s1ngularity
s1ngularity, also referred to as QUIETVAULT in the provided content, was an August 2025 npm software supply-chain campaign involving malicious versions of Nx packages published to the Node.js npm registry. The malware used the same general pattern later seen in Shai-Hulud: injecting a malicious bundle.js, adding a postinstall entry, repackaging, and publishing trojanized packages. High-confidence reporting in the content states the campaign targeted the Nx build system ecosystem and compromised an npm publishing token via a vulnerable GitHub Action. Developers who installed the poisoned Nx package versions were infected through install-time script execution.
The malware harvested credentials and secrets from developer environments, including GitHub tokens, npm credentials, SSH keys, API keys, cryptocurrency wallet files, and AI CLI tool configurations. One source in the content states the campaign harvested 2,349 credentials from developer machines. The content also states the malware leveraged AI for reconnaissance, specifically targeting AI CLI tool configurations, and describes s1ngularity as the first documented case of attackers weaponizing AI CLI tools for reconnaissance. Additional reporting in the content describes S1ngularity/QUIETVAULT as an AIM3 Level 3 malicious npm package set that leveraged AI to exploit vulnerable GitHub Actions and exfiltrate stolen data to an exposed repository within the victim’s GitHub account.
The campaign abused stolen GitHub tokens to take follow-on actions in GitHub. The content states attackers used stolen GitHub tokens to flip more than 10,000 private repositories to public, exposing more than 82,000 additional secrets. Reporting also links s1ngularity to later worm-like npm campaigns, especially Shai-Hulud, citing significant structural, design, and functional overlap and assessing later activity as a continuation of the broader ecosystem attacks that began with the August 2025 s1ngularity campaign.
Associated ecosystem and victimology details directly mentioned in the content include targeting of npm/Nx packages and developer machines, with infection delivered via malicious package lifecycle hooks such as postinstall. No standalone IOC set beyond the malware name, the Nx/npm targeting, the injected bundle.js, and the use of postinstall-based execution is provided in the content.
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Techniques & procedures
1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Recent activity
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A named npm supply-chain malware campaign using injected bundle.js and postinstall hooks to execute malicious code during package installation.
A supply-chain compromise involving malicious Nx packages that steals developer credentials (e.g., GitHub tokens, npm creds, SSH/API keys, crypto wallet files) and uses stolen GitHub tokens to expose private repositories; also targets AI CLI tool configurations and uses AI CLI tools for reconnaissance.
Named supply-chain incident affecting the JavaScript/npm ecosystem (no further technical details provided in the content).
Referenced as a prior supply-chain worm used for comparison to Shai-Hulud 2.0; no additional functional details provided in this content.
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