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Malware

Glove Stealer

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK36Techniques
IOCs15Tracked

Glove Stealer is an information-stealing malware family first publicly documented in November 2024 and described as written in .NET, with later reporting assessing some samples as a Python-based port/evolution of the same family. It has been distributed in phishing campaigns using ClickFix-style social engineering, including HTML attachments that display fake errors and instruct victims to execute attacker-provided scripts via PowerShell or the Windows Run prompt. Reporting also describes lures that mimic troubleshooting or fixing tools, and one campaign targeting Roblox exploit and cheat users with a trojanized .NET WPF application that stages a PyInstaller-packed Python 3.12 payload.

Core functionality centers on theft of browser and application data. Glove Stealer targets browser cookies, saved credentials, autofill data, and other browser artifacts, including Firefox and Chromium-family browsers. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, 2FA authenticators, password managers, email clients, gaming platforms, hundreds of browser extensions, and more than 80 locally installed applications. Named targets include Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, Aegis, LastPass, Bitwarden, KeePass, Thunderbird, Steam, and Battle.net. Staged data has been reported in folders/files such as AllPws.txt, INFS.txt, Cookies, Autofill, Restore, OTP, and Wallets. Host fingerprinting collected in INFS.txt included OS details, computer name, username, RAM, language, and CPU information.

A notable capability is bypass of Google Chrome App-Bound Encryption (ABE). Multiple reports state Glove Stealer uses a dedicated supporting module, including a .NET helper saved as %PROGRAMFILES%\Google\Chrome\Application\zagent.exe, to abuse Chromium’s IElevator service and retrieve the protected key from the Local State file. Gen Digital described it as the first widely documented family invoking the Elevation Service via IElevator to retrieve the wrapped key. Later reporting on a Python-based variant describes a more advanced ABE bypass matrix including IElevator COM abuse, debugger hardware breakpoints, double-DPAPI impersonation using an LSASS SYSTEM token, DLL injection into a suspended Chrome process, and UAC registry hijacking.

Behavior reported for the .NET family includes repeatedly terminating browser-related processes containing names such as chrome, yandex, browser, msedge, opera, brave, chromium, and CryptoTab; staging stolen data under a path derived from Environment.SpecialFolder.Recent and an MD5 hash based on the computer name and disk serial number; compressing collected data; encrypting the exfiltration package with 3DES in ECB mode using a key derived from DateTime.Now.Ticks and MD5; and exfiltrating the encrypted archive to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Reported network infrastructure associated with the .NET campaign includes master.volt-texs[.]online and master.hdsjfkgsadoghdsiougds[.]space, used for payload delivery, execution signaling, key backup, and exfiltration. Reported SHA-256 indicators for that campaign include 2bf6fab237ab58ae6cfe78f9a61ab6dcaf55f437cb7a77878e2e6aae3b208e80, 56da496329d54587c31119d8878a7831a9814a92839aa6a9873ceeb91575b11a, and 86ad4082e086a0b9a22dc91a16d0d9be38232975ab4d3d035224fb6d6cc7a44c.

The Python-based port described in later reporting adds anti-analysis and persistence features, including AMSI patching, ETW suppression, repeated Defender tampering, AppLocker evasion through relocation to trusted directories, Discord-based exfiltration and bot C2, and persistence via scheduled task, HKCU Run key, Startup VBS, COM hijack, PowerShell profile modification, and WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumer. That reporting also states the malware steals Roblox cookies, browser data, MetaMask vault data, developer secrets from notes and files, and Google account artifacts such as SAPISID-derived access to Gmail API data.

Association is high-confidence at the family level only: Glove Stealer has been directly linked to phishing/ClickFix-style delivery and Chrome ABE bypass via IElevator. Separate Ontinue reporting explicitly stated another developer-targeting ABE-stealer did not technically match Glove Stealer, though it was considered a close technique neighbor.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

36 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

this campaign started with a user receiving a phishing email. Along with the e-mail, typically an attachment is present in HTML format.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Along with the e-mail, typically an attachment is present in HTML format. An HTML page like this contains typical ClickFix motives, showing a crafted fake error message stating that some content couldn’t be accessed properly, then advising the user how to fix it.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled Task : Creates WindowsDefenderAgent configured to run at user logon with highest privileges.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The instructions then prompt the user to paste and execute it via a PowerShell terminal or a Run prompt on Windows

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

It queries local preferences via PowerShell: (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionPath -contains '<current_directory_path>' ... Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "<current_directory_path>" ... A background daemon thread periodically loops a PowerShell command ( Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true... )

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

By following the instructions, the user copies a malicious script to their clipboard and, after executing it in a terminal or the Run prompt, they unintentionally infect their own system.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

The helper formats a pipe to exfiltrate sensitive data using Chromium’s legitimate Mojo naming convention for IPC pipes.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled Task : Creates WindowsDefenderAgent configured to run at user logon with highest privileges.

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

WMI Event Subscriber : Registers an ActiveScriptEventConsumer tied to a Win32_LogonSession event filter, ensuring execution via the WMI subsystem upon boot.

T1546.013PowerShell ProfileEvidence1

PowerShell Profile Append : Appends execution calls directly into %USERPROFILE%\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1 .

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

COM Hijack : Hijacks a common CLSID to load the malicious payload upon targeted Windows shell operations.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Registry Run Key : Inserts a payload path under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run . Startup VBS : Writes %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\WindowsDefenderAgent.vbs to execute the binary windowlessly.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Glove Stealer uses a dedicated supporting module to bypass App-Bound encryption by using IElevator service

Privilege Escalation

10 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled Task : Creates WindowsDefenderAgent configured to run at user logon with highest privileges.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The pasted command redirects victims to an obfuscated PowerShell loader that injects a native AEB helper into a live browser process.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Because Roblox executors must hook game processes, inject dynamic link libraries (DLLs), and patch system memory...

