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Malware10 associated actors

EvilGinx

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days10 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors10Associated
ATT&CK40Techniques
IOCs263Tracked
Type
Trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingInitial access
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingAitm
Platforms
Cloud

Evilginx is an open-source adversary-in-the-middle phishing and adversary-emulation framework used in authorized penetration testing and malicious credential-harvesting operations. It acts as a reverse proxy between a victim’s browser and a legitimate authentication service, relaying live sign-in pages and authentication exchanges while capturing usernames, passwords, and authenticated session cookies. Service-specific configuration templates, known as phishlets, adapt the framework to different authentication flows. Operators can replay stolen session cookies to access accounts without repeating the intercepted login or MFA challenge. This can circumvent conventional MFA protections but does not inherently defeat phishing-resistant authentication.

Evilginx campaigns use phishing links, lookalike authentication domains, and targeted social-engineering lures to direct victims into proxied sign-in flows. Documented targets include Microsoft 365 and Entra ID accounts, university single sign-on portals, and ScreenConnect administrator accounts. The framework has been used by Russian state-linked actors Star Blizzard and LAUNDRY BEAR, financially motivated Scattered Spider, and the Qilin ransomware affiliate STAC4365. Its role is primarily credential theft, session hijacking, and initial access; subsequent mailbox theft, remote-access deployment, and ransomware execution are operator activities rather than inherent Evilginx functionality. Public forks extend or modify its phishing workflows.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

10 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Scattered Spider

The group's preferred initial access vectors continue to involve highly sophisticated social engineering, often combined with phishing campaigns utilizing typosquatted domains ... and tools like Evilginx to intercept credentials and session cookies.

via extrahopextrahop.com
TA419

Frameless BitB avoids iframes and supports Evilginx-based proxying of Microsoft login pages.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Star Blizzard

The group still runs password phishing with Evilginx, a tool that can also steal session cookies to get around two-factor authentication.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
LAUNDRY BEAR

Once a user entered their Microsoft credentials into this malicious site, LAUNDRY BEAR’s modified version of the open source adversary emulation toolkit, Evilginx, intercepted the user’s credentials.

via ic3 alertsic3.gov
saroula01

Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01), tous deux utilisés par codemado

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
mail-argenta

Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01), tous deux utilisés par codemado

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

Proofpoint linked the activity to credential-phishing campaigns aimed at researchers... with lures designed to steal access to their cloud accounts.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence4

Resource Development T1583.001: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains Star Blizzard registers domains to host their phishing framework.

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server (T1583.003)

T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

ShinyHunters affiliates used VoIP based calling services including Twilio, Google Voice, and 3CX for vishing operations.

T1588.002ToolEvidence3

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence9

But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.

T1566PhishingEvidence24

“What other tools, such as EvilGinx, let me attempt phishing playbooks...”

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"...or the actor may embed a link in a document [T1566.001] on OneDrive, Google Drive, or other file-sharing platforms."

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence17

Once a recipient replied, TA419 sent a shortened link claiming to provide further information... the shortened links passed through attacker-controlled websites.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence3

TA419's phishing chain targets Microsoft 365/Entra ID through the first-party OfficeHome application.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Star Blizzard has used JavaScript to redirect victim traffic from an adversary controlled server to a server hosting the Evilginx phishing framework.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Pre-phish page requiring the visitor to click the download button before being redirected to the phishing page.

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1204.003 Malicious Image Execution Default Configuration

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence9

But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"...Evilginx...capture credentials and session cookies in real time, bypassing MFA."

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence9

But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The parameter name is randomly generated and its value consists of a random RC4 encryption key, checksum and a base64 encoded encrypted value of all embedded custom parameter. This ensures that the generated link is different every time, making it hard to write static detection signatures for.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

For example, if a threat actor creates a phishing domain, goo-ink[.]online, emulating a Google domain, they can then append a URL structure, like adfs[.]llnl[.]gov ... in order to dupe a Lawrence Livermore National Lab employee into believing the link is legitimate.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence9

But today, attackers can pair AI-generated phishing with ‘MFA bypass kits,’ such as open-source Evilginx ... and the W3LL panel ... to deceive employees into handing over that ‘extra step’ of security.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Its operators used rotating domains, CAPTCHA challenges, browser fingerprinting, traffic filtering... to evade detection.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"...Evilginx...capture credentials and session cookies in real time, bypassing MFA."

Credential Access

14 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

By inserting themselves directly into legitimate sign-in workflows, attackers can capture session cookies, authentication tokens, and multi-factor authentication (MFA)-protected access in real time...

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

The victim is redirected to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page that steals the victim's cloud account login information.

