Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

Horabot

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs36Tracked
Type
Worm
Capabilities
ExfiltrationSpoofing
Delivery
PhishingLureClickfix
Platforms
Windows

Horabot is a Windows email-propagation malware family used in financially motivated banking-malware campaigns. Its principal role is to expand infections by abusing compromised email accounts rather than performing the banking fraud implemented by accompanying payloads such as Casbaneiro. It targets predominantly Spanish-speaking users, with activity across Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina, and later campaigns extending to Spain.

Horabot harvests email addresses through Microsoft Outlook and MAPI, filters collected contacts, exfiltrates addresses, and sends phishing messages through victims’ own accounts. Associated account-abuse components target Gmail, Yahoo, and Live accounts. Propagated messages impersonate invoices, confidential business documents, or judicial summonses and contain malicious PDF lures. Some campaigns dynamically generate password-protected PDFs for onward distribution. Sending messages from compromised accounts exploits recipients’ trust in known correspondents and helps the campaign evade email filtering.

Delivery chains use phishing links and ZIP archives, or ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA prompts, followed by HTA, JavaScript, VBScript, PowerShell, and AutoIt components. Associated infection chains employ obfuscation, environment checks, encrypted payloads, and Windows Startup shortcuts. Horabot has been deployed alongside Casbaneiro in campaigns attributed to the Brazilian cybercrime group Water Saci, also tracked as Augmented Marauder.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Water Saci

One of the scripts deployed later in the attack chain — a tool called Horabot — is designed to exploit the victim's email account, with the goal of self-propagation.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
Augmented Marauder

One of the scripts deployed later in the attack chain — a tool called Horabot — is designed to exploit the victim's email account, with the goal of self-propagation.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence2

Horabot serves as a propagation tool, using compromised email accounts to distribute phishing emails with dynamically generated PDF attachments to harvested contacts.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1566PhishingEvidence6

Threat actors typically rely on traditional initial access methods, such as phishing via email, SMS, and WhatsApp messages, impersonating financial institutions, and requesting invoices or payments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

The malicious file attached to the phishing email is password-protected, lending an air of legitimacy to the document and possibly helping it escape scrutiny from secure email gateways (SEGs). That zip file name is randomized for each victim — an obstacle for signature-based detection tools.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Clicking on an embedded link in the document directs the victim to a malicious link and initiates an automatic download of a ZIP archive, which, in turn, leads to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This threat group employs a wider-ranging attack model focused on a bespoke delivery and propagation mechanism that includes WhatsApp, ClickFix techniques, and email-centric phishing.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Casbaneiro's Delphi DLL module contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to fetch a PowerShell script that employs Horabot to distribute the malware via phishing emails to harvested contacts from Microsoft Outlook.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

...leading to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads. These scripts perform environment checks and retrieve further payloads from a remote server...

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

it opens a blank window, then immediately pulls and runs an external JavaScript payload hosted on the attacker’s domain.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Upon opening the PDF, users are directed to a malicious link that downloads a ZIP archive, leading to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Upon opening the PDF, users are directed to a malicious link that downloads a ZIP archive, leading to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

Victims who fall for the bait land on a site where they end up downloading a malicious zip file.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsEvidence1

Clean up the outbox

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Persistence setup: creates a LNK file and drops it into the Startup folder to maintain persistence.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsEvidence1

Clean up the outbox

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Persistence setup: creates a LNK file and drops it into the Startup folder to maintain persistence.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The script is obfuscated and employs a custom string encoding routine... Heavy obfuscation: the script uses multiple layers of obfuscation to obscure its behavior.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Cleanup routines: removes temporary files and terminates selected processes.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

Clicking on an embedded link in the document directs the victim to a malicious link and initiates an automatic download of a ZIP archive, which, in turn, leads to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-VM and “anti-Avast”: performs basic environment checks and terminates if a specific Avast folder or VM artifacts are detected.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The VBS script is designed to carry out environment and anti-analysis checks similar to those found in Horabot artifacts, including checks for Avast antivirus software, and proceeds to retrieve next-stage payloads from a remote server.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Cleanup routines: removes temporary files and terminates selected processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Information gathering and exfiltration: collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-VM and “anti-Avast”: performs basic environment checks and terminates if a specific Avast folder or VM artifacts are detected.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The VBS script is designed to carry out environment and anti-analysis checks similar to those found in Horabot artifacts, including checks for Avast antivirus software, and proceeds to retrieve next-stage payloads from a remote server.

Collection

4 techniques
T1114Email CollectionEvidence3

One of the scripts deployed later in the attack chain — a tool called Horabot — is designed to exploit the victim's email account, with the goal of self-propagation. It grabs their contacts, filters them, then blasts a new round of phishing emails to any number of new potential targets.

T1114.001Local Email CollectionEvidence1

...distribute the malware via phishing emails to harvested contacts from Microsoft Outlook.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

A significant amount of observed campaigns focus on stealing credentials for banking or other financial accounts, including use of banking trojans such as METAMORFO aka "Horabot," BBtok, and JanelaRAT.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Clicking on an embedded link in the document directs the victim to a malicious link and initiates an automatic download of a ZIP archive...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

These scripts perform environment checks and retrieve further payloads from a remote server, ultimately deploying Casbaneiro and Horabot.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltrate unique email addresses to the C2 | Information gathering and exfiltration: collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+6 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching36Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.