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Malware3 associated actors

Deuterbear

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BRONZE CANAL

BRONZE CANAL ... Tools ... Bifrose, Deuterbear, DRIGO, Flagpro, Gh0stTimes, KIVARS, PLEAD, Spiderpig, Waterbear, XBOW

via secureworkssecureworks.com
BlackTech

"In 2022, Earth Hundun began using the latest version of Waterbear — also known as Deuterbear — ... we consider it a different malware entity from the original Waterbear."

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
Earth Hundun

"In 2022, Earth Hundun began using the latest version of Waterbear — also known as Deuterbear — ... we consider it a different malware entity from the original Waterbear."

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

“Dynamically loads the APIs through the shellcode”

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

“Dynamically loads the DLLs through the shellcode”

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.012Print ProcessorsEvidence1

“Abuses print processors to run malicious DLLs during system”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.012Print ProcessorsEvidence1

“Abuses print processors to run malicious DLLs during system”

Stealth

4 techniques
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

“uses the same custom salted RC4 decryption… to decrypt the downloader… [and] uses the CryptUnprotectData API.”

T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence1

“Targets specific path/registry in the victim’s environment” and “Note that the CLSID value is unique and defined during malware installation.”

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

“Checking sandbox environment by API, Sleep… Checking execution in specific time, like 9~10 o’clock”

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

“checks the debugger mode” and “Checking debugger mode by process time”

Discovery

4 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

“Query password from registry… Query path of encrypted downloader from registry… [then] Downloader decryption…”

T1016.001Internet Connection DiscoveryEvidence1

“Downloaders check for internet connectivity on compromised systems.”

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

“Checking sandbox environment by API, Sleep… Checking execution in specific time, like 9~10 o’clock”

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

“checks the debugger mode” and “Checking debugger mode by process time”

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“Downloaders communicate with C&C by HTTP/HTTPS” and “Deuterbear downloader enables HTTPS tunnel”

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence1

“Encodes traffic with a non-standard RC4 to make the content of traffic more difficult to detect”

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

“Employs a RC4/RSA to conceal command and control traffic” and “The downloader… generate an RSA… [then] RC4_KEY_1 and RC4_KEY_2… encrypted by RSA”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“Sends collected data to C&C”

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.