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Malware8 associated actors

BTMOB

Tracked since Dec 1, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days11 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors8Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs93Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureVishing
Platforms
Android

BTMOB is an Android remote access trojan distributed as malware-as-a-service and used for mobile surveillance, information theft, and financial fraud. Derived from SpySolr, it shares a development lineage with CraxsRAT and CypherRAT. Its commercial ecosystem includes customizable Android payloads, droppers, automated application builders, desktop operator panels, and server infrastructure. Source-code leaks in February 2026 expanded its availability to independent operators, resellers, and developers of modified variants, complicating attribution.

BTMOB enables live screen monitoring and remote interaction, keylogging, SMS and call access, camera and microphone surveillance, GPS tracking, and credential theft. Observed samples also collect installed-application inventories, foreground-application telemetry, and notifications. After victims sideload a malicious application, BTMOB abuses Android Accessibility Services to acquire additional permissions and support persistent remote control. These capabilities enable operators to monitor sensitive communications and interfere with banking activity.

Distribution relies on phishing, counterfeit download pages, and malicious applications impersonating streaming platforms, banking security tools, government services, and other trusted offerings. Brazilian campaigns have combined WhatsApp messages, customer-support impersonation, loyalty offers, and telephone calls to persuade victims to install malicious applications. Other campaigns have used IPTV applications promising World Cup broadcasts. UAC-0263 has deployed BTMOB against Ukrainian users through websites advertising purported air-raid-alert applications, fuel discounts, and related services, within mobile targeting affecting military personnel, government officials, and other individuals. BTMOB is used by multiple unrelated operators rather than exclusively by one threat group.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

8 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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V0id.Ade1r

BTMob, a mobile remote access trojan (RAT) capable of extensive device surveillance and data theft, has gained traction across cybercriminal communities following the leak of its source code in February 2026.

via flashpoint blogflashpoint.io
H7TEEN Anon

BTMob, a mobile remote access trojan (RAT) capable of extensive device surveillance and data theft, has gained traction across cybercriminal communities following the leak of its source code in February 2026.

via flashpoint blogflashpoint.io
DaarkShop

BTMob, a mobile remote access trojan (RAT) capable of extensive device surveillance and data theft, has gained traction across cybercriminal communities following the leak of its source code in February 2026.

via flashpoint blogflashpoint.io
Owl

BTMob, a mobile remote access trojan (RAT) capable of extensive device surveillance and data theft, has gained traction across cybercriminal communities following the leak of its source code in February 2026.

via flashpoint blogflashpoint.io
R H

BTMob, a mobile remote access trojan (RAT) capable of extensive device surveillance and data theft, has gained traction across cybercriminal communities following the leak of its source code in February 2026.

via flashpoint blogflashpoint.io
UAC-0263

UAC-0263 has used decoy websites offering purported apps for air raid alerts, fuel discounts and other services. Its malware, known as BTMOB, gives hackers remote access to infected devices and allows them to steal information.

via the record mediatherecord.media

+2 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence3

The threat actors often redirect targets to counterfeit websites masquerading as streaming platforms, cryptocurrency services, or other widely recognised online brands in order to divert them to fraudulent application repositories containing malicious Android applications.

T1566PhishingEvidence9

It offers an “exploit chain,” that is, a malicious application, droppers, a payload builder, a Windows operator panel, servers, and phishing and credential-stealing tools.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

Basic phishing security hygiene applies as well, such as treating unsolicited links delivered via email, messaging apps, social media, and targeted advertisements with suspicion and not clicking on anything that even remotely seems like a scam.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The reported activity includes highly tailored attacks in Brazil, where criminals used WhatsApp messages, stolen personal details, fake loyalty offers, and follow-up phone calls to persuade targets to sideload an Android package.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

BTMOB... enables operators to remotely monitor, manipulate, and control compromised devices... The BTMOB establishes communication with attacker-controlled command-and-control infrastructure... allowing the operator to remotely manage the compromised device and maintain persistent access

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

The primary method through which the malware spreads is via social engineering, where users are sent links to bogus websites masquerading as streaming services or cryptocurrency mining platforms.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence7

“UAC-0244 and UAC-0263 ... use websites that appear legitimate and encourage users to download applications.”

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence4

Once installed, BTMOB seeks extensive access to the device by abusing Android Accessibility Services to gain elevated permissions and granting itself further system access and control over the device without additional user interaction.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Feature list includes "Startup and persistence," "Anti-kill," and "Fast stable and persistence."

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence4

Once installed, BTMOB seeks extensive access to the device by abusing Android Accessibility Services to gain elevated permissions and granting itself further system access and control over the device without additional user interaction.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Feature list includes "Startup and persistence," "Anti-kill," and "Fast stable and persistence."

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence4

Upon sideloading, the malware seeks elevated privileges by exploiting Android's Accessibility Services, giving it the ability to silently grant it additional permissions without the user having to take any further action.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence9

“UAC-0244 has created sites impersonating Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps” and UAC-0263 used “decoy websites offering purported apps for air raid alerts, fuel discounts and other services.”

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

Feature list includes "Hide and unhide app" and "Hide and unhide app icon."

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Feature list includes "Bypass play protect and all other antiviruses" and "Disable google play protect."

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

BTMOB gives adversaries broader options: exfiltrate a range of sensitive data, capture screenshots and record activity on the device, and ultimately take remote control of it.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Feature list includes "Live keylogger."

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

Feature list includes "Crypto and banking injections," "Advanced injection," and "Bypass banking apps and steal login."

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Feature list includes "Browser password stealer."

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

It offers an “exploit chain,” that is, a malicious application, droppers, a payload builder, a Windows operator panel, servers, and phishing and credential-stealing tools.

Collection

7 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

“DarkSword can be used to gather sensitive data such as login credentials, messages, contacts, and call histories” and CamelSpy collects “contacts, call logs, and stored images.”

T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

BTMOB gives adversaries broader options: exfiltrate a range of sensitive data, capture screenshots and record activity on the device, and ultimately take remote control of it.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Feature list includes "Live keylogger."

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

Feature list includes "Crypto and banking injections," "Advanced injection," and "Bypass banking apps and steal login."

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence8

Feature list includes "Silent screen control," "Capture lock screen," and "Silent screen control on all latest android devices."

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

"Recording audio from the microphone"

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

Unlike typical banking trojans, BTMOB offers adversaries a wider range of malicious actions, including ... activity recording...

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

WebSocket URL pattern ws://<host>:8080/con BTMob WebSocket command-and-control connection

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

HTTP POST to /yaarsa/private/yarsap_*.php ... /yaarsa/private/createacc.php ... /yaarsa/user/loginbt.php ... /yaarsa/index.php | ws://<host>:8080/con 426 Upgrade Required /yaarsa/server/websocket-server.js

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The platform packages the malicious Android app, a dropper, a desktop control panel, a server backend, and an automated APK builder.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence12

“BTMOB gives hackers remote access to infected devices and allows them to steal information.”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

BTMOB gives adversaries broader options: exfiltrate a range of sensitive data, capture screenshots and record activity on the device...

Impact

2 techniques
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence2

Feature list includes "Crypto mining from your victims."

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Feature list includes "Broadcast DDos."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

93 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

40 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching93Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors8Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.