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Malware1 associated actor

CopperStealth

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Orthrus

In March 2023, we observed two campaigns delivering new malware that we named CopperStealth and CopperPhish. ... CopperStealth’s infection chain involves dropping and loading a rootkit, which later injects its payload into explorer.exe and another system process. These payloads are responsible for downloading and running additional tasks.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The first campaign distributed CopperStealth on March 8, 2023, delivering the malware via installers provided on a popular Chinese software sharing website. It disguised the malware as free software and targeted the country’s users.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

When a shutdown request is received, the rootkit driver copies itself to a newly generated random driver. This is done with a few registry modifications, such as changing the driver name in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services registry and inserting a “PendingFileRenameOperations” registry value in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager to automatically move the file upon reboot.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

It then creates and starts a new driver service, which begins when the system starts.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

These payloads are responsible for downloading and running additional tasks... finally injects the patched module into explorer.exe... and the task module is injected into the previously found process with system integrity.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

It then creates and starts a new driver service, which begins when the system starts.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

CopperStealth’s infection chain involves dropping and loading a rootkit, which later injects its payload into explorer.exe and another system process.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

These payloads are responsible for downloading and running additional tasks... finally injects the patched module into explorer.exe... and the task module is injected into the previously found process with system integrity.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

When a shutdown request is received, the rootkit driver copies itself to a newly generated random driver. This is done with a few registry modifications, such as changing the driver name in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services registry and inserting a “PendingFileRenameOperations” registry value in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager to automatically move the file upon reboot.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The rootkit also blocks access to blocklisted registry keys and prevents certain executables and drivers from running.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The dropper then checks if the system architecture is 32-bit or 64-bit... This thread enumerates all running processes (SystemProcessInformation) and looks for explorer.exe and another process with SYSTEM integrity

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

After successful injection into explorer.exe, it makes a GET request to the task URL to get the task command to be performed.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The installer contains numerous encoded URLs; when the installer is run these URLs will be decoded and the files located at the said URLs will be downloaded and run on the affected system.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.