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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

ModiLoader

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs30Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

ModiLoader, also known as DBatLoader, is a multistage Windows malware loader used to download and execute additional malicious payloads. Delivered payloads include FormBook, Agent Tesla, Remcos RAT, and Warzone RAT. It is distributed through phishing and malspam campaigns, including purchase-order lures with ISO attachments containing executables disguised as business documents.

Analyzed variants are written in Delphi and use encrypted embedded resources, runtime decoding, and in-memory execution to conceal and launch subsequent stages. ModiLoader can retrieve encoded or encrypted payloads from remote infrastructure, including legitimate cloud-hosting services such as Microsoft OneDrive. Observed implementations use digital signatures for defense evasion, establish persistence through per-user startup registry entries, and inject payloads into legitimate Windows processes. Credential theft and remote-control functionality depend on the malware it deploys rather than being inherent capabilities of the loader.

ModiLoader has been used by multiple cybercriminal operators, including the activity cluster known as DDGroup. In May 2024, nine phishing campaigns targeted small and medium-sized businesses in Poland, Romania, and Italy, delivering Remcos, Agent Tesla, and FormBook. Those campaigns used compromised email accounts and servers for distribution and data collection, with ModiLoader replacing AceCryptor as the delivery tool.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DDGroup

To give an overview, here is a list of all observed tools and malware types the actor has been using in recent years: ModiLoader / DBatLoader

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

These messages often spoof companies sending invoices or purchase orders... The email contains an ISO image presented as a purchase order.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

添付ファイルの場合は不正なファイルが展開・実行すると感染を引き起こします。不正なファイルの形式としては、実行ファイル(exe)、ドキュメント(docx、xlsxなど)、その他のファイル(js、lnkなど)と、これらのファイルを内包した圧縮ファイル(zip、7-zip、rarなど)やISOイメージなど、様々な種類の形式を確認しています。

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

URLリンクを開いた場合は添付ファイルの場合と同様の不正なファイルがダウンロードされます。

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Opening the malicious attachment executes an HTML file with embedded JavaScript that is highly likely generated by an LLM. This script is designed to download and execute additional payloads

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Opening the malicious attachment executes an HTML file with embedded JavaScript that is highly likely generated by an LLM. This script is designed to download and execute additional payloads

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

最終的に実行ファイルもしくはドキュメントを起点として情報窃取型マルウェアに感染することがわかります。実行ファイル自体が情報窃取型マルウェア本体である場合と、実行ファイルがGuLoader...と呼ばれるダウンローダである場合があります。

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

URLリンクを開いた場合は添付ファイルの場合と同様の不正なファイルがダウンロードされます。

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

添付ファイルの場合は不正なファイルが展開・実行すると感染を引き起こします。

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The auto-elevated 'easinvoker.exe' executable is vulnerable to the 'relative path DLL Hijack' variant of DLL Hijacking... uses it to load the malicious 'netutils.dll'.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

By using this file, DBatLoader creates an autorun registry key under 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' to survive a reboot.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

By using this file, DBatLoader creates an autorun registry key under 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' to survive a reboot.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The first 'XdfiifagO.bat' batch file then leverages a well-known technique of bypassing Windows User Account Control (UAC) called the 'Mock Trusted Directories Method' to escalate privileges without displaying a UAC prompt.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

DBatLoader's resource section contains a GIF image as the second stage encrypted payload.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The ISO image contains a Windows executable (EXE) file for ModiLoader. The EXE file icon impersonates an Excel spreadsheet.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The encrypted byte from the resource section is added to the number 79... individual bytes are retrieved to decode the second stage DLL payload.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Therefore, the attacker copies 'easinvoker.exe' to the mock directory and uses it to load the malicious 'netutils.dll', which in turn executes the 'KDECO.bat' script.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The infected Windows host also checked its location using geoplugin.net, which is a legitimate service.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The auto-elevated 'easinvoker.exe' executable is vulnerable to the 'relative path DLL Hijack' variant of DLL Hijacking... uses it to load the malicious 'netutils.dll'.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

Once the payload has been decoded, the F_Execution_main function is responsible for allocating the decoded payload into memory... through the use of the 'VirtualAlloc' API.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The script 'KDECO.bat' includes PowerShell commands that exclude the 'C:\Users' directory from being scanned by Microsoft Defender.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The infected Windows host also checked its location using geoplugin.net, which is a legitimate service.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The ModiLoader EXE first generated a OneDrive URL using HTTP over TCP port 80. This redirected to an HTTPS version of the same URL over TCP port 443.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

the code from here is responsible for decoding Url and checking the Internet connection by trying to connect to the decoded Url is https://www.microsoft.com .

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

後者はGuLoaderが情報窃取型マルウェアをダウンロードして感染を引き起こします。...情報窃取型マルウェアがダウンロードされて感染する、または、GuLoaderを経由して多段階で情報窃取型マルウェアがダウンロードされて感染します。

Indicators of compromise

Observables

30 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching30Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.