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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

XTunnel

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 22 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs56Tracked
Type
Proxyware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationLateral movementScanningDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows
Also known asTrojan.ShunnaelXAPS

XTunnel, also known as X-Tunnel, XAPS, and TrojanShunnael, is a Windows network-proxy and tunneling tool associated with APT28, the Russian GRU-linked espionage group also known as Fancy Bear, Sednit, and Sofacy. It relays arbitrary network traffic between an Internet-based command-and-control server and an endpoint inside a compromised local network, enabling network pivoting and data exfiltration. APT28 used XTunnel during the 2016 Democratic National Committee intrusion, alongside other tools in its espionage arsenal.

XTunnel can probe networks for open ports and access locally stored passwords. It protects communications using SSL/TLS and RC4 and receives an alternate port number from its command-and-control server to use if the current connection closes. Analyzed variants embed OpenSSL and use code obfuscation, including opaque predicates that complicate analysis. The family also includes .NET variants.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

The APT28 software table lists XTunnel with proxying, encrypted channels, fallback channels, network-service scanning, and obfuscation.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

They also send emails purportedly containing links to news items, but instead linking to malware drop sites that install toolkits onto the target's computer.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Among other things, it uses zero-day exploits, spear phishing and malware to compromise targets.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

For example: in late March the attackers registered a domain with a typo—misdepatrment[.]com—to look suspiciously like the company hired by the DNC to manage its network, MIS Department.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) has been used to execute remote commands.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence16

A version of [XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) introduced in July 2015 obfuscated the binary using opaque predicates and other techniques in a likely attempt to obfuscate it and bypass security products.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence1

The Command and Control (C2) IPs were hardcoded into the provided sample which also matched the Netzpolotik reporting.

T1027.016Junk Code InsertionEvidence3

A version of [XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) introduced in July 2015 inserted junk code into the binary in a likely attempt to obfuscate it and bypass security products.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence3

[XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) is capable of accessing locally stored passwords on victims.(Citation: Invincea XTunnel)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

AADInternals can gather unsecured credentials for Azure AD services, such as Azure AD Connect, from a local machine... Agent Tesla has the ability to extract credentials from configuration or support files... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence5

[XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) is capable of probing the network for open ports.(Citation: Invincea XTunnel)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The C&C server can then order Xtunnel to open a tunnel with a designated machine, so that any data coming from the C&C server will be forwarded to this machine... any kind of TCP data can be sent through the tunnel... UDP traffic tunneling was introduced.

Command and Control

12 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence4

The C2 server used by [XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) provides a port number to the victim to use as a fallback in case the connection closes on the currently used port.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

APT28_2016-10_ESET_Observing the Comings and Goings Xtunnel

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The source code contains two different channel implementations, one over HTTP and one over email... HttpChannel::getRawPacket() method is implemented as a HTTP GET request... sendRawPacket() is an HTTP POST request.

T1090ProxyEvidence8

[XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) relays traffic between a C2 server and a victim.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence4

Xtunnel is a network proxy tool that can relay any kind of network traffic between a C&C server on the Internet and an endpoint computer inside a local network... An Xtunnel infected machine serves as a network pivot

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

Xtunnel first tries to retrieve the Internet Explorer proxy configuration... Once a proxy IP address has been chosen, Xtunnel uses the HTTP CONNECT method to reach its C&C server.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

The Sednit group developed a network proxy tool, named Xtunnel, to effectively transform a compromised computer into a network pivot, in order to contact machines that are normally unreachable from the Internet... An Xtunnel infected machine serves as a network pivot to contact machines that are normally unreachable from the Internet.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The attackers then upgraded valuable targets to the X-Agent backdoor, often pairing it with the Sedreco loader and the X-Tunnel network pivot.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

expanded its tactics to include X-Agent, X-Tunnel, and LameHug

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence2

Xtunnel proxies network traffic between a C&C server on the Internet and a target computer, hence creating a “tunnel” between the two... UDP traffic tunneling was introduced

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[XTunnel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0117) uses SSL/TLS and RC4 to encrypt traffic.(Citation: Invincea XTunnel)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

X-Tunnel for exfiltration

T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

On April 28, they used additional malware known as X-Tunnel to create an encrypted connection between the DCCC computers and GRU-controlled proxy computers for secure, large-scale data transfers, and then exfiltrated the over-70 Gigabytes of compressed data to a remote, GRU-controlled server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

56 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching56Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.