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Double DPAPI Impersonation: Enables SeDebugPrivilege , duplicates the SYSTEM token from lsass.exe , and executes double DPAPI calls to decrypt machine-level bound ABE keys.

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

WMI Event Subscriber : Registers an ActiveScriptEventConsumer tied to a Win32_LogonSession event filter, ensuring execution via the WMI subsystem upon boot.

T1546.013PowerShell ProfileEvidence1

PowerShell Profile Append : Appends execution calls directly into %USERPROFILE%\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1 .

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

COM Hijack : Hijacks a common CLSID to load the malicious payload upon targeted Windows shell operations.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Registry Run Key : Inserts a payload path under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run . Startup VBS : Writes %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\WindowsDefenderAgent.vbs to execute the binary windowlessly.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

As a result, Glove Stealer needs to acquire local admin privileges first to use this supporting module.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

To trigger the required UAC prompt silently, the loader uses the runas verb within the ProcessStartInfo configuration... UAC Registry Hijack: If integrity limitations block strategies 2 or 3, it writes a payload launcher command to HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command and calls fodhelper.exe or computerdefaults.exe to auto-elevate

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

the script copied and executed by the user invokes a PowerShell command encoded by Base64... The payload is downloaded from the server as a text... just Base64 encoded.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Threat actors exploit this brand recognition and 'security fatigue' to distribute highly evasive trojanized payloads disguised as legitimate execution tools... the initial stage is a .NET 4.8 Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF) application that presents a functional executor GUI complete with live DeepSeek AI integration.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The pasted command redirects victims to an obfuscated PowerShell loader that injects a native AEB helper into a live browser process.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Because Roblox executors must hook game processes, inject dynamic link libraries (DLLs), and patch system memory...

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Double DPAPI Impersonation: Enables SeDebugPrivilege , duplicates the SYSTEM token from lsass.exe , and executes double DPAPI calls to decrypt machine-level bound ABE keys.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If detected, the payload enters a 120-240 second sleep cycle and silently terminates. This function relies entirely on process-name detection, lacking traditional hardware, VM registry, or CPU timing checks.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Validation & Hiding : The loader downloads the binary ... and saves it to %APPDATA%\.cache\winupdate.exe . It applies Hidden and System attributes to the directory and binary.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Debugger Hardware Breakpoint: Launches Chrome using the DEBUG_PROCESS flag, placing a hardware breakpoint ( DR0 ) at the internal decryption routine inside chrome.dll to read the decrypted master key directly from the R15 register.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Glove Stealer uses a dedicated supporting module to bypass App-Bound encryption by using IElevator service

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Defender Exclusion Hooking ... Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath ... Active Memory Patching: It locates amsi.dll and overwrites the entry point of AmsiOpenSession ... It simultaneously patches ntdll.dll!EtwEventWrite with c3 ( ret ) to blind system telemetry. Background Exclusion Maintenance: ... Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true...

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Google Account Harvesting: It extracts SAPISID and __Secure-3PAPISID cookies to forge a SAPISIDHASH authorization header, directly querying the live Gmail API

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

It focuses on browser data (cookies, autofill, …)... The cookies, wallets and other possible data are not obtained just from the browsers

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

A synchronous run of browsers.collect(abe_key) ensures decrypted browser cookies and tokens are immediately available ... remaining modules (wallets, Discord, Telegram, password managers, note scanning).

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Data in which the stealer is interested in can be represented by searching for this list... \Network\Cookies \Login Data \Web Data \Local Extension Settings \Sync Extension Settings \Local State

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Glove Stealer uses a dedicated supporting module to bypass App-Bound encryption by using IElevator service

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

Sandbox Evasion: The _is_sandbox() method queries active processes using psutil against a blacklist ( idaq.exe , x64dbg.exe , procmon.exe , wireshark.exe ).

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The file INFS.txt contains a fingerprint of the device, including details like the OS, computer and username, maximum available RAM, language, CPU information and more.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If detected, the payload enters a 120-240 second sleep cycle and silently terminates. This function relies entirely on process-name detection, lacking traditional hardware, VM registry, or CPU timing checks.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Debugger Hardware Breakpoint: Launches Chrome using the DEBUG_PROCESS flag, placing a hardware breakpoint ( DR0 ) at the internal decryption routine inside chrome.dll to read the decrypted master key directly from the R15 register.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

exfil.pyc builds the ZIP archive entirely in memory. It enforces a strict 25MB upload limit ... if exceeded, it slices the archive into sequential byte chunks.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware then pings another C&C server... This address is used multiple times during the malware execution to indicate successfully passing certain stages and submitting other data

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

the campaign employs a multi-stage execution model, relying on remote dead-drop configuration points ... Pastebin ... MediaFire ... It actively hits internal Roblox APIs ... directly querying the live Gmail API ... | These chunks are transmitted to the AES-decrypted Discord Webhook URL ... pausing for exactly 1 second between requests to defeat API rate limiting.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The loader retrieves a remote config from Pastebin ... The JSON config points to a MediaFire storage page ... the loader downloads the binary ... and saves it to %APPDATA%\.cache\winupdate.exe .

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Discord Bot RAT Commands Operating in parallel to exfiltration, the malware resolves a Discord Bot token and Channel ID ... It monitors the channel for interactive Remote Access Trojan (RAT) commands

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

the exfiltrated package is sent to the other C&C server as a POST request, with the data encoded by Base64

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

These chunks are transmitted to the AES-decrypted Discord Webhook URL

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping36Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.