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Malware2 associated actors

BackConfig

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

BackConfig is a Windows malware family associated with the Hangover threat group, also tracked as Neon, Viceroy Tiger, and MONSOON. It has been used in targeted intrusions against government and military organizations in South Asia. The malware exhibits downloader and backdoor-like behavior centered on staging and repeatedly executing additional malicious payloads on compromised hosts.

BackConfig has been delivered through malicious documents containing VBA macros and through VBS-based installation routines that deploy its downloader component. On infected systems it can download and execute files using native Windows and networking APIs, including functionality consistent with retrieving remote content over HTTP and launching payloads locally. It also gathers basic host information such as the victim computer name.

For persistence, BackConfig abuses Windows Scheduled Tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads. It also employs multiple defense-evasion measures, including hiding files and folders from normal Windows Explorer view, storing payloads in directories made to resemble legitimate software locations, masquerading as a legitimate DHCP service binary, removing artifacts from previous infections, and identifying prior infection-related files and folders. Samples have also used custom string decryption routines and self-signed code-signing certificates crafted to imitate a legitimate software company, further complicating analysis and detection.

Overall, BackConfig is best characterized as a Windows downloader used in espionage-oriented campaigns, with persistence, payload staging, host profiling, cleanup, and masquerading features tailored for stealthy operations against high-value governmental and military targets.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DoNot APT

References : https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/updated-backconfig-malware-targeting-government-and-military-organizations/

Hangover

Unit 42 researchers recently published on activity by the Hangover threat group (aka Neon, Viceroy Tiger, MONSOON) carrying out targeted cyberattacks deploying BackConfig malware attacks against government and military organizations in South Asia.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to use scheduled tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) can download and run batch files to execute commands on a compromised host.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence5

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has used VBS to install its downloader component and malicious documents with VBA macro code.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) can leverage API functions such as <code>ShellExecuteA</code> and <code>HttpOpenRequestA</code> in the process of downloading and executing files.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

"Defense Evasion: BITS Jobs (T1197)"

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

"After the user executes the weaponized document, backdoor communication is established between BackConfig and the threat actors"

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"...making them download and execute a weaponized Microsoft Office document."

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence3

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has compromised victims via links to URLs hosting malicious content.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to use scheduled tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1137.001Office Template MacrosEvidence3

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to use hidden columns in Excel spreadsheets to store executable files or commands for VBA macros.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

"Defense Evasion: BITS Jobs (T1197)"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to use scheduled tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"...moved from plain text code and URLs to encoded... storing encoded executables within the documents..." and "Defense Evasion: Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)"

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence3

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has used compressed and decimal encoded VBS scripts.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has hidden malicious payloads in <code>%USERPROFILE%\Adobe\Driver\dwg\</code> and mimicked the legitimate DHCP service binary.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to remove files and folders related to previous infections.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence11

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has used a custom routine to decrypt strings.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

"Defense Evasion: BITS Jobs (T1197)"

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence5

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to set folders or files to be hidden from the Windows Explorer default view.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has been signed with self signed digital certificates mimicking a legitimate software company.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence11

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to gather the victim's computer name.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to identify folders and files related to previous infections.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"Command and Control: Standard Application Layer Protocol (T1071)" and "...communicates... using HTTPS"

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) has the ability to use HTTPS for C2 communiations.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) can download and execute additional payloads on a compromised host.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.