in HTA Defense Evasion Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name T1036.005 Files named .rar/.pptx/.wav to appear legitimate Defense Evasion Masquerading: Double File Extension T1036.007 HTML content with non-HTML extensions

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe, never touching the disk... | The next stages involve a PowerShell packer that decrypts and launches a shellcode injector... The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe...

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

clean up persistence mechanisms likely to erase forensic evidence... If a target CIS language is detected, DeviceManager executes a self-deletion routine: it removes its scheduled task, deletes its installation directory via cmd.exe, and terminates process execution.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Type 4: Self-delete (cleanup)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

The script block contains a minimal JavaScript loader that implements a Base64 decoding function... The main function decodes and executes the embedded script.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence4

bitsadmin.exe /transfer "<job>" /download /priority foreground "<url>" "<out>"

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

2. certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f (LOLBIN)

T1218.005MshtaEvidence12

Upon execution, MSHTA retrieves and runs an obfuscated variant of the CountLoader v3.2.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence3

Downloads an MSI installer and performs a silent install under the current user context. msiexec.exe /i "<UserProfile>\package.msi" /quiet /qn

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

Downloads a DLL from the URL to the user's profile and runs it via rundll32 using an export name supplied alongside the URL.

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence1

It demonstrates the growing sophistication of ClickFix campaigns by using steganography and environmental keying to deliver payloads while evading detection.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Before executing its payload, the HTA performs environment fingerprinting to evade sandboxes: Hostname check: If the hostname is AZURE-PC, execution terminates... Username check: If the username is Bruno, execution terminates...

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

It starts by hiding the mshta window to ensure that the malicious activity runs silently in the background without alerting the user.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Alongside Setup.exe, the archive contains one or more python3<X>.dll files that the interpreter automatically loads... they cause the local Lib directory to be used for dependency resolution and basic module loading.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

Shellcode Execution : The injected shellcode unpacks the final payload directly in memory.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

LummaStealer est une famille de malware de type infostealer activement utilisée dans des campagnes à grande échelle, dont la propagation repose notamment sur des campagnes de phishing et des techniques d’ingénierie sociale.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The next PowerShell stage disables security mechanisms such as AMSI and injects shellcode into a legitimate process.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

76 crypto wallet extension IDs -- MetaMask, Phantom, Trust Wallet, Coinbase Wallet, Rabby, Ledger Live, and 70 others

Discovery

11 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence2

Dual-use design : The combination of consumer crypto wallet theft (76 extensions) with enterprise AD reconnaissance (Domain Admin enumeration, forest mapping)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

the malware enumerates running processes via Win32_Process

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence3

Collects and exfiltrates extensive system/domain reconnaissance (computer role, domain/forest data, current user group memberships, Domain Admins members, domain computers).

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence8

Он собирает сведения о системе... В остальных случаях троян собирает GUID машины, SID пользователя, имя хоста, версию ОС, а также данные об архитектуре, установленном антивирусе и домене.

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence3

Collects and exfiltrates extensive system/domain reconnaissance (computer role, domain/forest data, current user group memberships, Domain Admins members, domain computers).

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Task type 9 activates a USB spreading module that enumerates removable drives via WMI

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence3

Collects and exfiltrates extensive system/domain reconnaissance (computer role, domain/forest data, current user group memberships, Domain Admins members, domain computers).

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Before executing its payload, the HTA performs environment fingerprinting to evade sandboxes: Hostname check: If the hostname is AZURE-PC, execution terminates... Username check: If the username is Bruno, execution terminates...

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence3

Он собирает сведения о системе, ищет приложения и браузерные расширения криптовалютных кошельков, проверяет наличие Signal Desktop

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence2

The loader also verifies whether CrowdStrike Falcon service is active by querying the antivirus list via WMI.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Locale check: If the system locale returns SYSTEM or the Cyrillic equivalent СИСТЕМА, execution terminates (avoids CIS-region systems...).

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence6

Propagates via removable media by creating malicious LNK shortcuts next to hidden originals; the shortcut executes the original file and then launches the malware via mshta with a C2 parameter.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... Collection Data from Local System T1005 Wallet files, browser extension data

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence3

Operators then add DOUBLECUP's code to their ClickFix sites, which retrieves the configuration... selects the command matching the victim's browser, and copies it to the clipboard when the page is opened.

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

The malware provides operators with persistence, system reconnaissance, command execution, payload delivery, and resilient command and control capabilities.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

The script identifies an active C2 by sending POST requests to domains in the format globalsnn{i}-new[.]cc.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

Также этот загрузчик способен скачивать и запускать MSI-пакеты, DLL, PowerShell-модули и другие файлы... загрузки новых пейлоадов.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

In short, a random six-digit key is generated and used as an XOR key to encode the Base64 representation of the plaintext.

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence1

The CountLoader client (HTA script) and its command-and-control (C2) server use a custom encoding/decoding routine to exchange data and conceal the actual content being transmitted.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence3

The campaign deploys an updated CountLoader and the newly identified DeviceManager RAT, which leverage advanced techniques such as Windows binary patching and blockchain-based C2 resolution.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence2

Command and Control Domain Generation Algorithms T1568.002 s{N}-rarlab.com, node{N}-py-store.com patterns

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

All communications between the client and the server are encrypted, with slightly different encryption schemes used for each direction.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Command and Control Encrypted Channel T1573.002 HTTPS via Cloudflare proxy

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

On successfully receiving the initial host information, CountLoader C2 server issues a unique JWT token tied to the submitted HWID.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

255 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

34 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching255Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping70Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.