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MalwareRansomware

Silent

SILENT is a Malware-as-a-Service operation analyzed by Breakglass Intelligence and branded as "SILENT." It was observed being distributed via pinkiecraft.com, a fake Minecraft client site serving a 57.2 MB ZIP archive containing an NSIS installer named PinkieCraft.exe. The installer deployed a triple-encrypted Electron-based payload set, including an infostealer, a Discord injection component, and a RAT-capable main process. The operation was described as technically capable but operationally sloppy due to exposed React source maps, development leaks, test keys in production, and misconfigured CORS.

The malware’s payloads included crypted.js as the primary infostealer, discord-injection-obf.js as a Discord credential interception module, and main.js as the Electron main process handling command-and-control, persistence, and privilege escalation. The JavaScript payloads were AES-256-CBC encrypted using PBKDF2 with SHA-512 and 100,000 iterations, then obfuscated with JsConfuser after decryption. Bundled modules included sqlite3, @primno/dpapi, ws, and node-telegram-bot-api.

SILENT targets Windows systems and steals browser cookies, saved passwords, autofill data, Discord tokens, browser extension wallet data, Telegram sessions, and gaming-platform-related account data. Targeted browsers included Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera Stable, Opera GX, Opera Neon, Vivaldi, Yandex Browser, and Mozilla Firefox. It used Chrome remote debugging hijack techniques by launching browsers with --remote-debugging-port and --headless to extract cookies via the DevTools protocol, and also downloaded Python 3.10 from globalcdn.nuget.org for a secondary cookie extraction method. It targeted wallets and related extensions including MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Trust Wallet, Binance Chain, Atomic Wallet, Authenticator, and Exodus, and exfiltrated the desktop Exodus wallet directory. It also stole Roblox, Steam, TikTok, and Minecraft-related account data, including Steam data via API key 440D7F4D810EF9298D25EDDF37C1F902. Telegram tdata session directories were archived and uploaded to GoFile infrastructure including e1.gofile.io, e2.gofile.io, e5.gofile.io, and e8.gofile.io.

The Discord injection component overwrote discord_desktop_core-*/index.js, restarted Discord, and intercepted login credentials, MFA codes, backup codes, profile changes, payment methods, friend lists, guild data, and QR-code-based remote authentication. It also intercepted Discord payment transactions involving Braintree merchant ID 49pp2rp4phym7387 and Stripe.

For defense evasion and privilege escalation, SILENT attempted six sequential UAC bypass techniques, including fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, SilentCleanup task abuse, exefile runas hijacking, and a VBScript ShellExecute runas method. It added Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell Add-MpPreference commands and killed Discord, Steam, major browsers, and Minecraft clients to release locks on credential stores.

The backend infrastructure included an admin panel hosted at funnywebsiteviewer.onrender.com with exposed production source maps at /static/js/main.17bcf5b0.js.map, revealing unminified React source code and backend details. The backend URL was hardcoded as https://datanetworksync.onrender.com. The operator login flow used WEEKLY-{32-char-hex} license keys, Telegram bot OTP delivery, and JWT issuance with a 5-minute OTP expiration. Recovered source code contained French-language comments, and backend leaks exposed development details including the path /var/www/new-api-protocol/. Exposed RAT functionality included screenshots, PowerShell execution, system control, file browsing, file download, EXE upload-and-execute, Discord token regeneration, credential re-harvest, alerts, sound playback, and bidirectional chat. Two chat endpoints were reportedly left unauthenticated. During a 92-minute observation window, an unauthenticated /api/health endpoint on the Cloudflare Worker proxy showed active API keys increasing from 75 to 76, indicating ongoing victimization in real time.

Separately from the MaaS operation, "Silent" is also listed in 2025 reporting as a newly identified ransomware group within the fragmented ransomware ecosystem, alongside groups such as Gunra, IMN Crew, Dire Wolf, JGroup, DATACARRY, and SatanLock. The provided content does not establish whether that ransomware-group reference is the same malware family or operator set as the SILENT MaaS infostealer/RAT operation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled tasks XML-defined tasks named GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore, Adobe Acrobat Update, or CCleaner Update -- triggers on boot... logon... every 4 hours, and session unlock.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The C2 backend... exposes... /api/execute-powershell/{hwid} POST Arbitrary PowerShell execution on victim... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... T1059.001 ... Remote PowerShell execution via RAT

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The malware is distributed through pinkiecraft.com, a fake Minecraft client site... The download page serves a 57.2 MB ZIP containing an NSIS installer (PinkieCraft.exe).

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled tasks XML-defined tasks named GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore, Adobe Acrobat Update, or CCleaner Update -- triggers on boot... logon... every 4 hours, and session unlock.

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

WMI event subscription Filter WinUpdate{SID} fires daily at 8:00 AM via WQL __InstanceModificationEvent

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

COM hijacking HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{clsid}\InprocServer32

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware deploys five independent persistence mechanisms (T1547.001, T1053.005, T1546.003, T1546.015): Registry Run keys HKCU\...\Run... Startup folder VBScript-created .lnk...

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled tasks XML-defined tasks named GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore, Adobe Acrobat Update, or CCleaner Update -- triggers on boot... logon... every 4 hours, and session unlock.

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

WMI event subscription Filter WinUpdate{SID} fires daily at 8:00 AM via WQL __InstanceModificationEvent

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

COM hijacking HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{clsid}\InprocServer32

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware deploys five independent persistence mechanisms (T1547.001, T1053.005, T1546.003, T1546.015): Registry Run keys HKCU\...\Run... Startup folder VBScript-created .lnk...

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The malware attempts six UAC bypass techniques sequentially until one succeeds (T1548.002): fodhelper.exe... eventvwr.exe... SilentCleanup scheduled task... exefile\shell\runas... VBScript runas...

Stealth

1 technique
T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The NSIS installer extracts an Electron application with three AES-256-CBC encrypted JavaScript payloads... After AES decryption, all three files employ JsConfuser obfuscation...

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The tdata session directory is archived and uploaded to GoFile... giving the operator full Telegram account access without re-authentication (T1539).

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

Cryptocurrency Wallet Theft Eight browser extension wallets are targeted by extension ID (T1552)... The desktop Exodus wallet at %APPDATA%\Exodus\exodus.wallet\ is also exfiltrated.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The stealer targets nine browser families, checking up to seven user profiles in each (T1555.003)... it extracts cookies... saved passwords... autofill data... Discord tokens...

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

The injected code intercepts... wss://remote-auth-gateway.discord.gg/* QR code login hijack (T1557).

Collection

2 techniques
T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

A notable technique is the Chrome Remote Debugging hijack (T1185): the malware launches browsers with --remote-debugging-port={port} --headless=new ... and calls Network.getAllCookies to extract session cookies...

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

The injected code intercepts... wss://remote-auth-gateway.discord.gg/* QR code login hijack (T1557).

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... T1102 Web Service Discord CDN for payload delivery

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... T1571 Non-Standard Port WebSocket C2 over HTTPS

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service GoFile.io, Render.com, Cloudflare Workers

Other

1 technique
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Before credential theft begins, the malware adds itself to Windows Defender exclusions (T1562.001): powershell ... Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath ... Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess ...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
10 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
3 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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IOC matching18

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping17

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.