Danti is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group, related to NetTraveller and DragonOK, known for targeting Indian government organizations and embassies, as well as entities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, Nepal, and the Philippines. Danti's campaigns in early 2016 leveraged spear-phishing emails containing malicious DOCX attachments exploiting CVE-2015-2545, a Microsoft Office vulnerability allowing remote code execution via embedded EPS files. The group used custom shellcode to drop backdoors and other payloads, including keyloggers and data exfiltration tools. Danti demonstrated the ability to modify exploits to evade antivirus detection and used multi-stage payloads, privilege escalation, and extensive system reconnaissance. Their infrastructure included C2 domains such as newsupdate.dynssl.com and dnsnews.dns05.com, often using dynamic DNS services and hosting in Asia. The attacks were highly targeted, focused on government and diplomatic sectors, and involved decoy documents relevant to the victims. Indicators of compromise include specific hashes, C2 domains, and email addresses associated with the campaigns.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.