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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

JLORAT

JLORAT is a Rust-written backdoor initially described by Kaspersky in April 2023 and associated at that time with the Tomiris threat actor. Reporting in the provided content also links JLORAT infrastructure and lineage to Hydra Saiga (also referred to as Yorotrooper, ShadowSilk, and Silent Lynx), citing overlap with Tomiris-associated infrastructure and similarities with the related Telemiris malware family. The implant appears to have been in use since at least 2022 and is described as having undergone virtually no significant changes over time. Its documented capabilities include taking screenshots, executing console commands, and uploading files from an infected system to command-and-control infrastructure. The broader campaigns in which JLORAT is referenced targeted government, diplomatic, intergovernmental, energy, and critical infrastructure entities, particularly in Central Asia, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East, using spear-phishing and malicious archives as common initial access mechanisms. The provided content does not include specific JLORAT hashes, domains, or IP indicators, but notes Kaspersky detection as HEUR:Trojan.Win32.TJLORT.a.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Tomiris

Analysis of the executables revealed that they were JLORAT samples, a backdoor written in Rust initially described by Kaspersky in April 2023 and associated with an actor they were tracking as Tomiris at the time.

via vmray blogvmray.com
Hydra Saiga

Analysis of the executables revealed that they were JLORAT samples, a backdoor written in Rust initially described by Kaspersky in April 2023 and associated with an actor they were tracking as Tomiris at the time.

via vmray blogvmray.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"some of them packaged in ISO or RAR files and attached to malicious phishing emails"; "The password-protected RAR attachment contained a Word document... running a malicious Macro"

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.