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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

CRYPTBOT

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs463Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationDefense evasionProcess injectionPost exploitationCrypto theft
Delivery
Landing pageCracked softwareSeo poisoningFake updatePhishingLureMalvertisingSpearphishing
Platforms
Windows

CryptBot is a Windows infostealer focused on harvesting sensitive user and system data from infected hosts. It is commonly distributed through fake software-download ecosystems, especially sites masquerading as sources for cracks, key generators, activators, serials, and free versions of commercial software. Operators have also used trojanized installers, including altered activators and modified software packages, and have relied on search-engine manipulation to drive victims to malicious landing pages. CryptBot has also appeared in broader commodity-malware delivery campaigns and in some cases has been delivered through loader or sideloading chains rather than directly.

The malware steals browser-stored credentials, cookies, browsing data, credit card information, and cryptocurrency-wallet data, and has also been observed collecting system profiling information and, in some versions, screenshots and selected files. Targeted applications have included major Chromium-based browsers and Firefox-family browsers, along with numerous desktop cryptocurrency wallets and wallet-related browser extensions. Stolen data is typically staged, often compressed into an archive, and exfiltrated to command-and-control infrastructure. Some variants also download and execute secondary payloads, most notably ClipBanker, and observed follow-on payloads have included other commodity malware.

CryptBot operators frequently change packing, loaders, filenames, scripts, and infrastructure to reduce detection. Reported execution chains include multi-layer archives, self-extracting packages, AutoIt-based loaders, in-memory decryption, manual DLL loading, and process hollowing or related injection techniques. Anti-analysis and defense-evasion behaviors reported across variants include anti-VM or anti-sandbox checks, duplicate-infection checks, self-deletion in some versions, obfuscation, and limited disk artifacts through in-memory execution. Infrastructure patterns have repeatedly involved rapidly rotated command-and-control servers, often using short-lived domains.

CryptBot has been active since at least 2019 and has been associated with large-scale criminal distribution operations affecting hundreds of thousands of systems. Public reporting and civil litigation have linked major distribution activity to cracked-software ecosystems and operators based in Pakistan. The malware is broadly opportunistic, but campaigns have particularly targeted users seeking pirated software and, in some reporting, users of Google Chrome because of the stealer’s emphasis on browser data theft.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

Mandiant analyzed the workstations belonging to the end user and discovered that some systems had been infected with CRYPTBOT, an info-stealer malware, shortly before the stolen session token was generated.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

CryptBot is an Infostealer that is being distributed through malicious websites disguised as software download pages.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence3

To gain wide visibility, the threat actors utilize search engine optimization to rank the malware distribution sites at the top of Google search results, providing a stable stream of prospective victims.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These can be used to gain an initial foothold into an organization’s network, or to help a threat actor move laterally within a breached network once they are inside.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence7

Visitors of these sites are taken through a series of redirections before they end up on the delivery page, so the landing page could be on a compromised legitimate site abused for SEO poisoning attacks.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

피싱 사이트를 통해 유포되는 CryptBot 정보탈취 악성코드 ... 유틸리티 프로그램으로 위장하여 정보탈취 악성코드를 유포하는 피싱 사이트

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The distribution pages are exposed at the top of the search result page of search engines such as Google, so the risk of infection is high.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

실행 시 Autoit 관련 파일을 생성 후 실행하는 유형이다.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Because Cryptbot’s operation doesn’t rely on the existence of unencrypted binaries on the disk, detecting it is only possible by monitoring for malicious behavior such as PowerShell command execution or external network communication.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

Red Canary shares the following four key points for threat detection: ... PowerShell or cmd.exe commands containing rd /s /q, timeout, and del /f /q together

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

The user becomes infected by clicking one of the malicious links and downloads either KMSPico, Cryptbot, or another malware without KMSPico.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Users download and install these packages, without realizing that doing so infects their machines with malware.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The core of this campaign lies in the abuse of a legitimate utility... The key vulnerability is that the design of ahost.exe is vulnerable to DLL side-loading or search order hijacking. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by placing a malicious DLL, named libcares-2.dll, in the same directory as ahost.exe.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These can be used to gain an initial foothold into an organization’s network, or to help a threat actor move laterally within a breached network once they are inside.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The injection of the Cryptbot bytes into memory occurs through the process hollowing method

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The injection of the Cryptbot bytes into memory occurs through the process hollowing method

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These can be used to gain an initial foothold into an organization’s network, or to help a threat actor move laterally within a breached network once they are inside.

