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Malware1 associated actor

FunnyDream

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK45Techniques
IOCs54Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Platforms
Windows

FunnyDream is a Windows backdoor and modular cyberespionage toolset used for persistent access, surveillance, and information theft. It has been deployed against government-sector organizations in Southeast Asia in operations observed from November 2018 through 2020, alongside Chinoxy and modified PcShare malware. FunnyDream is associated with the China-linked espionage group BRONZE EDGEWOOD, also known as Red Hariasa.

The backdoor supports remote shells, command execution, file upload and download, directory listing, file execution, and user-information collection. It can use Windows Management Instrumentation to launch a command shell on a remote machine, supporting lateral movement. Command-and-control communications support TCP and UDP, with some samples using HTTP or SOCKS proxies. Certain variants disguise XOR-obfuscated, zLib-compressed communications within HTTP-formatted traffic and retrieve proxy settings from the Windows Registry.

Collection components monitor document changes, gather Office documents and PDFs, capture screenshots, record keystrokes, and stage collected information in local archives. FilePakMonitor detects removable-drive insertion and collects matching files from attached media. Persistence mechanisms include Run registry entries, Startup-folder execution, and automatically starting services. FilePakMonitor also abuses phantom DLL hijacking in the Windows Search service to execute with SYSTEM privileges and has attempted injection into a Bkav antivirus process. Other evasion behaviors include identifying Bkav processes, programmatically dismissing antivirus dialogs, and deleting deployment traces. FunnyDream has been deployed through compromised domain-controller shares; its initial infection vector is not established.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BRONZE EDGEWOOD

BRONZE EDGEWOOD ... Tools ... Chinoxy, Cobalt Strike, FunnyDream, Md_client, Nishang Post Exploitation Framework, PCShare, Zuguo

via secureworkssecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

45 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence2

Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting.

Execution

4 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence5

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use WMI to open a Windows command shell on a remote machine.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence5

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use `cmd.exe` for execution on remote hosts.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use Native API for defense evasion, discovery, and collection.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use com objects identified with `CLSID_ShellLink`(`IShellLink` and `IPersistFile`) and `WScript.Shell`(`RegWrite` method) to enable persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has established persistence by running `sc.exe` and by setting the `WSearch` service to run automatically.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use a Registry Run Key and the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence3

The [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) FilepakMonitor component can inject into the Bka.exe process using the `VirtualAllocEx`, `WriteProcessMemory` and `CreateRemoteThread` APIs to load the DLL component.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has established persistence by running `sc.exe` and by setting the `WSearch` service to run automatically.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use a Registry Run Key and the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can Base64 encode its C2 address stored in a template binary with the `xyz0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw_-` or `xyz0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw_=` character sets.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has used a service named `WSearch` for execution.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence3

The [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) FilepakMonitor component can inject into the Bka.exe process using the `VirtualAllocEx`, `WriteProcessMemory` and `CreateRemoteThread` APIs to load the DLL component.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence5

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has the ability to clean traces of malware deployment.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence8

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can delete files including its dropper component.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use `rundll32` for execution of its components.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

The [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) Keyrecord component can capture keystrokes.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Discovery

14 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence4

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has the ability to discover application windows via execution of `EnumWindows`.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can check `Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings` to extract the `ProxyServer` string.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence6

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can parse the `ProxyServer` string in the Registry to discover http proxies.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence4

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can collect information about hosts on the victim network.(Citation: Kaspersky APT Trends Q1 2020)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence7

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has the ability to gather user information from the targeted system using `whoami/upn&whoami/fqdn&whoami/logonid&whoami/all`.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence6

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has the ability to discover processes, including `Bka.exe` and `BkavUtil.exe`.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

Several entries describe identifying whether the current user has admin privileges, determining privilege level, identifying groups the user belongs to, or verifying execution as SYSTEM.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence9

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can identify files with .doc, .docx, .ppt, .pptx, .xls, .xlsx, and .pdf extensions and specific timestamps for collection.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence7

The [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) FilepakMonitor component can detect removable drive insertion.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence4

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can check system time to help determine when changes were made to specified files.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence5

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can identify the processes for Bkav antivirus.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can enumerate all logical drives on a targeted machine.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.003Distributed Component Object ModelEvidence1

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda used WMI for lateral movement in victim environments,' 'Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement,' and 'Cinnamon Tempest has used Impacket for lateral movement via WMI.'

Collection

9 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence5

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can upload files from victims' machines.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky APT Trends Q1 2020)

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence4

The [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) FilePakMonitor component has the ability to collect files from removable devices.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

The [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) Keyrecord component can capture keystrokes.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can stage collected information including screen captures and logged keystrokes locally.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

The [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) ScreenCap component can take screenshots on a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence4

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can monitor files for changes and automatically collect them.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1560.002Archive via LibraryEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has compressed collected files with zLib.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1560.003Archive via Custom MethodEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) has compressed collected files with zLib and encrypted them using an XOR operation with the string key from the command line or `qwerasdf` if the command line argument doesn’t contain the key. File names are obfuscated using XOR with the same key as the compressed file content.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can send compressed and obfuscated packets to C2.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1090ProxyEvidence4

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can identify and use configured proxies in a compromised network for C2 communication.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence2

"APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications." / "BADCALL functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server." / "Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic..."

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can communicate with C2 over TCP and UDP.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can download additional files onto a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence3

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can connect to HTTP proxies via TCP to create a tunnel to C2.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can execute commands, including gathering user information, and send the results to C2.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

54 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching54Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping45Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.