ClipBanker
- Type
- Clipper
- Capabilities
- Crypto theftPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- PhishingMalspamCracked softwareSeo poisoningLure
- Platforms
- Windows
ClipBanker is Windows clipboard-hijacking malware designed to steal cryptocurrency by substituting attacker-controlled wallet addresses for addresses copied by victims. It continuously monitors clipboard contents, recognizes cryptocurrency address formats, and replaces matching strings so that subsequent transfers may be directed to the attacker. Supported currencies vary by variant; observed samples target Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero, and numerous other blockchain networks. This mechanism redirects transactions rather than requiring theft of wallet private keys.
ClipBanker is distributed through phishing attachments, counterfeit software installers, cracked-software download sites, and secondary payload delivery by malware such as CryptBot and Recordbreaker Stealer. It has also been deployed alongside DarkCloud. A trojanized Proxifier campaign used a malicious GitHub repository promoted through search results, displayed the legitimate installer while executing malicious stages, and ultimately injected the clipboard-hijacking payload into a legitimate Windows process. Crafted RAR archives exploiting the WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-8088 have also delivered ClipBanker into the Windows Startup folder.
Persistence varies across samples and infection chains, with observed mechanisms including Startup-folder execution, registry autoruns, and scheduled tasks. ClipBanker-associated activity has used ComputerDefaults execution hijacking to bypass User Account Control. Other delivery chains use in-memory PowerShell, registry-stored scripts, process injection, Microsoft Defender exclusions, and termination of analysis tools. These supporting mechanisms are not universal properties of the clipboard payload: some variants perform clipboard replacement without establishing their own persistence or communicating over the network.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Techniques & procedures
41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
Recently, we noticed a rather unique scheme for distributing malware that exploits SourceForge... Pages like that are well-indexed by search engines and appear in their search results.
A user searches for “Proxifier” on a popular search engine, and one of the top results points directly to the malicious GitHub repository ... The attackers have been actively pushing their malicious GitHub repository up through search engine results.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
The distribution method of the ClipBanker is through phishing emails or through social media posts that lure users to download malicious content.
Execution
9 techniques
Execution
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
Since June 17th, the C2s have been responding with settings value that downloads and runs additional malware besides libraries that will be used to steal information.
The ClipBanker uses PowerShell commands for executing malicious activities.
This file contains the password for the RAR archive. It also unpacks malicious files and runs the next-stage script.
The installer then executes an embedded Visual Basic script.
Many of the attack chains presented in this article rely on user interaction... users are manipulated through social engineering into willingly executing malicious commands copied to the clipboard.
When the attachment is uncompressed, normal users are likely to execute the contained malware as it is disguised with a PDF icon. The file attached to the email is a dropper that is responsible for generating and executing DarkCloud and ClipBanker.
Icon.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it Kape.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it... These scripts execute Input.exe (the AutoIt interpreter), passing the paths to Icon.dll and Kape.dll
Persistence
9 techniques
Persistence
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
The second part of the command sets a new value to the “ HKCU\Sofatwarte\cr” registry key
CreateProcess : this function allows the attacker to create a new process and its primary thread.
Then confvz creates services named NetworkConfiguration and PerformanceMonitor to autostart the batch files, and a service named Update to directly run the AutoIt interpreter
Using the built-in WMIC utility, an event filter is created to trigger a handler every 80 seconds... The handler executes the following command: ShellExperienceHost . exe -- ssl apap . app 445 - e cmd . exe
Additionally, as a backup autostart method, confvz adds this registry key: "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe" :: Debugger = "%WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe /c start start.exe"
In many cases, the malicious payload is placed in the startup folder to ensure persistence.
The decoded command ... used a Com-Object of “ Wscript.Shell ” to create a shortcut file (LNK) in the StartUp directory which is linked to the hysvc.exe payload.
Privilege Escalation
9 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
Icon.dll restarts the AutoIt interpreter and injects a miner into it, while Kape.dll does the same but injects ClipBanker.
