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MalwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

FudModule

FudModule is a sophisticated Windows rootkit associated with North Korean threat activity, particularly Lazarus Group and the espionage-focused Labyrinth Chollima cluster; reporting also notes use by Golden Chollima and links to Citrine Sleet and Diamond Sleet, indicating shared DPRK tooling. Public reporting places its emergence by at least 2022, with earlier variants analyzed by ESET and AhnLab as using BYOVD techniques against vulnerable drivers such as dbutil_2_3.sys and ene.sys, and later variants evolving beyond BYOVD to admin-to-kernel or Local Service-to-kernel zero-day exploitation.

Its core purpose is to obtain kernel-level access on Windows while evading detection. Reported capabilities include establishing kernel read/write primitives, performing direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM), and conducting direct kernel manipulation from user space in so-called data-only rootkit variants. Avast reported an updated variant deployed after exploitation of CVE-2024-21338 in appid.sys, where Lazarus obtained a kernel read/write primitive and used FudModule to manipulate kernel structures. Reported stealth and defense-evasion behaviors include disabling multiple kernel callback mechanisms, ETW tampering, zeroing EtwpActiveSystemLoggers, disabling selected ETW providers from a hardcoded list, interfering with minifilters and WFP callouts, manipulating handle table entries, suspending protected security processes, and removing PPL protection from AhnLab V3’s asdsvc.exe. Specific targeted security products/processes mentioned in reporting include Microsoft Defender (MsSense.exe, MsMpEng.exe), CrowdStrike Falcon (CSFalconService.exe), HitmanPro (hmpalert.exe), and AhnLab V3.

The malware has been observed in exploit chains using multiple zero-days. Content directly links FudModule to exploitation of vulnerable drivers, Chrome/Chromium, and Windows vulnerabilities. Reported vulnerabilities associated with FudModule operations include CVE-2024-21338, CVE-2024-38106, and references to CVE-2024-38193. Microsoft reported that in August 2024 a North Korean actor attributed with medium confidence to Citrine Sleet exploited Chromium CVE-2024-7971, then used CVE-2024-38106 for a Windows sandbox escape, and finally deployed FudModule in memory for kernel-level access. Avast separately documented Lazarus using CVE-2024-21338 to deploy an updated FudModule variant. Prior attack chains also reportedly used Kaolin RAT to load FudModule.

Targeting described in the supporting content includes Windows-based systems, with broader victimology tied to DPRK operations against defense, aerospace, manufacturing, logistics, shipping, financial institutions, and cryptocurrency organizations. Labyrinth Chollima reporting specifically associates FudModule with espionage operations and notes direct kernel manipulation for stealth. Microsoft states Citrine Sleet targets financial institutions and cryptocurrency organizations, while CrowdStrike reporting ties FudModule to the core Labyrinth Chollima espionage unit and notes shared access to the tool across DPRK clusters.

High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include domains voyagorclub[.]space and weinsteinfrog[.]com from a Microsoft-described 2024 exploitation chain, and sample hashes referenced in source collections related to Lazarus/FudModule activity: cbd1634cf7c638f2faf5e3ec79137db6704ec9de8df798fc46aeeed38de3da9b, 0296e2ce999e67c76352613a718e11516fe1b0efc3ffdb8918fc999dd76a73a5, 381d3ba5fd446e53f1c71f05a2b97124382146b4c7f28884174334db7b347219, 4b1cba57928e02665be444a51937228c4d7315ff5e08c13a03bd7c77eebdcf5e, and d9add2bfdfebfa235575687de356f0cefb3e4c55964c4cb8bfdcdc58294eeaca.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2024-21338Windows AppLocker appid.sys Kernel Elevation of Privilege

"...establishing a kernel read/write primitive. This primitive enabled Lazarus to perform direct kernel object manipulation in an updated version of their data-only FudModule rootkit..."

via avast decodeddecoded.avast.io
CVE-2024-38193Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

Tags: CVE-2024-38193 ... FudModule ... Lazarus Group ... Microsoft

via security online infosecurityonline.info
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Lazarus

On the other hand, Labyrinth Chollima's operations are motivated by cyber espionage, using tools like the FudModule rootkit to achieve stealth.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
TraderTraitor

The 2022 introduction of Fudmodule advanced capabilities through direct kernel manipulation and zero-day exploitation in vulnerable drivers, Chrome, and Windows.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
Golden Chollima

The 2022 introduction of Fudmodule advanced capabilities through direct kernel manipulation and zero-day exploitation in vulnerable drivers, Chrome, and Windows.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

Tags: CVE-2024-38193 ... FudModule ... Lazarus Group ... Microsoft

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

“Avast discovered an in-the-wild admin-to-kernel exploit for a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in the appid.sys AppLocker driver… Microsoft addressed this vulnerability as CVE-2024-21338… The vulnerability resides within the IOCTL dispatcher in appid.sys… expecting two kernel function pointers… remained accessible from user space… trick the kernel into calling an arbitrary pointer.” | “attackers… achieve kernel-level access by exploiting known vulnerable drivers, in a technique called BYOVD… Previous versions of the FudModule rootkit… exploiting… dbutil_2_3.sys… then… ene.sys.”

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

“Lazarus was already running with elevated privileges and then impersonated the local service account just prior to calling the IOCTL… using… NtSetInformationThread with the ThreadImpersonationToken… By impersonating local service, it can now obtain a read/write handle to \Device\AppId.”

Stealth

3 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1
TacticStealth

Labyrinth Chollima's operations are motivated by cyber espionage, using tools like the FudModule rootkit to achieve stealth.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

“Lazarus was already running with elevated privileges and then impersonated the local service account just prior to calling the IOCTL… using… NtSetInformationThread with the ThreadImpersonationToken… By impersonating local service, it can now obtain a read/write handle to \Device\AppId.”

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

“followed by a low-effort anti-debug check on PEB.BeingDebugged.”

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“leaking the base addresses of… ntoskrnl, netio, and fltmgr… calling NtQuerySystemInformation using the SystemModuleInformation class… KTHREAD address… using… SystemExtendedHandleInformation.”

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

“followed by a low-effort anti-debug check on PEB.BeingDebugged.”

Other

2 techniques
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

“FudModule… employs direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) techniques to disrupt various kernel security mechanisms… remove existing registry callbacks… remove all registered object callbacks… disable… process, thread, and image callbacks… Image verification callbacks… clears the entire list…” | “attempts to suspend PPL… processes associated with Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike Falcon, and HitmanPro… craft a custom handle table entry… bypassing… handle acquisition… call NtSuspendProcess… then… suspend… threads… resume process while threads remain suspended.” | “FudModule… get rid of… monitoring and antivirus minifilters… disables file system minifilters in a… data-only attack… iterates… _CALLBACK_NODE… decide whether to unlink… based on… driver name… and… altitude… FSFilter Anti-Virus… Activity Monitor.” | “FudModule… interfere with the installed callout routines… resolves netio!WfpProcessFlowDelete… iterates… WFP callout structures… sets… flag… FWP_CALLOUT_FLAG_CONDITIONAL_ON_FLOW… conditionally disable the callout…”

T1562.006Indicator BlockingEvidence1

“FudModule tampers with ETW internals… disable system loggers by zeroing out EtwpActiveSystemLoggers… [and] hardcoded list of 95 GUIDs… attempts to disable the respective providers… clear… ProviderEnableInfo.IsEnabled… [and] masks…”

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.