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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

Qwizzserial

Qwizzserial is an Android SMS-stealer observed in campaigns targeting users in Uzbekistan. Group-IB reported roughly 100,000 infections, with most victims in Uzbekistan, where SMS is commonly used for two-factor authentication. The malware has been described as harvesting SMS inbox contents, intercepting SMS messages, collecting phone numbers, bank card data, and enumerating installed financial or banking apps. Reported exfiltration methods include Telegram bots and HTTP POST requests. Qwizzserial has been distributed through Telegram-based social engineering, including Telegram channels posing as government agencies and fake financial-aid applications, and has also been found disguised as seemingly benign media files. It has been observed alongside broader Uzbekistan-focused Android malware activity involving other families such as Wonderland, and is described as part of campaigns abusing sideloaded APKs delivered via Telegram. High-confidence reporting links Qwizzserial to theft of sensitive financial and authentication-related data from Android users in Uzbekistan.

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3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ajina

"...and SMS stealer Qwizzserial."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
blazefang

"...and SMS stealer Qwizzserial."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
trickywonders

"...and SMS stealer Qwizzserial."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
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