Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Nitrogen

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs60Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPrivilege escalationLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injectionExtortion
Delivery
MalvertisingLanding pageDrive byCloaking
Platforms
WindowsEsxi

Nitrogen is a Windows-focused malware family that emerged in 2023 as an initial-access loader distributed through search-engine malvertising campaigns impersonating legitimate business and IT software. Trojanized installers use DLL sideloading and a bundled Python environment to establish persistent access, retrieve command-and-control payloads, and deploy post-exploitation tooling including Meterpreter, Sliver, and Cobalt Strike. Observed operators used privilege-escalation and security-evasion mechanisms, performed host and domain reconnaissance, moved laterally using administrative remote-execution mechanisms, and exfiltrated data before ransomware deployment. Nitrogen activity has been linked to ALPHV/BlackCat affiliate intrusions. By mid-2024, the operators had developed an independent double-extortion ransomware operation using a strain reportedly derived from leaked Conti v2 builder code. The ransomware has affected organizations across manufacturing, business services, technology, and other sectors, including North American industrial operations. An ESXi-targeting variant contains a key-handling implementation defect that can make encrypted data unrecoverable even to the operators.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
AdverCRow

AdverCRow is a group named by S2W that has been active since at least June 2023, and attempts to gain initial access through malvertising and then gains initial access through the Nitrogen malware.

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

5 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence5

Affiliates of the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware-as-a-service operation are turning to malvertising campaigns to establish an initial foothold in their victims' systems. Paid adverts for popular business software such as Slack and Cisco AnyConnect are being used to lure corporate victims into downloading malware

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

MITRE TTPs identified in this analysis T1583.001: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

T1583.008MalvertisingEvidence1

The observed infection chain starts with malvertising via Google and Bing Ads to lure users to compromised WordPress sites and phishing pages impersonating popular software distribution sites, where they are tricked into downloading trojanized ISO installers.

T1584.001DomainsEvidence1

MITRE TTPs identified in this analysis T1584.001: Compromise Infrastructure: Domains

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

MITRE TTPs identified in this analysis T1608.001: Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actors also enabled Administrator and multiple other accounts with the password “GoodLuck!”

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

threat actors infiltrated the network, gaining their initial foothold through malicious payloads from a drive-by download.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Paid adverts for popular business software such as Slack and Cisco AnyConnect are being used to lure corporate victims into downloading malware that in turn leads to ransomware deployment.

Execution

3 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

Further on, threat actors utilized PsExec, and WMIC for lateral movement

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

custom_installer.exe payload is responsible for decrypting another ZIP archive that contains additional payloads to be placed across multiple folders, as well as establishing a persistence mechanism via scheduled tasks.

T1059.006PythonEvidence2

Nitrogen is initial-access malware that leverages Python libraries for stealth

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

custom_installer.exe payload is responsible for decrypting another ZIP archive that contains additional payloads to be placed across multiple folders, as well as establishing a persistence mechanism via scheduled tasks.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actors also enabled Administrator and multiple other accounts with the password “GoodLuck!”

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

custom_installer.exe payload is responsible for decrypting another ZIP archive that contains additional payloads to be placed across multiple folders, as well as establishing a persistence mechanism via scheduled tasks.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The payloads zen.dll and fid.dll use the transacted hollowing technique

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

transacted hollowing is a technique that combines elements of both Process Hollowing and Process Doppelgänging

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

transacted hollowing is a technique that combines elements of both Process Hollowing and Process Doppelgänging

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actors also enabled Administrator and multiple other accounts with the password “GoodLuck!”

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Using Python libraries allows attackers to more easily blend into an organization's normal traffic patterns since they are so ubiquitous. Added obfuscation techniques further delay defenders from spotting malicious activity.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

the user was deceived when attempting to install WinSCP software.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The payloads zen.dll and fid.dll use the transacted hollowing technique

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

transacted hollowing is a technique that combines elements of both Process Hollowing and Process Doppelgänging

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

transacted hollowing is a technique that combines elements of both Process Hollowing and Process Doppelgänging

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actors also enabled Administrator and multiple other accounts with the password “GoodLuck!”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

foo.dll is responsible for decrypting the “data” file with the AES algorithm.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassEvidence2

MITRE TTPs identified in this analysis T1553.005: Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

These include bypassing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI), bypasses for Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and Windows Lockdown Policy (WLDP), antivirus evasion by using AntiHook

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The following reconnaissance commands were executed to gather information about the network and users: nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS

T1069.001Local GroupsEvidence1

net1 localgroup Administrators

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence1

net group "domain admins" /DOMAIN

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Further on, threat actors utilized PsExec, and WMIC for lateral movement

Collection

1 technique
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The Nitrogen ransomware gang says it stole 8 TB of data from Foxconn, including files allegedly tied to projects from Apple, Nvidia, Google, Dell, and Intel.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The KeeLoader used in the attack installed Cobalt Strike, and its watermark, 678358251, was found to be indirectly related to BlackCat and BlackBasta. Analysis of the used aenys[.]com infrastructure identified Nitrogen malware disguised as a WinSCP installation file, which also distributes Cobalt Strike.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The alleged Foxconn cache includes technical files... the cache contains confidential instructions, project documentation, and technical drawings.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

Once the hackers have that initial foothold, they can then infect the target with the malware of their choosing. In the case with this attack campaign, the target victims are being infected with the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

By 2024, the hacking group had moved into direct extortion, claiming victims across sectors where stolen data can create pressure fast.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

60 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching60Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.