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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

Crimson RAT

Crimson RAT is a custom .NET remote access trojan widely associated with Transparent Tribe/APT36 (also tracked as COPPER FIELDSTONE, Operation Transparent Tribe, ProjectM, Mythic Leopard, and Storm-0156), a Pakistan-linked espionage actor. Public reporting describes it as a long-running espionage tool used primarily against Indian government, military, diplomatic, academic, defense-adjacent, and more recently startup targets, with some reporting also noting activity focused on Afghanistan.

Observed delivery methods include spear-phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents containing VBA macros, weaponized Excel files, ISO container attachments, ZIP archives, and malicious LNK shortcuts. Reported infection chains include macros reconstructing and extracting ZIP payloads to %ALLUSERPROFILE%/ProgramData paths, and ISO/LNK chains that launch batch scripts and PowerShell, display decoy documents, and execute a Crimson RAT payload disguised as an Excel file. Reporting also notes exploitation of WinRAR CVE-2023-38831 in campaigns delivering Crimson RAT, as well as Indian government-themed and startup-themed lures.

Capabilities directly described in the source material include remote command execution; process listing and termination; file system browsing, search, upload/download, and exfiltration; screenshot capture and in some cases live screen streaming; persistence via Windows Registry Run keys and Startup-folder/LNK mechanisms; downloading and executing additional payloads; system reconnaissance; and collection of victim metadata such as machine name, username, OS version, IP/NIC, client ID, and installation path. Broader reporting on the Crimson tooling ecosystem also attributes microphone audio surveillance, webcam capture, keystroke logging, browser password theft, removable-media theft, and USB-worm functionality to related Crimson components managed through the Crimson Server C2.

Technical details in the provided content include use of custom TCP-based C2 on non-standard ports. One analyzed variant using the namespace dhrwarhsav hard-coded C2 IP 107.175.64.209 and attempted connections over ports 6728, 8661, 10614, 14822, and 18443; it used a custom length-prefixed UTF-8 protocol, copied itself for persistence, and set HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\_dreb. Another campaign report listed Crimson RAT communications over ports 18661, 20856, 26868, 29261, and 36628. A May 2025 report identified C2 infrastructure at 93.127.133.58:1097. Additional file/path artifacts mentioned in reporting include dhrwarhsav.exe, dorbanvca.exe, Book1.xls, and ProgramData paths such as C:\ProgramData\Edlacar, %ALLUSERPROFILE%\Media-List\tbvrarthsa.zip / tbvrarthsa.exe, and C:\ProgramData\Dacr\macrse.exe.

The malware is described as using evasion and anti-analysis measures including hidden WinForms execution, randomized function names, artificial file-size inflation with junk data, avoidance of certain system directories during traversal, and use of decoy documents to distract victims. Overall, the content consistently characterizes Crimson RAT as a mature espionage-focused RAT central to Transparent Tribe/APT36 operations.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

2024-12-04 ⋅ Microsoft Threat Intelligence Frequent freeloader part I: Secret Blizzard compromising Storm-0156 infrastructure for espionage Crimson RAT MiniPocket TwoDash Wainscot

Transparent Tribe

"...Transparent Tribe (aka APT36)... deliver Crimson RAT..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

“spread across systems by infecting removable media… USB Worm… infect removable devices with a copy of USBWorm itself”

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

“PowerPoint add-on files (.ppam)… contain malicious macros that, when enabled… initiate the malware download process.”

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“PDFs… embed malicious links… redirect users to fake login pages hosted on spoofed domains… designed to steal credentials.”

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

"The script uses PowerShell commands to remove security warnings that would normally alert users about suspicious files."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

“execute arbitrary commands… execute commands with COMSPEC and receive the output… This tab allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the remote machine.”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

"When someone opens what appears to be an Excel spreadsheet, they unknowingly activate a chain of hidden commands that install Crimson RAT..."

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3
TacticExecution

“doc requires enable-content/double-click… enabling macros… initiat[es] the infection process.”

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“The putsrt command ensures the malware remains active… Registry Run Keys T1547.001.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“The putsrt command ensures the malware remains active… Registry Run Keys T1547.001.”

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

“Obfuscated/Encrypted File T1027… Eazfuscator, string padding.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

"...malicious files disguised as legitimate documents"; "...a shortcut file masquerading as an Excel document..."; "...payload disguised as an excel executable."

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

"...file appears artificially inflated to 34 megabytes through embedded junk data... This bloating technique helps bypass signature-based detection systems."

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“get a process list… kill a process… Process manager: The attacker can obtain a list of running processes and terminate these…”

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“Commands such as filsz, listf, and fldr enables the malware to list, access, and download files.”

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“tries to circumvent certain vendors’ security tools by configuring the Server to prevent installation of some… components… on systems protected with Kaspersky… and… ESET.”

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

“spread across systems by infecting removable media… USB Worm… infect removable devices with a copy of USBWorm itself”

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

“steal files from removable media… Auto File Download… configure the bot to search files, filter results and upload multiple files… steal files of interest from removable devices”

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

“capture screenshots… designed for monitoring the remote screen… continuously send screenshots to the server…”

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

“perform audio surveillance using microphones… The malware uses the NAudio library to interact with the microphone… pushed to the victim’s machine using a special command.”

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

“record video streams from webcam devices… spying on a remote webcam and performing video surveillance.”

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“Crimson RAT connects to its hardcoded C2 server… 93.127.133.58 (port 1097)… direct TCP C2 on rotating ports.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“uploading Crimson components and executing these on remote system… download and upload files… USBWorm… download and execute the Crimson ‘Thin Client’… connect to a remote Crimson Server…”

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

"It communicates with command-and-control servers using custom TCP protocols on non-standard ports including 18661, 20856, 26868, 29261, and 36628."

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“Once the malware has collected sensitive data… it sends this data back to the C2 server… files sent via C2.”

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
9 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
16 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
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IOC matching25

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.