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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

Crimson RAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 29 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs139Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceLateral movement
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Crimson RAT is a custom .NET-based remote access trojan for Windows closely associated with Transparent Tribe, also known as APT36, a Pakistan-aligned cyberespionage group. It is used for persistent surveillance and information theft, particularly against Indian government, military, diplomatic, research, and educational targets. Campaigns have also targeted Indian cybersecurity and intelligence-related startups, including organizations providing services to law enforcement.

Crimson RAT supports arbitrary command execution, process enumeration and termination, system-information collection, drive and directory enumeration, and extensive file-management operations. It can upload, download, execute, search for, and delete files; capture individual or continuous screenshots; steal credentials and sensitive documents; and exfiltrate information to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Some variants also access clipboard contents and record audio. Command sets vary across implementations. The malware commonly communicates through custom TCP command-and-control protocols and establishes persistence using Windows startup mechanisms, including Run entries. A newer variant supports loading a separate USB worm component for propagation through removable media.

Delivery commonly relies on spearphishing and tailored social engineering, including military, academic, government-policy, and personal-interest lures. Infection chains use malicious Office macros, embedded OLE objects, Office add-ins, or archive and ISO attachments containing deceptive Windows shortcuts and scripts. Decoy documents conceal background payload execution. Evasion techniques include string and command obfuscation, .NET packing, delayed execution, hardware-based anti-analysis checks, and artificial binary inflation with junk data. Multiple generations and variants demonstrate continued development while retaining the family's core remote-control and espionage functionality.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT36

“Their historical RAT arsenal includes CapraRAT, Crimson RAT, ElizaRAT, and DeskRAT.”

via cyberwarzonecyberwarzone.com
APT-36

A well-known threat actor historically associated with Pakistan, APT36 (aka Transparent Tribe), was also active. Analysts suggest it used more sophisticated malware (Crimson RAT) to target Indian infrastructure, although its relation to hacktivism is murky.

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
Turla

2024-12-04 ⋅ Microsoft Threat Intelligence Frequent freeloader part I: Secret Blizzard compromising Storm-0156 infrastructure for espionage Crimson RAT MiniPocket TwoDash Wainscot

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

It’s a surprise that the Crimson RAT variant embedded a command for loading the malware usbworm. Which means it can do lateral movment through removable media like usb .

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Remcos is primarily delivered to victims via malicious attachments in phishing emails.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence11

Кампании начинаются с целевого фишинга: ZIP-архивы, ISO-образы и VHDX с LNK-ярлыками, документами-приманками, batch-скриптами и полезной нагрузкой.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

Crimson is typically delivered to the victim via a phishing email containing a malicious .doc file or link to a malicious executable.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Process: List processes Kill process Execute commands

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Batch-скрипт снимает Mark of the Web через PowerShell: Remove-Item -Stream Zone.Identifier или Unblock-File.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

“execute arbitrary commands… execute commands with COMSPEC and receive the output… This tab allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the remote machine.”

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence8

We used oletools to extract the VBA script from the macro... While executing the document it runs the VBA script.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

When target opens such attachment, it drops MSIL based Crimson RAT which has been used by APT36 in many of their past attacks.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

In addition to macros, we observed that Transparent Tribe have adopted OLE embedding as a technique to stage Crimson RAT. Malicious documents that implement this technique require users to double-click a document element.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence11

Жертва должна самостоятельно смонтировать ISO или распаковать ZIP и вручную запустить LNK-файл.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

Закрепление идёт через модификацию ключей реестра автозапуска HKCU\...\Run; пути в реестре обфусцированы.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

Закрепление идёт через модификацию ключей реестра автозапуска HKCU\...\Run; пути в реестре обфусцированы.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

It also uses Base64 encoding technique to encode the strings... The registry path is encoded in Base64 and while executing it decodes

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence2

The stage-1 HTA contains two embedded files... that are base64 encoded... Both the HTA contain embedded files...