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

“A sophisticated credential-harvesting campaign has been targeting ScreenConnect cloud administrators… The hackers are targeting super-administrator credentials…”

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Tools ... Hashcat ... EvilGinx

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence5

A custom module... automatically accepted “Keep me signed in” and submitted validated one-time codes.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

saroula01 est l’auteur du fork black-queen d’Evilginx, spécialisé dans l’abus du Device Code Flow OAuth ... 97 tokens OAuth actifs avec autoRefresh: true

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence32

Proxy intercepts authenticated session cookies, storing stolen tokens for unauthorized tenant takeover.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

CALISTO uses Evilginx on its VPS to capture the victim’s credentials.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"...Evilginx...capture credentials and session cookies in real time, bypassing MFA."

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence28

The phishing chain ... redirects the victim to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page. It is built on open source Frameless BitB ... [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.

T1557.002ARP Cache PoisoningEvidence2

Il déploie une plateforme AiTM complète sur picis.net ... Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01) ... T1557.002 — Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning (Credential Access)

T1557.003DHCP SpoofingEvidence4

The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationEvidence1

A custom module, /secondary/observe.js, tracked each target’s progress through authentication. It also automatically accepted “Keep me signed in” and submitted validated one-time codes.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence3

it’s also abused by threat actors for malicious credential harvesting and man-in-the-middle attacks.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Its operators used rotating domains, CAPTCHA challenges, browser fingerprinting, traffic filtering... to evade detection.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1550Use Alternate Authentication MaterialEvidence1

It urged defenders to assume any actor can bypass MFA through session hijacking or Device Code Flow abuse

T1550.004Web Session CookieEvidence8

This allowed supported password and MFA steps to complete while the attacker captured the resulting session cookies.

Collection

9 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

By inserting themselves directly into legitimate sign-in workflows, attackers can capture session cookies, authentication tokens, and multi-factor authentication (MFA)-protected access in real time...

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

The victim is redirected to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page that steals the victim's cloud account login information.

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

“A sophisticated credential-harvesting campaign has been targeting ScreenConnect cloud administrators… The hackers are targeting super-administrator credentials…”

T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

T1114 — Email Collection (Collection)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

T1119 — Automated Collection (Collection)

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence2

Frameless BitB ... contains a Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) overlay [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence28

The phishing chain ... redirects the victim to an attacker-in-the-middle (AitM) credential phishing page. It is built on open source Frameless BitB ... [and] an Evilginx phishlet to intercept usernames, passwords, and session cookies for Microsoft 365.

T1557.002ARP Cache PoisoningEvidence2

Il déploie une plateforme AiTM complète sur picis.net ... Evilginx forks : red-queen (mail-argenta), black-queen/master (saroula01) ... T1557.002 — Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning (Credential Access)

T1557.003DHCP SpoofingEvidence4

The attack combined adversary-in-the-middle, or AitM, phishing with a modified Frameless BitB toolkit... the proxy relayed the genuine Microsoft sign-in process while adding malicious scripts.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

From the main website, you’ll see a table where you can hunt for potential Command and Control (C2) servers listed in the feed.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

T1090ProxyEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Proxy (T1090)

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

codemado / picis.net : AiTM M365 ... gateway anti-bot Node.js avec FingerprintJS2, tunnel Cloudflare ... T1090.002 — Proxy: External Proxy (Command and Control)

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

T1102 — Web Service (Command and Control)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

263 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

45 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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ransom isac blogNews · Nov 17, 2026Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISACEvilginx-branded interfaces were observed on ten IP addresses across seven ASNs. The associated dashboard project supports management of phishing configurations, lure links and captured sessions, including cookies and tokens. The observed deployments’ backend functionality was not independently verified.Read more ↗spycloud blogNews · Nov 16, 2026Virtualine Goes Down, Remus and iAuthFlow Go After GmailMentioned as an example of an adversary-in-the-middle phishing framework that uses service-specific configuration templates to relay login traffic and capture session cookies and tokens. No involvement in the reported campaigns is established.Read more ↗sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Oct 20, 2026Microsoft Entra ID Enforces Mandatory Content Se | ShellcodeNamed as a reverse-proxy phishing framework that proxies legitimate authentication pages to capture credentials and authenticated session cookies, enabling attackers to bypass traditional MFA. The article claims Microsoft Entra ID's CSP enforcement disrupts its script-injection capabilities; that effectiveness is not independently established by the supplied content.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 1, 2026Chinese Hackers Posing as senior Anthropic employee Targeting US AI policy expertsA reverse-proxy phishing framework used here to relay legitimate Microsoft sign-in activity and facilitate theft of authenticated session cookies.Read more ↗
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IOC matching263Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors10Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping40Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.