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The downloader includes defenses against reverse engineering and automated string extraction... To hinder automatic extraction, the last 6 to 8 bytes of each URL are append to the URL, making the string difficult to extract statically. | A new variant featuring enhanced cryptography was recently released... The only cryptographic operation in the malware is performed on the data returned by the server... The data returned by the server is AES-CBC encrypted, with the encryption key derived using PBKDF2-SHA1.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Only the main function, which is responsible for calling the curl API, decrypting, and loading the DLL, has its control flow obfuscated... the code is obfuscated using an extensive switch-case structure.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence11

The adversaries install KMSPico also, because that is what the victim expects to happen, while simultaneously deploying Cryptbot behind the scenes.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The injection of the Cryptbot bytes into memory occurs through the process hollowing method

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The injection of the Cryptbot bytes into memory occurs through the process hollowing method

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence4

Cryptobot checks for the presence of "%APPDATA%\Ramson," and executes its self-deletion routine if the folder exists to prevent re-infection.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

These can be used to gain an initial foothold into an organization’s network, or to help a threat actor move laterally within a breached network once they are inside.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

An encoded PowerShell command then leverages Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to download and execute a malicious payload from a remote resource... Detection opportunity: mshta.exe utility making external network connections.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

This installer then launches a script that is also heavily obfuscated, which is capable of detecting sandboxes and AV emulation, so it won't execute when run on the researcher's devices.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

When the CryptBot binary loaded in the memory is executed, it scans for directories of certain anti-malware products. When the directory exists, the binary generates a random number and performs Sleep for that amount. It is assumed that delay execution is done to bypass detection.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

When the directory exists, the binary generates a random number and performs Sleep for that amount. It is assumed that delay execution is done to bypass detection.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The core of this campaign lies in the abuse of a legitimate utility... The key vulnerability is that the design of ahost.exe is vulnerable to DLL side-loading or search order hijacking. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by placing a malicious DLL, named libcares-2.dll, in the same directory as ahost.exe.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

When the sample is deciphered, the DLL is manually loaded... 'Failed to load DLL from memory'

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

CryptBot is a type of malware often referred to as an “infostealer” because it is designed to identify and steal sensitive information from victims’ computers such as authentication credentials, social media account logins, cryptocurrency wallets, and more.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence6

It functions as a stealer malware, capturing sensitive information like login credentials, browser cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet data.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence8

It functions as a stealer malware, capturing sensitive information like login credentials, browser cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet data.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The previous version of CryptBot used the pathname of the old version of Chrome when stealing Chrome browser information... The recently modified sample includes all the newest Chrome path names.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Threat actors are distributing altered KMSpico installers to infect Windows devices with malware that steals cryptocurrency wallets.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

[<Installed software:>][<Disk:>][<Process:>]

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

CryptBot malware steals infected PC’s information as well as various user information and sends them to the server.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

This installer then launches a script that is also heavily obfuscated, which is capable of detecting sandboxes and AV emulation, so it won't execute when run on the researcher's devices.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

When the CryptBot binary loaded in the memory is executed, it scans for directories of certain anti-malware products. When the directory exists, the binary generates a random number and performs Sleep for that amount. It is assumed that delay execution is done to bypass detection.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

When the directory exists, the binary generates a random number and performs Sleep for that amount. It is assumed that delay execution is done to bypass detection.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

[<Installed software:>]

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

각종 브라우저에 저장된 계정 및 패스워드, 암호화폐 지갑 파일, Discord 등의 메신저 토큰, FTP 클라이언트 정보, VPN 정보 등 다양한 주요 정보가 탈취 대상

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

CryptBot is a type of malware often referred to as an “infostealer” because it is designed to identify and steal sensitive information from victims’ computers such as authentication credentials, social media account logins, cryptocurrency wallets, and more.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

Among others it steals credentials for browsers, crypto currency wallets, browser cookies, and creates screenshots of the infected system.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

When the malware begins its malicious behaviors, it creates a random directory in %TEMP% and collects various user information.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence5

The file downloaded from the distribution website is a ZIP compressed file. Inside the file is another ZIP file that contains encrypted malware and a text file with a password.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence9

Because Cryptbot’s operation doesn’t rely on the existence of unencrypted binaries on the disk, detecting it is only possible by monitoring for malicious behavior such as PowerShell command execution or external network communication.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

In the log we can see that: A client 96.57.xx.xxx Sent a web request “GET tuneappservice.org/l3k42hj56h634gkj2lk14356jk4gh23k5jl6h4/gate.php?ped=RTY3M0E4NjhDQ0I5JE1DLTEwNw” We can see here what looks like a malware callback, it’s in fact Riltok.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

The service is described as a Fast flux but in reality it’s more a simple proxy system. BraZZZers rents a pool of VPSs all around the internet and uses them as proxy IPs in order to hide the real IP of a server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

The trojan downloads and executes three files from a public Bitbucket.org repository to %APPDATA%: 1.exe, 3.exe, and 4.exe.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The domains involved are resolving to a list of IPs, (we observed from 1 up to more than 20 IPs per domain) that are just redirecting the traffic to the real server.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

The story we are writing here will try to explain how, from a simple mistake made by an operator, we managed to collect and exploit a lot of precious information from a “Fast Flux” network called BraZZZerS Fast Flux between end of 2018 and 2022.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

On top of the usual .top domains used as CnC gateway, we saw the infrastructure hosting shops like larek.info or magazzz.top

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence10

The stolen information is then sent to the attacker... begins data exfiltration.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

463 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching463Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.