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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

Cicada3301

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK5Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationInitial accessDefense evasionExtortion
Platforms
WindowsLinuxEsxi

Cicada3301 is a ransomware-as-a-service operation first observed in mid-2024. The group deploys a Rust-based ransomware family targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments and operates a double-extortion model that combines file encryption with data-theft pressure through a leak site. Cicada3301 has been discussed as a possible rebrand, derivative, or code descendant of ALPHV/BlackCat, but any direct lineage remains unverified.

Technical analysis has identified substantial similarities between Cicada3301 and ALPHV, particularly in Linux and ESXi encryptors. Reported overlaps include use of Rust, ChaCha20 for file encryption with an RSA public key protecting per-file or per-session symmetric material, similar command-line options, comparable ransom-note conventions, and nearly identical logic for shutting down virtual machines and deleting snapshots on ESXi hosts. Analyses have also indicated that the Windows and ESXi builds are likely the same ransomware codebase compiled for different targets.

On Linux and ESXi, Cicada3301 has been observed as an ELF binary that accepts execution parameters controlling delay, user-interface output, VM and snapshot handling, and key validation. The malware decrypts an embedded ransom note from an encrypted blob within the binary, validates a supplied key before proceeding, generates encryption material using system randomness, encrypts smaller files fully and larger files partially, and appends encrypted keying material and a victim-specific extension to encrypted files. Its ESXi-focused behavior includes terminating virtual machine processes and removing snapshots to maximize operational impact.

Observed intrusion activity associated with Cicada3301 indicates initial access can be obtained through valid accounts, including remote access through ScreenConnect, with reporting assessing that such credentials were likely stolen or brute-forced. Some reporting links this access pattern to Brutus botnet activity associated with password-guessing against remote access and VPN services. Cicada3301 operators have also been reported seeking exploitation opportunities involving ScreenConnect vulnerabilities. Infrastructure overlap has additionally been noted between Cicada3301 affiliate activity and ShadowSyndicate-linked infrastructure, though that does not by itself establish organizational identity.

Cicada3301 has been active across multiple sectors and geographies as part of the broader ransomware ecosystem and has appeared in 2024 victim and prevalence reporting as an emerging operation. The group recruits affiliates on Russian-language cybercrime forums and fits the broader professionalized RaaS model rather than a single closed intrusion set.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-1708via intrinsec blogPath Traversal and Remote Code Execution in ConnectWise ScreenConnectWe found that at least one IP address ... was overlapping with the ShadowSyndicate attack infrastructure and an exfiltration server used by affiliates of a recent RaaS program known as Cicada3301.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-1709via intrinsec blogAuthentication Bypass in ConnectWise ScreenConnectWe found that at least one IP address ... was overlapping with the ShadowSyndicate attack infrastructure and an exfiltration server used by affiliates of a recent RaaS program known as Cicada3301.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ShadowSyndicate

We found that at least one IP address ... was overlapping with the ShadowSyndicate attack infrastructure and an exfiltration server used by affiliates of a recent RaaS program known as Cicada3301.

via intrinsec blogintrinsec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1578Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureEvidence1

Technical analysis reveals several key similarities with ALPHV: both use nearly identical command structures for shutting down VMs and removing snapshots, and share a similar file-naming convention.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

The files will then be encrypted with a symmetric key generated by OsRng using ChaCha20. | If it is greater than 0x6400000, then it will encrypt the file in parts, and if it is smaller, the whole file will be encrypted.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

Both use almost identical commands to shutdown VM and remove snapshots... esxcli vm process kill –type=force –world-id=

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

If the parameter no_vm_ss is chosen, the ransomware will encrypt files without shutting down the virtual machines that are running on ESXi. This is done by using the built-in esxicli terminal that will also delete snapshots.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

Technical analysis reveals several key similarities with ALPHV: both use nearly identical command structures for shutting down VMs and removing snapshots, and share a similar file-naming convention.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping5Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.