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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

Pulsar RAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK50Techniques
IOCs43Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionCrypto theft
Delivery
PhishingCracked software
Platforms
Windows

Pulsar RAT is a modular .NET remote access trojan targeting Windows systems. It has been characterized as an open-source, Quasar RAT-derived tool and is deployed through multi-stage, heavily obfuscated loaders that favor PowerShell, Donut-generated shellcode, reflective loading, and in-memory process injection to reduce on-disk artifacts. Documented delivery includes typosquatted malicious npm packages, where post-install execution can recover a steganographically concealed payload and deploy the RAT. Pulsar RAT has also appeared alongside browser-extension-based banking malware in Brazil-focused KREMLIN/REF9334 activity and in other commodity-malware campaigns.

The RAT supports interactive remote control, remote command execution, file operations, credential theft from Chromium- and Firefox-family browsers, keylogging, and collection of screen, webcam, and microphone data. It can steal cryptocurrency-wallet data and replace cryptocurrency addresses in the clipboard. Collected information may be compressed and exfiltrated through attacker-controlled infrastructure or common messaging services. Observed variants use anti-virtualization and anti-debugging checks, AMSI, ETW, and Windows Lockdown Policy bypasses, process injection, and watchdog behavior to hinder analysis and maintain execution. Persistence has been observed through user-level Run-key entries and scheduled tasks, with some loaders attempting UAC bypass. C2 communications have been observed using encrypted protocols and MessagePack-based messaging.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF9334

Documented REF9334 campaigns used PULSAR versions 1.6.6/1.7.3 in June 2025, PULSAR in the Codecaudiog B and Acrobat campaigns, and PULSAR 2.4.5 in the April 2026 Cremeb campaign.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
REF1695

The actor-hosted payload inventory maps plsr_instllr_1804.exe to Pulsar RAT, while the consolidated table lists PulsarRAT version 1.5.1.

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

50 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence4

"Malware found in NPM packages with 1 million weekly downloads"; "Complex npm attack uses 7-plus layers of obfuscation to spread Pulsar RAT"; "Fake npm utilities remotely delete entire app directories"

T1566PhishingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs Technique ID Name Implementation T1566 Phishing MSI delivered as social engineering lure

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“/c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn … Persistence: task runs every minute… Schedule.Service COM ProgID”

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Codecaudiog A (juin 2025) : PowerShell → RunPE → PULSAR.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

...exposes native Windows API functions, such as OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

[2] EXECUTION User runs MSI → Windows Installer executes CustomAction

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“/c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn … Persistence: task runs every minute… Schedule.Service COM ProgID”

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Persistence T1112 Modify Registry; Defense Evasion T1112 Modify Registry

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Persistence Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“/c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn … Persistence: task runs every minute… Schedule.Service COM ProgID”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Codecaudiog A : PowerShell → RunPE → PULSAR.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

T1055.004 Process Injection: APC ZwQueueApcThread

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence4

Remote execution <ExecuteViaRunPE>b__0 (process hollowing)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Persistence Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

“Silent UAC Bypass… uses the fodhelper.exe UAC bypass… (MITRE T1548.002)”

Stealth

19 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

GUID-encoded shellcode — 973 KB of x64 shellcode stored as 60,820 Windows GUIDs in the PE .rdata section, evading signature-based detection

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Defense Evasion T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence2

“a malicious npm package… employed steganography to download and deploy the Pulsar RAT.”

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

T1027.011 Fileless Storage Shellcode decoded into memory

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

“extracts an embedded Base64-encoded PowerShell payload…” and “contains an encrypted byte array that is decrypted at runtime using a bitwise XOR routine”

T1027.015CompressionEvidence1

“T1027.015 … Compression” and “Collected information is packaged into compressed archives…”

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

DLL sideloading de SentinelMemoryScanner.exe; leurre Adobe Framesync.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Codecaudiog A : PowerShell → RunPE → PULSAR.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

T1055.004 Process Injection: APC ZwQueueApcThread

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence4

Remote execution <ExecuteViaRunPE>b__0 (process hollowing)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion” and “writes it temporarily to disk… and then deletes the script.”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files GUID-to-bytes decoding at runtime

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

T1218.007 Msiexec MSI installer as execution vehicle

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

rundll32.exe "<temp>\cfgmgr.dll",nGOYQVFxRyF

T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence1

T1480 Execution Guardrails Debugger detection + sleep delays

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-VM CheckForVMwareAndVirtualBox , VMware/VirtualBox/QEMU/Parallels strings

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window” and “launches it using a hidden PowerShell instance…”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The shellcode then reflectively loads an embedded .NET PE (the Pulsar RAT payload) from position 0x99b41 in the decoded shellcode, using a custom in-memory PE loader.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Anti-debug IsDebuggerPresent , CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Persistence T1112 Modify Registry; Defense Evasion T1112 Modify Registry

T1553.004Install Root CertificateEvidence1

“SSL bypass Custom ServerCertificateValidationCallback (accepts all certs)”

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

1. AMSI Bypass: AmsiInitialize AmsiScanBuffer AmsiScanString The shellcode patches AMSI functions in memory to disable antivirus scanning of script content.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Category Evidence Keylogging Gma.System.MouseKeyHook , KeyloggerService

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie Browser profile exfiltration

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

T1555.003 Web Browser Credentials Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera/Firefox

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

T1012 Query Registry SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

T1057 Process Discovery WMI Win32_BIOS , Win32_DiskDrive

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

T1082 System Information Discovery OS version, hardware, CLR version

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-VM CheckForVMwareAndVirtualBox , VMware/VirtualBox/QEMU/Parallels strings

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

“enumerate installed antivirus products via WMI: Get-CimInstance… AntiVirusProduct… Based on what it finds, it takes different paths”

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Anti-debug IsDebuggerPresent , CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent

Collection

6 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Category Evidence Keylogging Gma.System.MouseKeyHook , KeyloggerService

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

Category Evidence Screen capture SharpDX , SharpDX.Direct3D11 , SharpDX.DXGI , SharpDX.D3DCompiler

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Clipboard hijack : Monitors clipboard continuously; replaces any recognized crypto address with attacker's address

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Category Evidence Audio NAudio.Core , NAudio.Wasapi , Error stopping audio

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Category Evidence Webcam AForge.Video , AForge.Video.DirectShow , FilterInfoCollection

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

Browser theft PK11SDR_Decrypt (Firefox), logins (Firefox logins.json), Cloning browser profile

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"A third steganographic PNG... acted as the live C2 channel, delivering the final encrypted Pulsar RAT payload on demand."

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

C2 connection: HTTPS → host.fedmenigga.workers.dev:443

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

Cloudflare Worker relay → 31.57.147.207:? (backend)

T1090.004Domain FrontingEvidence1

Cloudflare Workers C2 relay — host.fedmenigga.workers.dev proxies all C2 traffic through Cloudflare's CDN

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

Téléchargement de Node.js, récupération de configuration, téléchargement des binaires.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

"...obfuscation to spread Pulsar RAT"

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Data exfiltration : All captured data (keystrokes, screenshots, credentials, clipboard) sent to C2 operator in real-time

Indicators of compromise

Observables

43 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching43Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping50Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.