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Malware1 associated CVE

ClipBanker

Tracked since Dec 4, 2025 · Updated 22 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs69Tracked
Type
Clipper
Capabilities
Crypto theftPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingMalspamCracked softwareSeo poisoningLure
Platforms
Windows

ClipBanker is Windows clipboard-hijacking malware designed to steal cryptocurrency by substituting attacker-controlled wallet addresses for addresses copied by victims. It continuously monitors clipboard contents, recognizes cryptocurrency address formats, and replaces matching strings so that subsequent transfers may be directed to the attacker. Supported currencies vary by variant; observed samples target Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero, and numerous other blockchain networks. This mechanism redirects transactions rather than requiring theft of wallet private keys.

ClipBanker is distributed through phishing attachments, counterfeit software installers, cracked-software download sites, and secondary payload delivery by malware such as CryptBot and Recordbreaker Stealer. It has also been deployed alongside DarkCloud. A trojanized Proxifier campaign used a malicious GitHub repository promoted through search results, displayed the legitimate installer while executing malicious stages, and ultimately injected the clipboard-hijacking payload into a legitimate Windows process. Crafted RAR archives exploiting the WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-8088 have also delivered ClipBanker into the Windows Startup folder.

Persistence varies across samples and infection chains, with observed mechanisms including Startup-folder execution, registry autoruns, and scheduled tasks. ClipBanker-associated activity has used ComputerDefaults execution hijacking to bypass User Account Control. Other delivery chains use in-memory PowerShell, registry-stored scripts, process injection, Microsoft Defender exclusions, and termination of analysis tools. These supporting mechanisms are not universal properties of the clipboard payload: some variants perform clipboard replacement without establishing their own persistence or communicating over the network.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-8088via jmp esp blogExploited in the wildWinRAR Archive Extraction Path Traversal Leading to Code ExecutionIn this blog post, I’ll be diving into the technical details of the WinRAR vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-8088. This vulnerability carries a high severity score of 8.4 and affects WinRAR on Windows operating systems due to a path traversal flaw. | RAR Sample with Clipbanker Malware The RAR archive contains text files and an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) linked to a Clipbanker executable. Upon extraction, the Clipbanker executable is placed in the Startup folder.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

Recently, we noticed a rather unique scheme for distributing malware that exploits SourceForge... Pages like that are well-indexed by search engines and appear in their search results.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

A user searches for “Proxifier” on a popular search engine, and one of the top results points directly to the malicious GitHub repository ... The attackers have been actively pushing their malicious GitHub repository up through search engine results.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The distribution method of the ClipBanker is through phishing emails or through social media posts that lure users to download malicious content.

Execution

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Since June 17th, the C2s have been responding with settings value that downloads and runs additional malware besides libraries that will be used to steal information.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

The ClipBanker uses PowerShell commands for executing malicious activities.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

This file contains the password for the RAR archive. It also unpacks malicious files and runs the next-stage script.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

The installer then executes an embedded Visual Basic script.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Many of the attack chains presented in this article rely on user interaction... users are manipulated through social engineering into willingly executing malicious commands copied to the clipboard.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

When the attachment is uncompressed, normal users are likely to execute the contained malware as it is disguised with a PDF icon. The file attached to the email is a dropper that is responsible for generating and executing DarkCloud and ClipBanker.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Icon.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it Kape.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it... These scripts execute Input.exe (the AutoIt interpreter), passing the paths to Icon.dll and Kape.dll

Persistence

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

The second part of the command sets a new value to the “ HKCU\Sofatwarte\cr” registry key

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

CreateProcess : this function allows the attacker to create a new process and its primary thread.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Then confvz creates services named NetworkConfiguration and PerformanceMonitor to autostart the batch files, and a service named Update to directly run the AutoIt interpreter

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

Using the built-in WMIC utility, an event filter is created to trigger a handler every 80 seconds... The handler executes the following command: ShellExperienceHost . exe -- ssl apap . app 445 - e cmd . exe

T1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionEvidence1

Additionally, as a backup autostart method, confvz adds this registry key: "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe" :: Debugger = "%WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe /c start start.exe"

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

In many cases, the malicious payload is placed in the startup folder to ensure persistence.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The decoded command ... used a Com-Object of “ Wscript.Shell ” to create a shortcut file (LNK) in the StartUp directory which is linked to the hysvc.exe payload.