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence1

Transparent Tribe... continuously used Crimson RAT but with either an encoded or a packed version... two new samples that were obfuscated with Eziriz’s .NET Reactor were also found

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

These macro-enabled PowerPoint add-on files (PPAM) are utilized to wrap malicious payloads by embedding archive files as OLE objects.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

It then copies and decompresses it into the Documents folder as a screensaver file “hacrvidth vibev.scr” and executes it.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The DLL files dropped are not sideloaded by the AllaKore RAT, and they are legitimate files... These are Microsoft Windows-related libraries...

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

dey5lt Delete a file in the given path

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

Снятие Mark of the Web через PowerShell (Remove-Item -Stream Zone.Identifier или Unblock-File) для обхода SmartScreen.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The stage-1 HTA contains two embedded files, a decoy and a DLL, that are base64 encoded.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

It performed a delayed execution technique by holding the execution. It gets the current system time and holds for 3 minutes before continuing execution.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

In order to confirm if the Crimson RAT is running, it starts a process and checks repeatedly (up to 10 times) whether the application still exists.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

It uses AMSI (Anti Malware Scan Interface) bypass technique to escape from scanning of AMSI API.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence5

gey5tavs, pry5ocl Gets the list of all running process

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Chairtabkjh8.exe sends system information to C2 including computer name and username.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

it gets the information about the image files like image name, size of image and its creation time as specified by C2.

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

diy5rs Retrieves the list of Drives in the system

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

It performed a delayed execution technique by holding the execution. It gets the current system time and holds for 3 minutes before continuing execution.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

In order to confirm if the Crimson RAT is running, it starts a process and checks repeatedly (up to 10 times) whether the application still exists.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

“tries to circumvent certain vendors’ security tools by configuring the Server to prevent installation of some… components… on systems protected with Kaspersky… and… ESET.”

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

It’s a surprise that the Crimson RAT variant embedded a command for loading the malware usbworm. Which means it can do lateral movment through removable media like usb .

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Crimson RAT variant embedded a command for loading the malware usbworm.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

By using these commands, they can access all the files, pictures, system info, the running processes from the system.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

A few of these C2 commands don’t have functionality yet, but they are similar to the ones first documented by Proofpoint.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

“perform audio surveillance using microphones… The malware uses the NAudio library to interact with the microphone… pushed to the victim’s machine using a special command.”

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

A few of these C2 commands don’t have functionality yet, but they are similar to the ones first documented by Proofpoint.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence4

it creates a new directory E0d1 under C:\ProgramData\ and writes the array of values from the VBA into a file Chairtabkjh.zip in that directory. The zip file contains the executable file named Chairtabkjh8.exe

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence6

After collecting the data from the victim’s system, it tries to make a TCP connection to send the data to the C2 server sunnyleone[.]hopto[.]org by using different customized ports each time

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Opening the LNK triggers the MSHTA process, which executes a remote HTA file hosted on a compromised domain.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Для Crimson RAT описана C2-связь через собственный TCP-протокол с обфусцированными командами и жёстко прописанными адресами серверов.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

It also has the capability to delete the files in the system and also to download additional payloads and execute them.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

其最终释放的木马为该组织独有的远控木马Crimson RAT。具有远程Shell、上传、下载文件、获取进程信息、结束指定进程等多种远控功能。

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The use of a byte array to store a hostname like richa-sharma.ddns[.]net instead of a plain string ... and the ddns[.]net is a Dynamic DNS domain, commonly used by attackers for Command & Control (C2) servers

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence2

both the final payloads... are executed and connected with the same IP but different port numbers for C2 communication... 6663, 9828... Crimson RAT... 9149, 15597, 18518, 26791, 28329.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence6

Эксфильтрация идёт через тот же C2-канал: файлы Office, PDF, скриншоты, содержимое буфера обмена и системная информация.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

139 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching139Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.