ClipBanker is a Windows cryptocurrency clipboard-hijacking Trojan, commonly classified as a clipper. It continuously monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and substitutes attacker-controlled addresses when it identifies a supported wallet format, causing victim cryptocurrency transfers to be redirected to the attacker. Variants target numerous blockchain ecosystems, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero, Solana, TRON, Ripple, Litecoin, and others. ClipBanker is frequently deployed as a secondary payload by information stealers and loaders, including CryptBot, Recordbreaker Stealer, LummaC2, and BLISTER, and has also been delivered through trojanized software installers, malicious archives, fake software-download sites, phishing, and ClickFix-style social engineering. Observed variants establish persistence through Windows Startup-folder artifacts, registry autorun locations, or scheduled tasks. Some campaigns use PowerShell, MSHTA, in-memory execution, process injection, and security-product exclusions to evade detection before running the clipboard-monitoring payload. Victims have been observed globally, with campaigns particularly affecting cryptocurrency users.
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1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
In this blog post, I’ll be diving into the technical details of the WinRAR vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-8088. This vulnerability carries a high severity score of 8.4 and affects WinRAR on Windows operating systems due to a path traversal flaw. | RAR Sample with Clipbanker Malware The RAR archive contains text files and an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) linked to a Clipbanker executable. Upon extraction, the Clipbanker executable is placed in the Startup folder.
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
Since June 17th, the C2s have been responding with settings value that downloads and runs additional malware besides libraries that will be used to steal information.
The ClipBanker uses PowerShell commands for executing malicious activities.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
The second part of the command sets a new value to the “ HKCU\Sofatwarte\cr” registry key
CreateProcess : this function allows the attacker to create a new process and its primary thread.
Then confvz creates services named NetworkConfiguration and PerformanceMonitor to autostart the batch files, and a service named Update to directly run the AutoIt interpreter
Using the built-in WMIC utility, an event filter is created to trigger a handler every 80 seconds... The handler executes the following command: ShellExperienceHost . exe -- ssl apap . app 445 - e cmd . exe
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker.
CreateProcess : this function allows the attacker to create a new process and its primary thread.
Then confvz creates services named NetworkConfiguration and PerformanceMonitor to autostart the batch files, and a service named Update to directly run the AutoIt interpreter
Using the built-in WMIC utility, an event filter is created to trigger a handler every 80 seconds... The handler executes the following command: ShellExperienceHost . exe -- ssl apap . app 445 - e cmd . exe
This vulnerability carries a high severity score of 8.4 and affects WinRAR on Windows operating systems due to a path traversal flaw.
The PowerShell command had ran with the following parameters: ... -e – EncodedCommand, allow to encode the command with base 64 format.
Attackers use the file pumping technique to inflate the file size by appending junk data. The file in question was padded with null bytes.
Moreover, the attacker tried to masquerade it with a legitimate name of “ GoogleChromUpdateTask”
The main purpose of this second trojan is to execute a malicious PowerShell command by running CMD.exe.
The final API function that we have covered in this section is the GetUserName function that can be used by the attacker for enumeration and discovering actions.
The Clipbanker executable establishes a connection to the attacker’s Telegram server.
It also downloads and installs additional malware. The malware that is additionally downloaded is usually ClipBanker, but there have also been cases of other types of malware being distributed such as Formbook and SmokeLoader.
ShellExperienceHost.exe is the netcat executable from the malicious archive. The arguments above make the utility establish an encrypted connection with the C2 server apap[.]app on port 445 and launch a command-line interpreter with redirected input/output through that connection.
68 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
ClipBanker is referenced through a variant-associated malicious DLL, indicating clipboard hijacking or theft-oriented behavior in the broader payload set.
Crypto-stealing malware mentioned only in related content.
Стилер, обнаруженный на рабочей станции пользователя; закреплялся через реестр Windows, добавлялся в исключения Защитника Windows и маскировался атрибутами hidden/system.
A data stealer variant observed persisting via a Windows Run registry key after adding its folder to Windows Defender exclusions and hiding the file with hidden/system attributes.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.