Privilege Escalation

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Icon.dll restarts the AutoIt interpreter and injects a miner into it, while Kape.dll does the same but injects ClipBanker.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

CreateProcess : this function allows the attacker to create a new process and its primary thread.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Then confvz creates services named NetworkConfiguration and PerformanceMonitor to autostart the batch files, and a service named Update to directly run the AutoIt interpreter

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

Using the built-in WMIC utility, an event filter is created to trigger a handler every 80 seconds... The handler executes the following command: ShellExperienceHost . exe -- ssl apap . app 445 - e cmd . exe

T1546.012Image File Execution Options InjectionEvidence1

Additionally, as a backup autostart method, confvz adds this registry key: "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe" :: Debugger = "%WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe /c start start.exe"

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence6

In many cases, the malicious payload is placed in the startup folder to ensure persistence.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The decoded command ... used a Com-Object of “ Wscript.Shell ” to create a shortcut file (LNK) in the StartUp directory which is linked to the hysvc.exe payload.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1006Direct Volume AccessEvidence1

This vulnerability carries a high severity score of 8.4 and affects WinRAR on Windows operating systems due to a path traversal flaw.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The PowerShell command had ran with the following parameters: ... -e – EncodedCommand, allow to encode the command with base 64 format.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

Attackers use the file pumping technique to inflate the file size by appending junk data. The file in question was padded with null bytes.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

Moreover, the attacker tried to masquerade it with a legitimate name of “ GoogleChromUpdateTask”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Icon.dll restarts the AutoIt interpreter and injects a miner into it, while Kape.dll does the same but injects ClipBanker.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The script block contains a minimal JavaScript loader that implements a Base64 decoding function... The main function decodes and executes the embedded script.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

The main purpose of this second trojan is to execute a malicious PowerShell command by running CMD.exe.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2

The tool is MSHTA, short for Microsoft HTML Application Host, a built-in Windows utility that can run scripts from local files and remote internet locations... Attackers have been using it to deliver some of today’s most harmful malware... All use MSHTA as a stepping stone during early or middle stages of infection.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the script checks for processes associated with antivirus software, security solutions, virtual environments, and research tools. If it detects anything like that, it deletes itself.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

This was done after adding the malware’s folder to Windows Defender exclusions and applying hidden and system attributes to the file to hide it from regular users.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

First, it sets the MSHTA window to 1x1 pixels, starts it minimized, and hides it from the taskbar to evade detection.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Icon.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it Kape.dll Clean dynamic-link library with a compressed AutoIt script appended to it... These scripts execute Input.exe (the AutoIt interpreter), passing the paths to Icon.dll and Kape.dll

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

The second part of the command sets a new value to the “ HKCU\Sofatwarte\cr” registry key

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence4

This was done after adding the malware’s folder to Windows Defender exclusions and applying hidden and system attributes to the file to hide it from regular users.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The attacker used USER.DLL to perform a keyboard monitoring (keylogging).

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

it aims to steal and record any type of sensitive information from the infected environment such as browser history, cookies, Outlook data, Skype, Telegram

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The final API function that we have covered in this section is the GetUserName function that can be used by the attacker for enumeration and discovering actions.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

the attack flow contains several stages of LOLBins (Living Off the Land) abuse, masquerading, persistency, enumeration techniques, credential thieving

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the script checks for processes associated with antivirus software, security solutions, virtual environments, and research tools. If it detects anything like that, it deletes itself.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The main goal of this threat is to steal confidential information.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The attacker used USER.DLL to perform a keyboard monitoring (keylogging).

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence12

Scarab ransomware deploys a ClipBanker that monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallets, and changes them.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The downloaded archive contains another password-protected archive, installer.zip , and a Readme.txt file with the password.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The Clipbanker executable establishes a connection to the attacker’s Telegram server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

It also downloads and installs additional malware. The malware that is additionally downloaded is usually ClipBanker, but there have also been cases of other types of malware being distributed such as Formbook and SmokeLoader.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

ShellExperienceHost.exe is the netcat executable from the malicious archive. The arguments above make the utility establish an encrypted connection with the C2 server apap[.]app on port 445 and launch a command-line interpreter with redirected input/output through that connection.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

69 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

24 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching69Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.