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Malware

Vidar 2.0

Vidar 2.0 is an information-stealing malware family referenced as one of the more popular infostealers in the cybercriminal ecosystem. The provided reporting states that it has been distributed via fake game cheats hosted or promoted on GitHub and Reddit, and that it is also delivered in JackFix campaigns, where heavily obfuscated PowerShell payloads download multiple commercial infostealers and loaders, including Vidar 2.0. Recent reporting in the supplied content says Vidar 2.0 has shifted from primarily targeting consumer browser credentials to targeting enterprise cloud credentials and authentication keys, including credentials cached on unmanaged or BYOD devices, increasing organizational risk. The content does not attribute Vidar 2.0 itself to a specific threat actor, but it notes use by Russian-speaking cybercriminals in the context of JackFix delivery activity. High-confidence capabilities directly mentioned in the content are credential theft and theft of authentication material; no specific IOCs are provided in the supplied material.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

many of the sites distributing these malicious "cheats" are hosted on GitHub Pages... attackers typically host only landing pages on GitHub, which then link to external download sites hosted on infrastructure they control.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

These campaigns typically begin in Discord chat rooms or Reddit communities dedicated to cheating in specific online games... take the shape of an offer for a "free" cheating tool.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persistence is then established through a scheduled task named “SystemBackgroundUpdate”, configured to run at user logon with elevated privileges.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The downloaded file is a PowerShell script compiled into a .NET binary using PS2EXE.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Analysis revealed that these executables are PowerShell scripts compiled into .NET binaries using the open-source PS2EXE module.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

the script inside the Perfume.mdb file... it becomes clear that the script functions as a dropper for the final payload.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The walkthrough mimics a legitimate software setup, telling victims to disable antivirus, extract a password-protected archive, and run the file with administrator rights.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

The injected payload extracts encryption keys directly from browser memory, then communicates the stolen keys back to the main malware process via named pipes to avoid disk artifacts.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persistence is then established through a scheduled task named “SystemBackgroundUpdate”, configured to run at user logon with elevated privileges.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persistence is then established through a scheduled task named “SystemBackgroundUpdate”, configured to run at user logon with elevated privileges.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The malware also employs an advanced technique that launches browsers with debugging enabled and injects malicious code directly into running browser processes using either shellcode or reflective DLL injection.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Builder offers polymorphism options with heavy control-flow flattening and numeric state-machine switch constructs, making static detection more difficult.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The downloaded payload (background.exe) is a Themida-packed Vidar stealer 2.0.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Several fake GitHub repositories were identified distributing Vidar stealer 2.0 variant masking as game cheats or hardware ID ban bypass software... software named “TempSpoofer.exe” or “Monotone.exe” or “CFXBypass.exe”.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The malware also employs an advanced technique that launches browsers with debugging enabled and injects malicious code directly into running browser processes using either shellcode or reflective DLL injection.

T1070.005Network Share Connection RemovalEvidence1

It adds a Windows Defender exclusion for a specified attacker-controlled directory... create a randomly named directory inside the %AppData% directory, adds it to Defender’s exclusion list

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

It is executed as a background process and attempts to elevate its privileges using “runas”.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Extensive anti-analysis checks, including debugger detection, timing checks, uptime, and hardware profiling.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Vidar checks CPU and memory information via a couple of APIs to decide the number of threads to be used in the execution.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

it verifies the file by checking the MZ header and sets both the directory and file attributes to “hidden” so that it’s not visible to users.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The malware also employs an advanced technique that launches browsers with debugging enabled and injects malicious code directly into running browser processes using either shellcode or reflective DLL injection.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Extensive anti-analysis checks, including debugger detection, timing checks, uptime, and hardware profiling.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence2

The injected payload extracts encryption keys directly from browser memory, then communicates the stolen keys back to the main malware process via named pipes to avoid disk artifacts.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

Vidar 2.0 targets a broad range of data, including browser cookies and autofill, cryptocurrency wallet extensions and desktop apps, cloud credentials, Steam accounts, Telegram, and Discord data.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

Infostealer malware specializes in stealing data from browsers and other apps, including passwords, credit card information, and cryptocurrency wallet information.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

Discord is also a target... uses the same techniques as a browser hijack to extract data... such as login tokens.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Extensive anti-analysis checks, including debugger detection, timing checks, uptime, and hardware profiling.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Vidar checks CPU and memory information via a couple of APIs to decide the number of threads to be used in the execution.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Extensive anti-analysis checks, including debugger detection, timing checks, uptime, and hardware profiling.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Once Vidar 2.0 collects all the data it can access on the infected machine, it captures screenshots, packages everything, and sends it to delivery points that include Telegram bots and URLs stored on Steam profiles.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

Once Vidar 2.0 collects all the data it can access on the infected machine, it captures screenshots, packages everything, and sends it to delivery points that include Telegram bots and URLs stored on Steam profiles.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

it creates a directory within the %ProgramData% where it will store all the stolen data and exfiltrates them in their command-and-control (C2) servers.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Then it tries to connect to the Telegram servers to perform a ‘GET’ request.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

It then contacts a hard-coded Pastebin URL to retrieve the next-stage payload address from GitHub... it connects to Telegram bots and Steam profiles acting as dead drop resolvers.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence2

Vidar is known to abuse Telegram and Steam as dead drop resolver (DDR) to mask their C2 servers.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

It then contacts a hard-coded Pastebin URL to retrieve a secondary GitHub-hosted payload URL... downloads a second executable named “background.exe”.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Once Vidar 2.0 collects all the data it can access on the infected machine, it captures screenshots, packages everything, and sends it to delivery points that include Telegram bots and URLs stored on Steam profiles.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
12 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
6 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
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hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
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IOC matching20

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.