CreateProcess : this function allows the attacker to create a new process and its primary thread.
Then confvz creates services named NetworkConfiguration and PerformanceMonitor to autostart the batch files, and a service named Update to directly run the AutoIt interpreter
Using the built-in WMIC utility, an event filter is created to trigger a handler every 80 seconds... The handler executes the following command: ShellExperienceHost . exe -- ssl apap . app 445 - e cmd . exe
Additionally, as a backup autostart method, confvz adds this registry key: "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe" :: Debugger = "%WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe /c start start.exe"
In many cases, the malicious payload is placed in the startup folder to ensure persistence.
The decoded command ... used a Com-Object of “ Wscript.Shell ” to create a shortcut file (LNK) in the StartUp directory which is linked to the hysvc.exe payload.
Stealth
12 techniques
Stealth
This vulnerability carries a high severity score of 8.4 and affects WinRAR on Windows operating systems due to a path traversal flaw.
The PowerShell command had ran with the following parameters: ... -e – EncodedCommand, allow to encode the command with base 64 format.
Attackers use the file pumping technique to inflate the file size by appending junk data. The file in question was padded with null bytes.
Moreover, the attacker tried to masquerade it with a legitimate name of “ GoogleChromUpdateTask”
Icon.dll restarts the AutoIt interpreter and injects a miner into it, while Kape.dll does the same but injects ClipBanker.
The script block contains a minimal JavaScript loader that implements a Base64 decoding function... The main function decodes and executes the embedded script.
The main purpose of this second trojan is to execute a malicious PowerShell command by running CMD.exe.
The tool is MSHTA, short for Microsoft HTML Application Host, a built-in Windows utility that can run scripts from local files and remote internet locations... Attackers have been using it to deliver some of today’s most harmful malware... All use MSHTA as a stepping stone during early or middle stages of infection.
the script checks for processes associated with antivirus software, security solutions, virtual environments, and research tools. If it detects anything like that, it deletes itself.
This was done after adding the malware’s folder to Windows Defender exclusions and applying hidden and system attributes to the file to hide it from regular users.
First, it sets the MSHTA window to 1x1 pixels, starts it minimized, and hides it from the taskbar to evade detection.
Icon.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it Kape.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it... These scripts execute Input.exe (the AutoIt interpreter), passing the paths to Icon.dll and Kape.dll
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
The second part of the command sets a new value to the “ HKCU\Sofatwarte\cr” registry key
This was done after adding the malware’s folder to Windows Defender exclusions and applying hidden and system attributes to the file to hide it from regular users.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
The attacker used USER.DLL to perform a keyboard monitoring (keylogging).
it aims to steal and record any type of sensitive information from the infected environment such as browser history, cookies, Outlook data, Skype, Telegram
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
The final API function that we have covered in this section is the GetUserName function that can be used by the attacker for enumeration and discovering actions.
the attack flow contains several stages of LOLBins (Living Off the Land) abuse, masquerading, persistency, enumeration techniques, credential thieving
the script checks for processes associated with antivirus software, security solutions, virtual environments, and research tools. If it detects anything like that, it deletes itself.
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
The main goal of this threat is to steal confidential information.
The attacker used USER.DLL to perform a keyboard monitoring (keylogging).
Scarab ransomware deploys a ClipBanker that monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallets, and changes them.
The downloaded archive contains another password-protected archive, installer.zip , and a Readme.txt file with the password.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The Clipbanker executable establishes a connection to the attacker’s Telegram server.
It also downloads and installs additional malware. The malware that is additionally downloaded is usually ClipBanker, but there have also been cases of other types of malware being distributed such as Formbook and SmokeLoader.
ShellExperienceHost.exe is the netcat executable from the malicious archive. The arguments above make the utility establish an encrypted connection with the C2 server apap[.]app on port 445 and launch a command-line interpreter with redirected input/output through that connection.
Observables
69 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
24 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.