TinyTurla-NG
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Intezer researchers used AI agents to rebuild source code for Slack, Apple’s Finder and a TinyTurla-NG sample, from a backdoor family Cisco Talos attributes to the Turla group.
Techniques & procedures
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
The tasks can be executed either using a PowerShell or command (cmd.exe) shell... while executing commands via PowerShell.exe, TinyTurla-NG will additionally execute the following PowerShell cmdlet to prevent the recording of command history: Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing
The tasks can be executed either using a PowerShell or command (cmd.exe) shell.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
The operators used different websites running vulnerable WordPress versions ... which allowed the upload of PHP files containing the C2 code consisting of names such as: rss-old[.]php, rss[.]old[.]php or block[.]old[.]php
the batch script deletes a registry key in HKCU\SW\classes\CLSID and restarts explorer[.]exe indicating an attempt to create persistence using COM hijacking
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
the batch script deletes a registry key in HKCU\SW\classes\CLSID and restarts explorer[.]exe indicating an attempt to create persistence using COM hijacking
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
“killme” : Create a BAT file ... Then, use the BAT file to delete a file from the disk of the victim machine
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
TinyTurla-NG deployed these scripts to exfiltrate key material used to secure the password databases of popular password management software, indicating a concerted effort for Turla to steal login credentials.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
In this campaign, Turla uses compromised WordPress-based websites as command and control endpoints (C2) for the TTNG backdoor.
“get” : Fetch a file specified by the C2 using an HTTP GET request and write it to the specified location on disk.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The archive file is then exfiltrated to the C2 using HTTP/S POST requests along with a log of the activity performed being sent to the C2 as well.
Observables
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.