EvilGinx
- Type
- Trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftSession hijackingInitial access
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishingAitm
- Platforms
- Cloud
Evilginx is an open-source adversary-in-the-middle phishing and adversary-emulation framework used in authorized penetration testing and malicious credential-harvesting operations. It acts as a reverse proxy between a victim’s browser and a legitimate authentication service, relaying live sign-in pages and authentication exchanges while capturing usernames, passwords, and authenticated session cookies. Service-specific configuration templates, known as phishlets, adapt the framework to different authentication flows. Operators can replay stolen session cookies to access accounts without repeating the intercepted login or MFA challenge. This can circumvent conventional MFA protections but does not inherently defeat phishing-resistant authentication.
Evilginx campaigns use phishing links, lookalike authentication domains, and targeted social-engineering lures to direct victims into proxied sign-in flows. Documented targets include Microsoft 365 and Entra ID accounts, university single sign-on portals, and ScreenConnect administrator accounts. The framework has been used by Russian state-linked actors Star Blizzard and LAUNDRY BEAR, financially motivated Scattered Spider, and the Qilin ransomware affiliate STAC4365. Its role is primarily credential theft, session hijacking, and initial access; subsequent mailbox theft, remote-access deployment, and ransomware execution are operator activities rather than inherent Evilginx functionality. Public forks extend or modify its phishing workflows.
Associated threat actors
10 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The group's preferred initial access vectors continue to involve highly sophisticated social engineering, often combined with phishing campaigns utilizing typosquatted domains ... and tools like Evilginx to intercept credentials and session cookies.
Frameless BitB avoids iframes and supports Evilginx-based proxying of Microsoft login pages.
The group still runs password phishing with Evilginx, a tool that can also steal session cookies to get around two-factor authentication.
Once a user entered their Microsoft credentials into this malicious site, LAUNDRY BEAR’s modified version of the open source adversary emulation toolkit, Evilginx, intercepted the user’s credentials.
Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01), tous deux utilisés par codemado
Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01), tous deux utilisés par codemado
+4 more in the app. View in Mallory
Techniques & procedures
40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Proofpoint linked the activity to credential-phishing campaigns aimed at researchers... with lures designed to steal access to their cloud accounts.
Resource Development
4 techniques
Resource Development
Resource Development T1583.001: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains Star Blizzard registers domains to host their phishing framework.
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server (T1583.003)
ShinyHunters affiliates used VoIP based calling services including Twilio, Google Voice, and 3CX for vishing operations.
The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.
Initial Access
5 techniques
Initial Access
But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.
“What other tools, such as EvilGinx, let me attempt phishing playbooks...”
"...or the actor may embed a link in a document [T1566.001] on OneDrive, Google Drive, or other file-sharing platforms."
Once a recipient replied, TA419 sent a shortened link claiming to provide further information... the shortened links passed through attacker-controlled websites.
TA419's phishing chain targets Microsoft 365/Entra ID through the first-party OfficeHome application.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
Star Blizzard has used JavaScript to redirect victim traffic from an adversary controlled server to a server hosting the Evilginx phishing framework.
Pre-phish page requiring the visitor to click the download button before being redirected to the phishing page.
Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1204.003 Malicious Image Execution Default Configuration
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.
"...Evilginx...capture credentials and session cookies in real time, bypassing MFA."
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
The parameter name is randomly generated and its value consists of a random RC4 encryption key, checksum and a base64 encoded encrypted value of all embedded custom parameter. This ensures that the generated link is different every time, making it hard to write static detection signatures for.
For example, if a threat actor creates a phishing domain, goo-ink[.]online, emulating a Google domain, they can then append a URL structure, like adfs[.]llnl[.]gov ... in order to dupe a Lawrence Livermore National Lab employee into believing the link is legitimate.
But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.
Its operators used rotating domains, CAPTCHA challenges, browser fingerprinting, traffic filtering... to evade detection.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
"...Evilginx...capture credentials and session cookies in real time, bypassing MFA."
Credential Access
14 techniques
Credential Access
By inserting themselves directly into legitimate sign-in workflows, attackers can capture session cookies, authentication tokens, and multi-factor authentication (MFA)-protected access in real time...
The victim is redirected to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page that steals the victim's cloud account login information.
“A sophisticated credential-harvesting campaign has been targeting ScreenConnect cloud administrators… The hackers are targeting super-administrator credentials…”
Tools ... Hashcat ... EvilGinx
A custom module... automatically accepted “Keep me signed in” and submitted validated one-time codes.
saroula01 est l’auteur du fork black-queen d’Evilginx, spécialisé dans l’abus du Device Code Flow OAuth ... 97 tokens OAuth actifs avec autoRefresh: true
Proxy intercepts authenticated session cookies, storing stolen tokens for unauthorized tenant takeover.
CALISTO uses Evilginx on its VPS to capture the victim’s credentials.
"...Evilginx...capture credentials and session cookies in real time, bypassing MFA."
The phishing chain ... redirects the victim to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page. It is built on open source Frameless BitB ... [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.
Il déploie une plateforme AiTM complète sur picis.net ... Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01) ... T1557.002 — Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning (Credential Access)
The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.
A custom module, /secondary/observe.js, tracked each target’s progress through authentication. It also automatically accepted “Keep me signed in” and submitted validated one-time codes.
it’s also abused by threat actors for malicious credential harvesting and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Its operators used rotating domains, CAPTCHA challenges, browser fingerprinting, traffic filtering... to evade detection.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
It urged defenders to assume any actor can bypass MFA through session hijacking or Device Code Flow abuse
This allowed supported password and MFA steps to complete while the attacker captured the resulting session cookies.
Collection
9 techniques
Collection
By inserting themselves directly into legitimate sign-in workflows, attackers can capture session cookies, authentication tokens, and multi-factor authentication (MFA)-protected access in real time...
The victim is redirected to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page that steals the victim's cloud account login information.
“A sophisticated credential-harvesting campaign has been targeting ScreenConnect cloud administrators… The hackers are targeting super-administrator credentials…”
T1114 — Email Collection (Collection)
T1119 — Automated Collection (Collection)
Frameless BitB ... contains a Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) overlay [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.
The phishing chain ... redirects the victim to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page. It is built on open source Frameless BitB ... [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.
Il déploie une plateforme AiTM complète sur picis.net ... Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01) ... T1557.002 — Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning (Credential Access)
The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
From the main website, you’ll see a table where you can hunt for potential Command and Control (C2) servers listed in the feed.
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Proxy (T1090)
codemado / picis.net : AiTM M365 ... gateway anti-bot Node.js avec FingerprintJS2, tunnel Cloudflare ... T1090.002 — Proxy: External Proxy (Command and Control)
T1102 — Web Service (Command and Control)
Observables
263 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
45 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.