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Malware4 associated actors

BitLocker

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Post exploitationExtortion
Platforms
Windows

BitLocker is Microsoft's legitimate Windows volume-encryption feature, not a malware family. Threat actors abuse it after compromising systems to encrypt drives under attacker-controlled passwords or recovery material, deny victims access to data, and support ransom demands. This approach enables ransomware-like impact without deploying a purpose-built malicious encryptor.

Observed attacks have enabled BitLocker through administrative scripts, Group Policy, and scheduled tasks, including domain-wide deployment. Operators have configured encryption and forcibly locked or dismounted volumes, with reboot or shutdown actions used to make systems inaccessible. BitLocker has also been deployed alongside DiskCryptor, with different encryption tools used against servers and workstations.

Documented users include the Iranian threat cluster COBALT MIRAGE, also tracked as DEV-0270, and APT41. Other unrelated operators have likewise abused the feature, so its presence does not establish attribution. Associated intrusions have included exploitation of exposed Microsoft Exchange servers, privilege escalation, and administrative remote access before encryption; these are operator activities rather than capabilities of BitLocker itself. Malicious use has affected organizations across multiple industries and geographic regions. BitLocker does not inherently provide an infection vector, credential theft, lateral movement, or command-and-control functionality.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Guacamaya

BitLocker was then deployed through Group Policy. A first task installed the feature across the domain; a later scheduled task started encryption with attacker-controlled passwords.

via mac sploit blogmac.sploit.dk
Magic Hound

APT35 primarily conducts cyber espionage using spearphishing, social engineering, and custom malware techniques; however, it has also exploited Microsoft BitLocker to encrypt targets’ data in exchange for ransom payments.

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
COBALT MIRAGE

Last week, Microsoft took the wraps off a string of ransomware attacks mounted by a Phosphorus subgroup dubbed DEV-0270 using living-off-the-land binaries such as BitLocker.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
APT41

APT41 also used Microsoft Bitlocker to encrypt workstations...

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for command and control (C2); Plink for C2; Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement; BitLocker for data encryption; SoftPerfect Network Scanner for system network configuration discovery.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

The attackers exploited an internet-exposed RDP service on a machine connected to an 8 TB storage device containing mission-critical data.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

These were used to deploy scheduled tasks responsible for enabling the BitLocker service and individually encrypting the infrastructure’s disks...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

These were used to deploy scheduled tasks responsible for enabling the BitLocker service and individually encrypting the infrastructure’s disks, generating a key for each encrypted system.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

logon or start scripts containing the appropriate command line or PowerShell commands

T1106Native APIEvidence1

In addition to the ChamelGang activities, we have observed intrusions involving abuse of Jetico BestCrypt and Microsoft BitLocker to encrypt endpoints as a means to demand ransom. BestCrypt and BitLocker are used legitimately for data protection purposes.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

push the BitLocker GPO configuration across the domain alongside logon or start scripts containing the appropriate command line or PowerShell commands

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

These were used to deploy scheduled tasks responsible for enabling the BitLocker service and individually encrypting the infrastructure’s disks...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

These were used to deploy scheduled tasks responsible for enabling the BitLocker service and individually encrypting the infrastructure’s disks, generating a key for each encrypted system.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

The attackers exploited an internet-exposed RDP service on a machine connected to an 8 TB storage device containing mission-critical data.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

push the BitLocker GPO configuration across the domain alongside logon or start scripts containing the appropriate command line or PowerShell commands

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

These were used to deploy scheduled tasks responsible for enabling the BitLocker service and individually encrypting the infrastructure’s disks...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

These were used to deploy scheduled tasks responsible for enabling the BitLocker service and individually encrypting the infrastructure’s disks, generating a key for each encrypted system.

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence3

it would be possible for a threat actor with domain administrator privileges to both push the BitLocker GPO configuration across the domain alongside logon or start scripts

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence3

it would be possible for a threat actor with domain administrator privileges to both push the BitLocker GPO configuration across the domain alongside logon or start scripts

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence2

By exploiting this network exposure and misconfiguration, attackers breached the system, identified an additional drive, and leveraged BitLocker to encrypt the data and demand a ransom payment.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence18

The APT actors forced BitLocker activation on host networks to encrypt data [T1486].

Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.