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LoJax is a Windows-targeting UEFI firmware rootkit and bootkit publicly identified in 2018 as the first known UEFI rootkit observed in the wild. It has been attributed to the Sednit threat group, also tracked as APT28, Fancy Bear, and Sofacy, and was used in espionage operations following an initial remote compromise of victim systems. Rather than relying on physical access or supply-chain tampering, LoJax was deployed post-compromise to obtain persistence below the operating system.
LoJax achieves persistence by modifying SPI flash firmware and inserting a malicious unsigned DXE driver, commonly identified as SecDxe, into UEFI firmware. The implant executes during the DXE phase through a ReadyToBoot callback, before the operating system bootloader runs. It targets systems with insecure firmware configurations, including cases where Secure Boot is disabled or misconfigured and where SPI flash protections are insufficient. Reporting also associates its installation chain with abuse of a legitimate low-level hardware access driver from RWEverything to inspect firmware protections, dump SPI contents, and rewrite modified firmware.
A notable feature of LoJax is its embedded NTFS-capable DXE component, derived from previously leaked code, which allows the firmware implant to access Windows partitions during early boot. From firmware, it drops a kernel-mode component disguised with a non-driver extension and a user-mode service payload onto disk before normal OS startup completes. The kernel component prepares persistence for the user-mode agent by modifying Windows startup behavior, including BootExecute-related registry settings and service-related configuration, enabling the user-mode payload to run as a long-lived command-and-control agent after boot.
LoJax is significant because it spans firmware, boot, kernel, and user mode in a layered persistence chain. This architecture allows it to survive operating system reinstallation and, in SPI-resident cases, even disk replacement. Its purpose is stealthy, durable post-exploitation access rather than commodity crimeware activity, and it is widely regarded as a landmark example of real-world firmware malware used by a state-linked espionage actor.
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1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
The same executable disables the BIOS write protections before the firmware modification by just changing the BIOS control register or exploiting known vulnerabilities like VU#766164, CVE-2017-3197 (potentically) if needed. | TAU analyzed the known UEFI bootkit samples in the wild (LoJax, MosaicRegressor, and TrickBoot) and summarized the characteristics... Only LoJax has both.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
2018-09-01 ⋅ ESET Research ⋅ LoJax: First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values. Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries. APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.
After a bootkit installation, the bootkit execution starts with DXE drivers in all cases. The drivers register a callback to intercept the EFI_EVENT_GROUP_READY_TO_BOOT event. The interception enables attackers to take control before the OS bootloader runs.
“LoJax: First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group” and “First STRONTIUM UEFI Rootkit Unveiled”.
На данный момент мы можем выделить два вектора атаки на UEFI-платформу: перепрошивка SPI и модификация менеджера загрузки.
The Service Control Manager is not directly abused; instead, it legitimately launches rpcnetp.exe during the normal service startup sequence initiated by wininit.exe, based on service registry configuration prepared earlier by autoche.exe.
LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk *’ to ‘autocheck autoche *’ in order to execute its payload during Windows startup. ... HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager autocheck autochk *
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
В случае LoJax в основу подхода по компрометации легла эксплуатация уязвимости race condition.
The Service Control Manager is not directly abused; instead, it legitimately launches rpcnetp.exe during the normal service startup sequence initiated by wininit.exe, based on service registry configuration prepared earlier by autoche.exe.
LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk *’ to ‘autocheck autoche *’ in order to execute its payload during Windows startup. ... HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager autocheck autochk *
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
ReSetfTA.efi : UEFI application resetting the infection marker for debug
Чтобы взаимодействовать c PCI-устройством, LoJax использует драйвер в составе утилиты Read & Write Everything ... она имеет подписанный легитимный драйвер, который как раз и использовали разработчики LoJax.
After a bootkit installation, the bootkit execution starts with DXE drivers in all cases. The drivers register a callback to intercept the EFI_EVENT_GROUP_READY_TO_BOOT event. The interception enables attackers to take control before the OS bootloader runs.
“LoJax: First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group” and “First STRONTIUM UEFI Rootkit Unveiled”.
Compromising the Management Engine of a system would have considerable value on its own, but the leaks show that the group is using the unique privileges of the ME firmware as a way to gain indirect access to the UEFI/BIOS, drop additional payloads, and gain runtime control of the system below the operating system using System Management Mode (SMM).
32 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, associated with Sednit/APT28.
A real-world UEFI bootkit discovered in 2018, repurposed from LoJack anti-theft software and installed remotely by overwriting parts of UEFI firmware flash memory.
UEFI-level implant/rootkit that adds a DXE module to firmware for persistence across OS reinstallation and disk replacement, dropping an agent to disk on each boot.
UEFI bootkit referenced as detectable by the Peacock UEFI attestation/monitoring framework; no additional details provided here.
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Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.