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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Albiriox

Albiriox is an Android banking trojan and remote-access malware family sold as a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) offering on Russian-speaking cybercrime forums. Reporting indicates it entered a private beta in September 2025 and became publicly offered in October 2025, with evidence suggesting Russian-speaking operators. It is designed for on-device fraud (ODF), giving attackers real-time control of infected Android devices so fraudulent actions can be performed directly inside victims’ legitimate banking, fintech, payment, trading, wallet, and cryptocurrency applications.

Observed capabilities include VNC-based remote control, including an Accessibility-based mode referred to as AcVNC/AC VNC, screen streaming, UI automation, screen manipulation, and overlay attacks for credential theft. The Accessibility-based remote-control mode is described as bypassing Android FLAG_SECURE protections used by many banking and crypto apps to block screen capture. Reported command functionality includes click/swipe/text input, app launch and uninstall, black-screen or blank-screen concealment, live keylogging-related controls, and device-control actions. Albiriox communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over unencrypted TCP sockets using structured JSON messages, including an initial handshake with device identifiers such as HWID, model, and Android version, plus ping/pong heartbeats.

The malware has a hardcoded target list of more than 400 applications worldwide, including banks, fintech services, payment processors, cryptocurrency exchanges, digital wallets, and trading platforms. Multiple reports state early campaigns targeted Austrian users using German-language lures. A documented infection chain used fake Penny Market-themed apps and fake Google Play-style pages, with delivery via SMS/smishing, WhatsApp-based lure flows, and sideloaded fake applications. The dropper used social engineering such as a bogus System Update screen to obtain the Install Unknown Apps permission and then install the final payload. Researchers also reported use of JSONPacker obfuscation and a custom builder integrated with the Golden Crypt/Golden Encryption crypting service to improve stealth and evade static detection.

High-confidence infrastructure and operational details directly tied to Albiriox in the provided content include the domain com-selfhelp[.]page and primary server 45.154.98[.]13, which hosted a Flask-based operator panel on port 8443 and a Go-based implant listener on port 443. Exposed panel assets indicated capabilities including hidden VNC, keylogging, credential theft, clipboard monitoring, CAPTCHA harvesting, cloud-storage exfiltration, remote shell access, and payload building. Additional referenced observables include subdomains such as c2.com-selfhelp[.]page, admin.com-selfhelp[.]page, ftp.com-selfhelp[.]page, and staging.com-selfhelp[.]page, the secondary IP 172.86.111[.]19, and a linked sample SHA256 3975fce3783a3b8a4780d70e7d8d9588825cf92cba92128a16f86bec50890b99. Overall, the provided reporting consistently characterizes Albiriox as a rapidly evolving Android ODF threat focused on financial and cryptocurrency fraud through full device takeover, remote interaction, and credential theft.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Russian-speaking threat actors

A new Android malware named Albiriox is being offered on cybercrime forums by Russian-speaking threat actors... Albiriox is a banking trojan designed for on-device fraud (ODF), enabling attackers to take control of compromised mobile devices to carry out fraudulent transactions from the victim’s cryptocurrency or banking applications.

via security weeksecurityweek.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Attacks involving Albiriox commence with SMS messages with links redirecting to fraudulent websites masquerading as the Google Play Store and other legitimate services where an app could be downloaded

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Downloading the fake apps installs a dropper for Albiriox

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"use of the Overlay Attack technique... System Update Overlay... Black Screen Overlay... Targeted Application Overlay"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"use of the Overlay Attack technique... System Update Overlay... Black Screen Overlay... Targeted Application Overlay"

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

which displays a bogus system update screen to enable the "Install Unknown Apps" permission and eventually allow device hijacking

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

The dropper contains an encrypted .dex file hidden deep in the app structure, using obfuscation and uncommon paths to evade analysis.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

“...custom Builder that integrates the well‑known Golden Crypt crypting service, enabling Albiriox to be packaged in a ‘Fully Undetectable’ form.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

SMS messages with links redirecting to fraudulent websites masquerading as the Google Play Store and other legitimate services

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

“...a full black screen to hide fraudulent activity during VNC control...”

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

“...a developing overlay system designed for credential theft.” / “...generic overlays triggered when targeted financial apps are opened. These overlays support credential theft...”

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Albiriox also harnesses overlay attacks to exfiltrate credentials from more than 400 financial apps

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

“The malicious code incorporates a VNC-based remote access module for direct device manipulation...”

Collection

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

“...a developing overlay system designed for credential theft.” / “...generic overlays triggered when targeted financial apps are opened. These overlays support credential theft...”

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Albiriox also harnesses overlay attacks to exfiltrate credentials from more than 400 financial apps

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“...all collected data was sent to the attackers’ Telegram bot.”

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"persistent communication channel with its C2 infrastructure using an unencrypted TCP Socket connection"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

"Once this permission is granted, the application installs the final payload Albiriox on the compromised device."

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Aside from leveraging a VNC-based remote access tool to allow real-time device control and monitoring

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

“Albiriox communicates with its C2 using unencrypted TCP sockets... structured JSON messages and a ping/pong heartbeat...”

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
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IOC matching1

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.