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Mallory
Malware1 associated CVE

WhisperKill

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Wiper
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

WhisperKill is a destructive Windows wiper associated with the January 2022 WhisperGate campaign targeting Ukrainian government and other Ukrainian organizations during the opening phase of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is a C-language file wiper used alongside other destructive components in coordinated intrusions that also involved website defacement and, in some environments, manual destruction of virtual machines. WhisperKill was delivered by the WhisperGate malware chain and functioned as the file-corruption stage of that operation.

Its primary behavior is to overwrite files matching a predefined set of extensions on local fixed and remote drives with 1 MB blocks of 0xCC bytes, irreversibly destroying data rather than encrypting it for recovery. After execution, it self-deletes. Reporting has also noted code similarity or substantial code reuse with earlier destructive malware, including WhiteBlackCrypt and the Encrpt3d ransomware codebase, reinforcing assessment of it as a repurposed destructive tool rather than conventional ransomware.

WhisperKill formed part of a broader cluster of wiper activity directed at Ukraine in 2022, alongside families such as WhisperGate, HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, CaddyWiper, and DoubleZero. Public reporting has linked its deployment to attacks on Ukrainian state entities, but definitive attribution to a specific state actor remains contested in open sources. The malware’s role, targeting, and timing place it within the wave of sabotage-oriented cyber operations aimed at disrupting Ukrainian government and organizational operations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-44228via trend micro researchLog4ShellWhisperKill: This malware, downloaded by WhisperGate, destroys files with specific extensions.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -enc ... ; C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe rmdir 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender' -Recurse

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Після запуску самовидаляється.

Discovery

1 technique
T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

WhisperKill enumerates drives A to Z and destroys files on drives that are either Type 3 (DRIVE_FIXED) or 4 (DRIVE_REMOTE)

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

WhisperGate: This malware downloads and executes additional payload from the C&C server constructed on Discord.

Impact

2 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence6

WhisperKill: This malware, downloaded by WhisperGate, destroys files with specific extensions.

T1561.002Disk Structure WipeEvidence1

Шкідливий програмний код забезпечує відображення повідомлення про викуп та спотворює дані, перезаписуючи кожен 199 сектор жорсткого диску відповідним повідомленням.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.