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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actors

Horabot

Horabot is a Windows banking malware family and botnet first identified in June 2023, though reporting cited in the content assesses it has been used in attacks targeting Latin America since at least November 2020. It has been described as both a banking trojan and a propagation/spreader component used alongside Casbaneiro/Metamorfo in multi-stage phishing campaigns. High-confidence reporting links recent activity to the Brazilian cybercrime group Augmented Marauder, also tracked as Water Saci.

The malware has targeted primarily Spanish-speaking users in Latin America, including Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina, with additional campaigns aimed at Spanish-speaking users in Latin America and Spain or Europe. Mexico appears heavily affected in one 2025 campaign, where researchers observed 5,384 infected machines, about 93% of them in Mexico. Targeting is financially motivated, with lures themed as judicial summonses, invoices, or confidential business documents.

Observed infection chains rely on phishing and social engineering rather than software exploitation. Delivery methods described in the content include phishing emails with password-protected PDF attachments, links to malicious ZIP archives, fake CAPTCHA pages that instruct victims to run mshta, and follow-on HTA, JavaScript, VBScript, PowerShell, and AutoIt stages. The malware chain performs environment and anti-analysis checks, including checks for Avast and VM artifacts, retrieves additional payloads from remote servers, and establishes persistence via a Startup-folder LNK shortcut.

Horabot’s key behavior is self-propagation through compromised email accounts. It abuses the victim’s mailbox, harvests contacts via Outlook/MAPI, filters addresses, and sends phishing emails from the victim’s own account, increasing trust and reducing the likelihood of email security detection. Campaigns described in the content generate tailored, password-protected PDF lures dynamically through a remote PHP API using a random PIN, then distribute them to harvested contacts. Reporting also states Horabot-related components targeted Yahoo, Live, and Gmail accounts and functioned as spam and account-hijacking tools.

In the broader attack ecosystem, Casbaneiro is repeatedly described as the primary banking trojan payload, while Horabot is used as the delivery and propagation mechanism. In another detailed 2025 campaign, Horabot is described as a bundle consisting of a Delphi banking trojan plus a PowerShell-driven email worm. The banking trojan component uses fake banking overlays to steal credentials during active banking sessions, and reporting associates the overall operation with targeting banks and financial platforms such as Santander, Banco do Brasil, and Binance.

Technical indicators and infrastructure directly mentioned in the content include use of HTA/VBS/AutoIt loaders; encrypted payload files with .ia and .at extensions; deployment of Casbaneiro as staticdata.dll and Horabot as at.dll in one campaign; dynamic PDF generation via hxxps://tt.grupobedfs[.]com/.../gera_pdf.php; fake CAPTCHA and staging infrastructure at evs.grupotuis[.]buzz and pdj.gruposhac[.]lat; configuration retrieval from cgf.facturastbs[.]shop; and socket C2 infrastructure including lifenews[.]pro:49569 and 64.177.80[.]44. One report notes the malware’s custom TCP protocol uses traffic framed between double ## markers, which researchers identified as a reliable IDS/Suricata detection opportunity.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Saci

One of the scripts deployed later in the attack chain — a tool called Horabot — is designed to exploit the victim's email account, with the goal of self-propagation.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
Augmented Marauder

One of the scripts deployed later in the attack chain — a tool called Horabot — is designed to exploit the victim's email account, with the goal of self-propagation.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence2

Horabot serves as a propagation tool, using compromised email accounts to distribute phishing emails with dynamically generated PDF attachments to harvested contacts.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1566PhishingEvidence6

Threat actors typically rely on traditional initial access methods, such as phishing via email, SMS, and WhatsApp messages, impersonating financial institutions, and requesting invoices or payments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

The malicious file attached to the phishing email is password-protected, lending an air of legitimacy to the document and possibly helping it escape scrutiny from secure email gateways (SEGs). That zip file name is randomized for each victim — an obstacle for signature-based detection tools.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Clicking on an embedded link in the document directs the victim to a malicious link and initiates an automatic download of a ZIP archive, which, in turn, leads to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This threat group employs a wider-ranging attack model focused on a bespoke delivery and propagation mechanism that includes WhatsApp, ClickFix techniques, and email-centric phishing.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Casbaneiro's Delphi DLL module contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to fetch a PowerShell script that employs Horabot to distribute the malware via phishing emails to harvested contacts from Microsoft Outlook.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

...leading to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads. These scripts perform environment checks and retrieve further payloads from a remote server...

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

it opens a blank window, then immediately pulls and runs an external JavaScript payload hosted on the attacker’s domain.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Upon opening the PDF, users are directed to a malicious link that downloads a ZIP archive, leading to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Upon opening the PDF, users are directed to a malicious link that downloads a ZIP archive, leading to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

Victims who fall for the bait land on a site where they end up downloading a malicious zip file.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsEvidence1

Clean up the outbox

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Persistence setup: creates a LNK file and drops it into the Startup folder to maintain persistence.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsEvidence1

Clean up the outbox

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Persistence setup: creates a LNK file and drops it into the Startup folder to maintain persistence.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The script is obfuscated and employs a custom string encoding routine... Heavy obfuscation: the script uses multiple layers of obfuscation to obscure its behavior.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Cleanup routines: removes temporary files and terminates selected processes.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

Clicking on an embedded link in the document directs the victim to a malicious link and initiates an automatic download of a ZIP archive, which, in turn, leads to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-VM and “anti-Avast”: performs basic environment checks and terminates if a specific Avast folder or VM artifacts are detected.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The VBS script is designed to carry out environment and anti-analysis checks similar to those found in Horabot artifacts, including checks for Avast antivirus software, and proceeds to retrieve next-stage payloads from a remote server.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Cleanup routines: removes temporary files and terminates selected processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Information gathering and exfiltration: collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-VM and “anti-Avast”: performs basic environment checks and terminates if a specific Avast folder or VM artifacts are detected.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The VBS script is designed to carry out environment and anti-analysis checks similar to those found in Horabot artifacts, including checks for Avast antivirus software, and proceeds to retrieve next-stage payloads from a remote server.

Collection

4 techniques
T1114Email CollectionEvidence3

One of the scripts deployed later in the attack chain — a tool called Horabot — is designed to exploit the victim's email account, with the goal of self-propagation. It grabs their contacts, filters them, then blasts a new round of phishing emails to any number of new potential targets.

T1114.001Local Email CollectionEvidence1

...distribute the malware via phishing emails to harvested contacts from Microsoft Outlook.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

A significant amount of observed campaigns focus on stealing credentials for banking or other financial accounts, including use of banking trojans such as METAMORFO aka "Horabot," BBtok, and JanelaRAT.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Clicking on an embedded link in the document directs the victim to a malicious link and initiates an automatic download of a ZIP archive...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

These scripts perform environment checks and retrieve further payloads from a remote server, ultimately deploying Casbaneiro and Horabot.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltrate unique email addresses to the C2 | Information gathering and exfiltration: collects the host IP, hostname, username, and OS version, then sends this data to a C2 server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
12 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
21 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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IOC matching36

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping29

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.