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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

XTunnel

Also known asTrojan.ShunnaelXAPS

X-Tunnel, also referred to as XTunnel, Xtunnel, and internally as XAPS, is a custom network proxy and pivoting tool associated with APT28/Fancy Bear/Sednit/Sofacy, a Russia-linked espionage group publicly tied in multiple reports to GRU Unit 26165. It was part of APT28’s long-running 2010s toolkit alongside X-Agent, Sedreco, Seduploader, and related implants, and was used in notable intrusions including the 2015 German Bundestag compromise and the 2016 Democratic National Committee intrusion. In the DNC case, reporting states X-Agent handled keylogging and screenshot capture while X-Tunnel was used for exfiltration; CrowdStrike also described Fancy Bear tradecraft at the DNC as using X-Agent and X-Tunnel, with deployment via RemCOM and anti-forensics such as event log clearing and timestamp manipulation.

Functionally, X-Tunnel relays traffic between an Internet-based command-and-control server and a compromised endpoint inside a local network, effectively turning the victim host into a pivot point for network traversal. It supports multiple simultaneous tunnels and has been described as relaying any kind of network traffic between the C2 server and internal systems. ESET reported that Sednit commonly used Xtunnel later in an intrusion to pivot to other reachable systems. The malware has also been reported as capable of probing networks for open ports and accessing locally stored passwords on victim systems.

For command and control protection, XTunnel uses encrypted communications; reporting specifically mentions SSL/TLS and RC4, and ESET described a custom protocol encapsulated in TLS. Later versions reportedly added HTTP proxy support and persistent HTTP connections. Fidelis analysis of a DNC-related sample found embedded OpenSSL 1.0.1e, hardcoded command-and-control IP addresses, and a code component named "Xtunnel_Http_Method.exe," matching prior Microsoft reporting attributed to Fancy Bear. One cited X-Tunnel C2 IP was 45.32.129[.]185, and reporting also linked the typo-squatted domain misdepatrment[.]com to that infrastructure. Additional reporting noted use of Njalla-registered infrastructure for SPLM and XTUNNEL C2 servers.

Recent reporting indicates continuity between older APT28 tooling and newer implants: ESET linked BeardShell to Sednit in part through a rare opaque-predicate obfuscation technique previously seen in Xtunnel, reinforcing Xtunnel’s place in the group’s custom malware lineage.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

The toolkit was unchanged: X-Agent for keylogging and screenshotting, X-Tunnel for exfiltration, Mimikatz for credential theft.

via sekoia blogblog.sekoia.io
APT 28

They then linked this deceptive domain to a long-known APT 28 so-called X-Tunnel command-and-control IP address, 45.32.129[.]185.

via web archiveweb.archive.org
APT29

ESET found that BeardShell also uses a unique obfuscation technique previously seen in Xtunnel, a network-pivoting tool that APT28 used in the 2010s.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

They also send emails purportedly containing links to news items, but instead linking to malware drop sites that install toolkits onto the target's computer.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Among other things, it uses zero-day exploits, spear phishing and malware to compromise targets.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

For example: in late March the attackers registered a domain with a typo—misdepatrment[.]com—to look suspiciously like the company hired by the DNC to manage its network, MIS Department.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence12

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence1

The Command and Control (C2) IPs were hardcoded into the provided sample which also matched the Netzpolotik reporting.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

AADInternals can gather unsecured credentials for Azure AD services, such as Azure AD Connect, from a local machine. Agent Tesla has the ability to extract credentials from configuration or support files. APT3 has a tool that can locate credentials in files on the file system such as those from Firefox or Chrome.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware performing network scanning, port scanning, service enumeration, OS fingerprinting, and identifying open ports/services across victim environments.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The C&C server can then order Xtunnel to open a tunnel with a designated machine, so that any data coming from the C&C server will be forwarded to this machine... any kind of TCP data can be sent through the tunnel... UDP traffic tunneling was introduced.

Command and Control

10 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

CrowdStrike had prepared a technical report to go online later that morning. The security firm carefully outlined some of the allegedly “superb” tradecraft of both intrusions: the Russian software implants were stealthy, they could sense locally-installed virus scanners and other defenses, the tools were customizable through encrypted configuration files, they were persistent, and the intruders used an elaborate command-and-control infrastructure.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The source code contains two different channel implementations, one over HTTP and one over email... HttpChannel::getRawPacket() method is implemented as a HTTP GET request... sendRawPacket() is an HTTP POST request.

T1090ProxyEvidence4

The Sednit group developed a network proxy tool, named Xtunnel, to effectively transform a compromised computer into a network pivot, in order to contact machines that are normally unreachable from the Internet

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence4

Xtunnel is a network proxy tool that can relay any kind of network traffic between a C&C server on the Internet and an endpoint computer inside a local network... An Xtunnel infected machine serves as a network pivot

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

Xtunnel first tries to retrieve the Internet Explorer proxy configuration... Once a proxy IP address has been chosen, Xtunnel uses the HTTP CONNECT method to reach its C&C server.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

The Sednit group developed a network proxy tool, named Xtunnel, to effectively transform a compromised computer into a network pivot, in order to contact machines that are normally unreachable from the Internet... An Xtunnel infected machine serves as a network pivot to contact machines that are normally unreachable from the Internet.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The attackers then upgraded valuable targets to the X-Agent backdoor, often pairing it with the Sedreco loader and the X-Tunnel network pivot.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence2

Xtunnel proxies network traffic between a C&C server on the Internet and a target computer, hence creating a “tunnel” between the two... UDP traffic tunneling was introduced

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence2

Multiple malware families and intrusion sets are described as encrypting C2 traffic using SSL/TLS/HTTPS (e.g., "used HTTPS for command and control", "encrypts C2 communications with TLS", "uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications", "TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2"). | Examples include: "encrypt C2 messages with AES-256-CBC sent underneath TLS", "encrypts C2 traffic with AES and RSA", "uses SSL/TLS and RC4", and "BlowFish algorithm".

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

X-Tunnel for exfiltration

T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

On April 28, they used additional malware known as X-Tunnel to create an encrypted connection between the DCCC computers and GRU-controlled proxy computers for secure, large-scale data transfers, and then exfiltrated the over-70 Gigabytes of compressed data to a remote, GRU-controlled server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

24 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
11 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
13 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching24

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping21

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.