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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

BRUSHFIRE

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Network device

BRUSHFIRE is a passive, memory-resident backdoor written in bare C that targets Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It was observed in post-exploitation activity beginning in mid-March 2025 involving CVE-2025-22457, a buffer overflow vulnerability enabling remote code execution. The activity is associated with UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor, and also involved the TRAILBLAZE dropper and components of the SPAWN malware ecosystem.

A shell-script deployment chain uses TRAILBLAZE to inject BRUSHFIRE into a code cave within an existing appliance web process. BRUSHFIRE hooks SSL_read, calls the original function, and checks whether the returned data begins with a specific trigger string. When matching input is received, it XOR-decrypts and executes shellcode embedded in that input. If the shellcode produces a return value, BRUSHFIRE sends it back using SSL_write. This passive design allows attacker-supplied code to execute through the appliance's existing TLS-handling process.

The observed deployment is nonpersistent: restarting the affected process or appliance removes the implant, requiring the dropper to run again. Its in-memory execution and integration into a legitimate web process support stealthy post-compromise access.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-22457via mandiant threat intelligenceExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Ivanti Secure Access GatewaysThe earliest evidence of observed CVE-2025-22457 exploitation occurred in mid-March 2025. Following successful exploitation, we observed the deployment of two newly identified malware families, the TRAILBLAZE in-memory only dropper and the BRUSHFIRE passive backdoor. | BRUSHFIRE is a passive backdoor written in bare C that acts as an SSL_read hook.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC5221

BRUSHFIRE is a passive backdoor written in bare C that acts as an SSL_read hook.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

"deployment of ... malware families ... TRAILBLAZE ... BRUSHFIRE ... deployment of the previously reported SPAWN ecosystem of malware"

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

UNC5221 is actively leveraging the n-day vulnerability CVE-2025-22457, they likely identified by analyzing the patch previously released in February.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

"Mandiant observed the deployment of two newly identified malware families ... through a shell script dropper."

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

We identified the suspected China-nexus espionage actor UNC5221 exploiting this flaw in the wild for remote code execution in their operations, dating back to mid-March.

T1574.013KernelCallbackTableEvidence1

"BRUSHFIRE ... acts as an SSL_read hook." / "TRAILBLAZE injects a hook into the identified /home/bin/web process."

Persistence

1 technique
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence2

[BRUSHFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9011) has monitored inbound VPN traffic to compromised appliances until specific inbound packets contain a specific magic string/pattern instead of external beaconing.(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

"use of a shell-script dropper to inject TRAILBLAZE and BRUSHFIRE into a live web process, avoiding persistence and focusing on stealth"

Stealth

6 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

"use of a shell-script dropper to inject TRAILBLAZE and BRUSHFIRE into a live web process, avoiding persistence and focusing on stealth"

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

"It then deletes all of the temporary files previously created ... as well as the contents of the /data/var/cores directory."

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

[BRUSHFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9011) has decrypted XOR strings prior to execution.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence2

[BRUSHFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9011) has monitored inbound VPN traffic to compromised appliances until specific inbound packets contain a specific magic string/pattern instead of external beaconing.(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

T1574.013KernelCallbackTableEvidence1

"BRUSHFIRE ... acts as an SSL_read hook." / "TRAILBLAZE injects a hook into the identified /home/bin/web process."

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

[BRUSHFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9011) has executed its commands within memory and is not saved on disk.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"BRUSHFIRE ... acts as an SSL_read hook ... execute shellcode contained in the data ... call SSL_write to send the value back."

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence2

[BRUSHFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9011) has monitored inbound VPN traffic to compromised appliances until specific inbound packets contain a specific magic string/pattern instead of external beaconing.(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence2

[BRUSHFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9011) has the ability to exfiltrate data on-demand through executing commands obtained via monitoring for specially crafted packets and sending output back in an embedded SSL response.(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.