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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

XDealer

XDealer is a backdoor/RAT used in cyberespionage operations and is also referred to in the provided content as DinodasRAT. It has been associated with the China-nexus activity clusters Earth Krahang and LuoYu. In Earth Krahang intrusions, researchers reported that since 2023 the actor shifted from the RESHELL backdoor to XDealer because it provides more comprehensive backdoor capabilities, and observed both Windows and Linux variants. XDealer was delivered during the initial stage of attacks via spear-phishing or deployment through web shells on compromised servers. In one documented case, a compromised government mailbox sent a malicious RAR archive containing an LNK file that installed XDealer and displayed a decoy document related to the targeted agency. The broader Earth Krahang campaign targeted government entities worldwide, especially foreign affairs and other ministries, with a concentration in Southeast Asia and additional victims in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. The content also notes that LuoYu newly used XDealer alongside ShadowPad and PlugX. A notable artifact reported for some XDealer loaders is that they were signed with certificates issued by GlobalSign to the Chinese companies 上海笑聘网络科技有限公司 and 上海指聚网络科技有限公司, which researchers assessed were likely stolen and abused.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Earth Krahang

Since 2023, the Earth Krahang shifted to another backdoor (named XDealer by TeamT5 and DinodasRAT by ESET). Compared to RESHELL, XDealer provides more comprehensive backdoor capabilities.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
LuoYu

Since 2023, the Earth Krahang shifted to another backdoor (named XDealer by TeamT5 and DinodasRAT by ESET). Compared to RESHELL, XDealer provides more comprehensive backdoor capabilities.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1584.004ServerEvidence1

Earth Krahang abuses the trust between governments to conduct their attacks. We found that the group frequently uses compromised government webservers to host their backdoors and send download links to other government entities via spear phishing emails.

T1586.002Email AccountsEvidence1

In one case, the actor used a compromised mailbox from a government entity to send a malicious attachment to 796 email addresses belonging to the same entity.

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

Earth Krahang delivers backdoors to establish access to victim machines. Cobalt Strike and two custom backdoors, RESHELL and XDealer, were employed during the initial stage of attack.

T1588.003Code Signing CertificatesEvidence1

we found that some of the XDealer DLL loaders were signed with valid code signing certificates issued by GlobalSign to two Chinese companies.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

the group frequently uses compromised government webservers to host their backdoors and send download links to other government entities via spear phishing emails.

T1608.005Link TargetEvidence1

Since the malicious link uses a legitimate government domain of the compromised server, it will appear less suspicious to targets and may even bypass some domain blacklists.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

The threat actor abused the following vulnerabilities multiple times: CVE-2023-32315: command execution on OpenFire; CVE-2022-21587: command execution on Oracle Web Applications Desktop Integrator.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Earth Krahang also makes use of spear phishing email to attack its targets... In one case, the actor used a compromised mailbox from a government entity to send a malicious attachment to 796 email addresses.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

the group frequently uses compromised government webservers to host their backdoors and send download links to other government entities via spear phishing emails.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Maintaining backdoor persistence with task scheduling

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

the emails are intended trick their targets into opening attachments or embedded URL links that ultimately lead to the execution of a prepared backdoor file on the victim’s machine.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

The malicious attachment was a RAR archive containing an LNK file that deployed the Xdealer malware and opened a decoy document.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Maintaining backdoor persistence with task scheduling

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Maintaining backdoor persistence with task scheduling

Stealth

1 technique
T1036.007Double File ExtensionEvidence1
TacticStealth

backdoor filenames are usually related to geopolitical topics... 'Plan of Action (POA) - TH-VN - TH_Counterdraft_as of Feb 2022.doc.exe'

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1534Internal SpearphishingEvidence1

the actor used a compromised mailbox from a government entity to send a malicious attachment to 796 email addresses belonging to the same entity.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Its binaries are packed with ConfuserEX and its command-and-control (C&C) communication is encrypted with the AES algorithm.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

uses certutil commands to download and install the SoftEther VPN server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.